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Abstract
Many philosophers have held that perceptual experience is fundamentally a 
matter of perceivers being in particular representational states. Such states are 
said to have representational content, i.e. accuracy or veridicality conditions, 
capturing the way that things, according to that experience, appear to be. In this 
thesis I argue that the case against representationalism — the view that 
perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational — that is 
set out in Charles Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004) constitutes a 
powerful, but much misunderstood and neglected argument against this 
prevailing philosophical orthodoxy.
 In chapter 2, I present an interpretation of Travis’s arguments that poses a 
dilemma for the representationalist concerning the indeterminacy and 
availability of perceptual content. Chapters 3 and 4 evaluate a variety of 
arguments in favour of such content based upon the nature of appearances, or 
‘looks’, including those by Byrne (2009), Siegel (2010) and Schellenberg 
(2011b), each of which I find to be problematic. Finally, chapters 5 and 6 
examine the relationship between representational content and phenomenal 
character, i.e. what perceptual experience is subjectively like, outlining some 
potential responses to Travis’s anti-representationalism. These include the 
external individuation of content and self-knowledge, and the operation of 
perceptual discriminatory capacities, the latter of which does not necessarily 
favour a representationalist account of experience.
 I conclude that Travis’s arguments establish substantive constraints upon the 
nature and role of perceptual content. Moreover, I argue that the debate centres 
less upon the existence of such content than its explanatory role, particularly in 
relation to phenomenal character and the contents of other mental states: belief, 
intention, thought, knowledge, and so on. This in turn highlights the need for 
representationalists to better clarify the role of the contents their theories posit, 
and why such theories constitute a better explanation of the relevant 
phenomena than the corresponding non-representational view.
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1. Introduction
Representationalism & anti-representationalism
1.1. Background
The notion that perceptual experience is representational or has representational 
content has become something close to orthodoxy in recent philosophy of 
perception. Drawing upon the notions of belief and thought, philosophers have 
sought to characterise perceptual experience in terms of its ‘content’, or how, in 
experience, a perceiving subject ‘represents’ the world as being. An alternative 
philosophical tradition, however, sees perceptual experience as being essentially 
presentational. That is, to perceive something consists in being immediately and 
directly acquainted with some mind-independent object and its properties. To 
the extent that this presentational view is incompatible with the more formal 
notion of representation — and it is not clear that they are incompatible — some 
of its advocates are concerned to argue that there is no need, or room, for the 
notion of representation in a philosophical account of perceptual experience. It 
is, to borrow an image from Wittgenstein (1953: §271), a wheel that may be 
turned, but that does not form part of the mechanism.1 Indeed, some doubt the 
very coherence of the representationalist account.
 This divergence of views may be traced back at least as far as David Hume, 
who famously argued that the objects of perception cannot be the familiar 
mind-independent objects of the physical world, but are rather ideas or ‘sense 
impressions’ in the mind (Hume 1999: XII.i, 201). Whilst few modern-day 
philosophers would endorse Hume’s ‘argument from illusion’ for the conclusion 
that the objects of perception are mental and not physical in nature,2 the above 
views can be seen as offering different responses to the challenge it presents. The 
presentational view rejects Hume’s argument from illusion as unsound,3 instead 
1 A comment that is echoed by Travis (2004: 86).
2 Robinson (1994) being a notable exception.
3 Cf. Reid 1997: VI.xxii, 186; Snowdon 1990.
characterising perception as having an ‘act–object’ structure in which the subject 
is directly confronted by, or acquainted with, external objects and/or their 
properties. This yields a relational conception of experience according to which 
perception cannot be explained in terms of anything that omits either of its 
relata (e.g. representation). The representational view, on the other hand, 
accepts Hume’s contention that perception cannot be accounted for in terms of 
the presentation of external objects alone. Unlike Hume’s ‘ideas’, however, 
representational contents are not themselves perceived, but rather are a way of 
capturing the connection between perceptual subjects and objects in a 
metaphysically neutral way — something that many advocates of the 
presentational view consider to be either misguided or impossible. The precise 
reasons for thinking that subjects perceive the world by representing it (albeit 
more or less distinctly) to be some particular way, however, are less than clear, 
and have become a matter of considerable dispute within the literature.
 In this thesis, I aim to contribute to this debate by articulating and 
evaluating a series of challenges to the view that perceptual experiences have 
specific representational contents, and consequently whether representation is a 
necessary condition for perception. In particular, I examine a number of 
arguments arising from Charles Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (Travis 
2004) that purport to show that there is no role for the notion of representation 
in a philosophical account of perceptual experience. If sound, these arguments 
present a direct challenge to the representationalist strand of Hume’s legacy, 
which has often — somewhat misleadingly in my view — been placed in 
opposition to a so-called relational view of experience. According to the 
relational view (of which there are many variants), perceptual experience is not 
most fundamentally a matter of representing the world to be some way, but of 
standing in a particular relation — the perceptual relation  (Crane 2006)— to the 
mind-independent objects of experience. It is therefore fundamentally 
presentational in character. Supporters of such a view include Charles Travis 
(ibid; forthcoming), John Campbell (2002), M.  G.  F. Martin (2002b) and Bill 
Brewer (2011), all of whom deny that the notion of representation plays a 
fundamental role, or in some cases any role at all, in a philosophical account of 
perceptual experience.
 In what follows, I examine the effectiveness of Travis’s arguments in ruling 
out various forms and accounts of representational content in order to clarify 
both (i)   the nature of the challenge to the representational view, and (ii) the 
extent to which this supports a non-representational view of perceptual 
experience. I conclude that the arguments set out in chapter 2 below present a 
serious and important challenge to the prevailing representationalist orthodoxy 
— one that has yet to be adequately addressed by its advocates. Moreover, these 
arguments offer a means of framing the debate in terms of the theoretical 
commitments and explanatory role of representational content — in particular 
its role in explaining the subjective phenomenological character of experience — 
in a way that helps to clarify the various issues at stake. Thus, instead of the 
potentially misleading dichotomy between ‘representational’ and 
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‘presentational’, or relational, views of experience we find that there are (at 
least) two distinct roles that representational contents are thought to play, one 
of which turns out to be highly problematic. Thus, not only do Travis’s 
arguments rule out many otherwise seemingly plausible accounts of 
representational content (chapters 3 and 4), but they also present a challenge to 
the representational theory’s ability to account for how we are able to recognise, 
or come to know, the representational contents of experience (chapters 5 and 6). 
Indeed, the issue of recognisability, as I will call it, turns out to lie at the heart of 
the debate.
1.2. Perceptual Experience and Representation
Before providing an overview of the various arguments and chapters of my 
thesis below, it will be useful to first establish some terminology concerning the 
concepts to which it relates. Foremost amongst these are the notions of 
perceptual experience, phenomenal character and representational content.
1.2.1. Perceptual experience
The term ‘perception’, at least as it applies to the present debate, refers to 
sensory perception: touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing, and so on. It is therefore 
distinct from what might be called, in a more general sense, mere perception, as 
this term is sometimes used to emphasise the subjectivity of human belief or 
experience. Nevertheless, there is a distinctively subjective aspect to sensory 
perception in terms of the subjective character of the experiences that individual 
perceptual subjects enjoy, or what I will call their phenomenal character (1.2.2). 
 In the sense in which I use the term below, an experience is a perceptual 
episode in one or more sense modalities that occurs to some individual subject 
and is of some determinate duration.4 Such token (i.e. particular) occurrences of 
experiences might more properly be called ‘experiencings’, since the term 
‘experience’ is potentially ambiguous between a general experience-type (a 
universal) and its particular instantiations. Nevertheless, I do not propose to 
take a stand on this issue here. Similarly, in referring to (perceptual) experience 
simpliciter, I do not mean to exclude the possibility of other types of 
experiences, such as thinkings, feelings, imaginings, and so on. Since this thesis 
is primarily concerned with the philosophy of perception, however, I will use the 
term ‘experience’ to refer to perceptual experience throughout, except where 
otherwise noted.
 Somewhat unfortunately, philosophers have tended to take visual perceptual 
experience to be paradigmatic of perceptual experience in general. This is 
perhaps due to its rich and complex structure, which is more obviously 
amenable to introspection than, say, touch or smell. Alternatively, it may be 
because out of all the external senses, vision most obviously seems to connect us 
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4 I will remain neutral on the question of whether experiences can be literally instantaneous, 
or must be of non-zero duration, though philosophical considerations concerning our 
experience of the time and change point to the latter (Gallagher 1998).
with external objects in a — at least prima facie — peculiarly immediate and 
direct way. Ironically, these very features may be what sets vision apart from the 
other senses as something of a special case, at least in terms of its complexity, 
though each of these points can to a greater or lesser extent also be said to apply 
to other sensory modalities. Indeed, many advocates of representational content, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, take their accounts to generalise more or less 
unproblematically across the senses. For present purposes, however, I will 
follow philosophical convention in taking visual experiences to be at least 
illustrative of perceptual experience in general, if not paradigmatically so. As 
such, none of the main arguments I give below are intended to be peculiar to 
vision. In cases where particular senses — smell, touch, proprioception, etc. — 
may be thought to pose particular difficulties or problems, I will set these to one 
side to concentrate on the more general point. It is a substantive question, 
however, to what extent both representational and relational theories of 
perception apply to each of the sense modalities, as well as to the multi-sensory 
nature of perceptual experience as a whole. These, however, are not problems I 
consider in detail here.
 There exists a further issue concerning whether ‘perception’ and its 
cognates, as well as ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’ and so on, should be taken as success 
terms. Some philosophers, as well as many non-philosophers, use perceptual 
terms to denote only genuine (i.e. non-deviant or illusory) perceptual episodes. 
On this usage, a subject’s ‘seeing’ a tree, for example, entails the existence of the 
tree that is seen. Or, to put the point another way, if there were no such tree, 
then they could not have seen it. On another usage of ‘seeing’, however, one 
might be said to ‘see’ a dagger even though one is exposed to no such object — 
when experiencing a hallucination, for example. This use of ‘seeing’ is neutral 
about the existence of its objects, instead answering to the disjunctive criterion 
that either the perceptual episode is a genuine perceptual seeing (i.e. that there is 
such an object) or it is subjectively indistinguishable from such an experience 
(e.g. it is a hallucination or imagining). What goes for ‘seeing’ also goes for 
(mere) ‘perceiving’ such that many philosophers take sensory imaginings or 
hallucinations to be cases of perceptual experience, as opposed to some other 
kind of experience that is merely subjectively indistinguishable from it. On this 
terminological point, I take ‘perception’ and ‘experience’ to be committed to the 
existence of the objects or properties to which they refer; i.e. they are success 
terms. In deference to common usage, however, I will extend the term 
‘perceptual experience’ to include hallucinations and other perception-like 
episodes, and not only genuine (i.e. appropriately caused veridical) perceivings. 
This should not be taken to beg important philosophical questions concerning 
whether hallucinations and genuine perception are of the same psychological 
kind — a point that disjunctivists deny.5  However, for convenience and 
consistency with the literature it will be useful to group all such experiences 
under a single heading.
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5  Hinton (1973), Snowdon (1990; 2005), McDowell (1982; 1986), Martin (2002; 2004; 
2006).
1.2.2. Phenomenal character
It is intuitively evident that perceptual experiences have a certain subjective 
aspect that constitutes (or can constitute) part of the subject’s conscious state. I 
will call this its phenomenal character. The phenomena in question are perfectly 
familiar ones and reflect the sense in which, for example, the experience of a red 
tomato differs from that of a green one, or the feel of a rough surface differs 
from the feel of a smooth surface, and so on. This may variously be described as 
‘subjective character’, ‘phenomenology’, ‘what it’s like’, ‘raw feel’, and so on, 
and is no doubt due to some combination of the qualities of the relevant 
experience, its objects, and the particular sensations that they evoke. The precise 
definition and explanatory role of phenomenal character, however, are 
contentious — indeed, this turns out to be one of the central issues in the present 
debate (chapters 5, 6). Some theorists reject the idea that perceptual experiences 
have any additional qualitative aspect over and above their content, whether 
this be representational or object-involving. Nevertheless, it is important to 
mark the role that phenomenal character plays both in conscious experience and 
in philosophical accounts of perception more generally.
 For present purposes, I take the term ‘phenomenal character’ to be neutral 
both between the various metaphysical accounts of it (e.g. Naïve Realist or 
representational) as well as between what is subjectively distinguishable to the 
subject having the experience and what M. G. F. Martin (2002a: 186) has called 
its ‘phenomenal nature’. Some philosophers take it as definitional that two 
experiences which are subjectively indistinguishable from one another — e.g. a 
genuine perception and a qualitatively matching hallucination or illusion — have 
the same (i.e. type-identical) phenomenal character. Others, notably Martin and 
other Naïve Realists, argue that an experience’s phenomenal character extends 
beyond what is discriminable to the subject so that two qualitatively matching 
experiences may possess differing phenomenal characters, the precise nature of 
which may not be apparent to the subject. For the avoidance of confusion, I 
take phenomenal character to include at least what is discriminable to the 
subject in terms of the subjectively distinguishable phenomenology of perceptual 
experience, but that it may extend to aspects of experience that are not readily 
available to introspection.6  Thus, according to this usage, an experience’s 
phenomenal character may, though need not, outstrip what is subjectively 
distinguishable to the subject of the relevant experience.
1.2.3. Representational content
Since I will be considering whether experiences have representational content, it 
is important to be clear about what does and does not constitute 
‘representation’ in this context. Paradigm cases of representation include: man-
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6 The term ‘introspection’ is another somewhat unfortunate term of art, suggesting as it does 
a perception-like faculty for gaining self-knowledge concerning the contents of one’s 
experience. For present purposes I take this term to be synonymous with first-personal 
reflection upon experience without prejudicing the nature of, or processes involved in, self-
reflection (cf. 6.3.2).
made artefacts such as photographs, which represent the visible appearances of 
objects; maps, which represent spatial and geographical features; and language, 
which represents the content of thoughts and discourse. Representations are 
standardly thought to admit of a content–vehicle distinction such that wherever 
we find representation, we find both representational vehicles — photos, maps, 
utterances, etc. — and representational contents, i.e. what is represented by those 
vehicles. It is therefore of the essence of representation that what does the 
representing  is logically distinct from what is being represented — in this case the 
objects and properties of perception.7
 Applying the notion of representation to the realm of mental phenomena is 
notoriously problematic, but typically involves the attribution of content to a 
series of representational vehicles that includes the brain and central nervous 
system.8 It is a substantive philosophical question whether the vehicles of mental 
representation and content are limited to the brain and body or whether they 
extend to features of the subject’s physical or linguistic environment. This 
question has particular implications in the philosophy of perception, this being 
the faculty (if any) by which subjects become aware of, or are connected to, 
their surrounding environment, thereby creating the possibility of objective 
thought. Indeed, the ability of our perceptual faculties to ground thought and 
knowledge is one of the issues that drives much of the present debate. According 
to various forms of semantic externalism, the content of mental representations 
not only supervene upon the subject’s bodily state, but also upon aspects of their 
environment (Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975; Burge 1979, 1986). Similarly, various 
forms of vehicle externalism attribute a representation-bearing role to objects 
and events beyond the subject’s physical body (Hurley 1998: ch. 8). Again, I will 
not take a stance on these issues here except insofar as they impact upon the 
status and role of representational content in perception (chapters 5 and 6). My 
thesis, however, concerns the contents of perceptual experiences rather than 
their vehicles as I take the precise nature of the latter to be a primarily empirical 
question. The nature of perceptual content, however, is not necessarily 
something that can be settled solely by scientific investigation since it also 
concerns the function(s) and explanatory role(s) of such content in accounting 
for a subject’s mental life, thought and behaviour. There is also, as I discuss in 
chapters 2, 6 and elsewhere, room for the idea that experiences may have 
multiple contents, each fulfilling a different explanatory role (cf. Chalmers 
2006; Crane forthcoming). This approach is not, however, immune to the 
criticisms set out below (2.2.2).
 Central to the notion of representation and the content–vehicle distinction is 
the idea of one thing varying in accordance with another, or covariance. 
Contrary to Berkeley, as Reid (1977: V.xiii, 74) pointed out, there is no need for 
mental representations to literally resemble their contents — indeed, the idea 
seems absurd. My belief that I am seeing a red rose is not itself red, nor is it a 
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7  A notable exception is Sedivy (2004), who has questioned whether this distinction is 
applicable to mental representation.
8 Unless otherwise noted, by ‘content’ I mean representational content.
rose, and so on. The relevant covariance must therefore take place across 
different qualities, such as correspondence between the perceptible attributes of 
some external object and the firing patterns of neuronal assemblies in the optic 
nerve and brain, for example. Such covariance is not, however, sufficient for 
representation in the sense that is relevant here. In order for there to be 
representation, there must also be the possibility of misrepresentation such that 
the relevant content can either be accurate or inaccurate. For example, if I think 
that some actual violets are red when they are in fact blue, then my thought 
does not accurately represent the world, and is therefore non-veridical, or false. 
Conversely, when the conditions specified by my mental content are satisfied, 
then my thought can be said to be an accurate representation, and so is 
veridical, or true. The notion that content entails a series of accuracy or 
veridicality conditions is central to the notion of representation outlined here, 
though the precise nature of these conditions is open to debate. Any notion of 
content that rejects this entailment is therefore not a form of representation in 
the sense that I mean here, but rather relates to a more generic use of the term to 
mean what a perception (thought, belief, etc.) is of — or what I shall call its 
objects.9
 Complications arise when we consider that even representational contents 
which are satisfied, and so veridical, can be the result of deviant perceptual 
experiences — the direct stimulation of the brain via electrodes, or perceptual 
hallucinations, for example. In such cases, even though the content of the 
experience may be accurate, the mental state that bears that content is not 
related to its objects in the appropriate way, yielding a subjectively matching 
hallucination.10  Thus, whilst genuine perception (i.e. not including perceptual 
illusions and hallucination) is by definition veridical, not all veridical (in the 
present sense) perceptual experiences are genuine perceptions. According to the 
representational view, then, a perceptual state must both (a) possess 
representational content whose accuracy conditions are satisfied, and (b) be 
appropriately related — whether causally or otherwise — to the objects that 
make the content veridical in order to constitute genuine perception.11 
Opponents of the view deny that any such characterisation can be given. For 
present purposes, however, I will differentiate between veridicality, meaning 
accuracy or satisfaction of content, and types of experience — perception, 
hallucination, illusion, and so on.
 The above conditions on representational states — the content–vehicle 
distinction, the ability to misrepresent, veridicality — rule out a large number of 
ostensible cases as being representational in the appropriate sense. These 
include, though are not limited to:
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9 Cf. Martin forthcoming a: ch. 2.
10 Sometimes called a ‘veridical hallucination’; e.g. Johnston 2006: 273.
11  Siegel (2010: 36) calls these conditions ‘weak veridicality’ and ‘strong veridicality’, 
respectively, where the latter entails the former. However, this terminology is potentially 
misleading as it places what are arguably two quite different kinds of conditions under the 
same banner.
(i) Causal traces, such as tree rings, which are sometimes said to ‘represent’ 
the age of the tree. Here, ‘representation’ is synonymous with mere 
causal correlation since, in the normal case, the number of rings 
correspond to the age of the tree in years. However, as Travis (2004: 58–
59) points out, this cannot be considered representation in the stronger 
sense since we would not say that number of rings misrepresented (i.e. 
represented falsely) the tree’s age where the number of rings did not so 
correspond. Similarly, the mere activity of neurons in the brain or 
nervous system — for example in the retina or visual cortex — in response 
to external stimuli is insufficient for representation, though under 
appropriate circumstances such activity may constitute vehicles of 
representations. Such stimulus–response patterns are merely causal traces 
of external events and interactions that, whilst they may carry 
information, do not amount to representation unless part of a more 
complex intensional system.12  Rather, such traces indicate or are 
factively correlated with their immediate or distal causes.
(ii) Stand-ins, markers or proxies such as a piece in a board game or a pin in 
a map. In the final case, such a marker may be said to ‘represent’ a 
location of some real-world object or geographical feature that 
corresponds to its position on the map. However, strictly speaking, it is 
the location of the marker within the representational system of the map 
that represents a geographical location, and not the marker itself. Such a 
marker does not represent a real world object unless it depicts it in some 
literal sense — as a picture of church depicts a church, for example. 
Similarly, a piece in a board game does not represent the player in the 
sense that is relevant here, but rather serves as a proxy whose location, 
rather than the marker or piece itself, represents that player’s location in 
the game. Again, such ‘stand-ins’ may form part of, or draw upon the 
representational properties of, a more complex representational system, 
but they do not themselves represent in the sense of ‘representation’ that 
is relevant here.
Whilst it is commonplace to talk about each of the above examples as forms of 
‘representation’, they are not the kinds of representation that theorists take to 
constitute mental representation. This is perhaps better captured by the 
philosophical notion of intentionality or aboutness, i.e. intentional directedness 
towards some object or property which that state or content is about. Indeed, 
since all other kinds of representation, whether directly or indirectly, owe their 
representational status to some form of mental representation, the notion of 
intentionality may be thought to have a certain kind of priority or privileged 
status within the debate about representational content.
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12  In neuroscience and other scientific literature, ‘representation’ is often used to denote just 
this sort of information carrying. This is, however, a weaker sense of representation than the 
one intended here.
 In the following chapter I establish the more precise notion of p-
representation — intended to suggest ‘perceptual representation’ — with which I 
will be concerned throughout the rest of this thesis. It is an open question at this 
point whether perceptual experience, as I have defined it, involves p-
representation, and if so, what the conditions for p-representation are. Indeed, 
whether there is such a thing as p-representation, and what form its contents 
might take, are two of the main questions with which I engage.
1.2.4. Representationalism and relationalism
As suggested above, much of the recent debate about representational content in 
experience has been concerned with the distinction between views that accord 
representational content a fundamental, and so irreducible, role in a 
philosophical account of perceptual states, and those that deny that it has any 
such role. I will label these positions representationalism and anti-
representationalism, respectively. 
 The central claim of representationalism can be summarised as follows:
REP      The notions of representation and representational content make 
a fundamental, and so ineliminable, contribution to explaining 
the nature and role of perceptual psychological states in thought 
and behaviour.
Anti-representationalism is simply the denial of this claim. Call this NREP. Note 
that representationalism is not to be confused with the position commonly 
known as intentionalism, which is a thesis about the representational basis of 
phenomenal character (Byrne 2001). Intentionalism presupposes 
representationalism in the sense that I use that term here, but it is not identical 
to it since one could coherently hold representationalism to be true and yet 
reject intentionalism (chapter 5). Unfortunately, some philosophers have used 
the term ‘representationalism’ as a synonym for intentionalism, but I propose to 
keep them separate.
 A further position claims that the perceptual relation between subject and 
object plays a similarly irreducible role in the explanation of perceptual 
psychological states. I will label this position relationalism. Relationalists claim 
that:
REL      The subject’s relation to the mind-independent objects (and/or 
their properties) of sensory perception makes a fundamental, and 
so ineliminable, contribution to explaining the nature and role of 
perceptual psychological states in thought and behaviour.
Note that relationalism, as I have formulated it, is a claim about genuine (i.e. 
non-deviant) perception. REL is therefore silent on the status of non-veridical 
perceptual experiences, such as hallucinations and illusions. Anti-relationalism is 
simply the denial of REL. Call this NREL.
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 Now, it is a substantive question which combinations of these theses are 
compatible with one another; that is, whether it is possible, or indeed coherent, 
to be both a representationalist and a relationalist — or indeed an anti-
representationalist and an anti-relationalist (the ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ versions of each 
view are obviously incompatible with one another). Those who take these 
positions to be compatible can be said to adopt some form of hybrid or 
compatibilist view concerning the nature of perceptual states, as discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6. The conjunction of REP and REL — call this COM — therefore 
entails that:
COM    Both representational content and the subject’s relation to the 
objects or properties of perception play a fundamental, and so 
ineliminable, role in explaining the nature and role of perceptual 
psychological states in thought and behaviour.
 There are further substantive philosophical questions as to whether REP, REL 
and COM are plausible or coherent positions, and what the motivations for 
holding them might be. These chiefly fall under the headings of
(i) Psychological: explaining the nature or types of perceptual states for the 
purpose of giving a comprehensive account of thought and behaviour;
(ii) Epistemological: explaining the justificatory role of such states in the 
ability of conscious subjects to gain knowledge and awareness of their 
environment;
(iii) Phenomenological: accounting for the distinctive nature and 
contribution that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences 
make to the mental life of perceptual subjects.
(iv) Metaphysical: accounting for the nature of the relation between 
perceivers, experiences, objects and properties in the world.
These explanatory projects are not mutually exclusive, nor do they neatly map 
onto the taxonomy of views I sketched out above. Indeed, a large part of this 
thesis will be devoted to clarifying and untangling the roles of the above claims 
and positions in satisfying these various desiderata for a philosophically 
satisfying account of sensory perception, as is summarised below.
1.3. Overview
Chapter 2 presents an interpretation of Charles Travis’s influential but, in my 
view, often misunderstood paper, ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (2004; 
forthcoming). In it, Travis aims to show via a series of arguments that the 
notions of representation and representational content have no place in a 
philosophical account of perceptual experience. Foremost among these 
arguments is the ‘argument from looks’ in which Travis sets up a dilemma for 
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the representationalist about perceptual experience. In order for perceptual 
representations, or what I call p-representations, to perform the role their 
proponents assign them, they would, according to Travis, have to pick out some 
way that the world must be in order for them to be veridical; i.e. their accuracy 
conditions. However, p-representations are incapable of doing this in a way that 
is consistent with our being able to recognise, i.e. grasp or gain reflective access 
to, those representational contents. Since such recognisability is, according to 
Travis, a necessary condition for representation, there can be no such 
representations, and so representationalism is false.
 I examine these ideas at greater length in chapters 3 and 4 which consider a 
number of oft-cited objections to Travis’s arguments, along with the role that 
perceptual appearances — ‘looks’ in the case of vision — play, respectively. 
Chapter 3 addresses objections to Travis made by Alex Byrne (2009), Susannah 
Siegel (2011) and Susannah Schellenberg (2011b). These centre upon Travis’s 
notion of ‘looks-indexing’, according to which the representational contents of 
perceptual states are recognised by the subject in virtue or because of how 
things, in those experiences, look (mutatis mutandis for non-visual modalities). 
Byrne concurs with Travis that perceptual states cannot be looks-indexed, but 
nevertheless goes on to propose a kind of content based on the phenomenal 
character of experience that he alleges is capable of meeting Travis’s 
recognisability condition. I argue that Travis’s argument from looks is equally 
applicable to such ‘non-comparative looks’, which do not — as Byrne, Siegel and 
Schellenberg seem to think — constitute a satisfactory response to it. Indeed, the 
argument simply reiterates at the level of non-comparative looks with the same 
problematic outcome for representationalism as for comparative looks. Further 
arguments from Siegel and Schellenberg similarly fail to establish REP due to 
equivocation or because they beg the question against the opposing anti-
representationalist view.
 Chapter 4 takes up the question of whether it is possible to ground any 
satisfactory account of p-representation on the semantics of ‘looks’ or the nature 
of appearances. Since phenomenal character, at least insofar as this is accessible 
to introspection, is (pace Byrne) equivocal between different representational 
contents, it is incapable of fixing univocal, mind-independent accuracy 
conditions for p-representation. The only accuracy conditions that are fixed in 
this way are, as argued in chapter 3, the mind-dependent conditions for the 
subject’s having that very experience.13  This does not, however, constitute 
grounds for thinking that such contents generalise to all suitably individuated 
experience-types in the way that representationalism requires, as my argument 
against Siegel shows. Furthermore, the availability of alternative comparative 
analyses of the semantics of ‘looks’, such as Martin’s ‘parsimonious’ view 
(Martin 2010) and Brewer’s ‘relevant similarities’ (Brewer 2011), means that 
any argument for representational content on the basis of looks is at best neutral 
in the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about 
experience. Concerns about the contents of non-veridical perceptual states turn 
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out to be similarly equivocal, though do highlight an important methodological 
difference in the construction of a theory of perception — namely, whether to 
consider perception from a primarily epistemological (i.e. knowledge-based) or 
primarily phenomenological (i.e. subjective character-based) perspective. Such 
methodological differences, however, are not easily resolved on the basis of the 
distinctions or concerns outlined here, and to a large extent are as much 
determined by the outcome of the present debate as they inform it.
 In chapter 5, having rejected the notion of looks-indexing, as well as the 
possibility of grounding p-representational content in appearances to the 
subject, I examine some further responses to Travis’s anti-representationalism. 
These divide into two categories: (i) those that reject and (ii) those that attempt 
to satisfy Travis’s recognisability requirement. I argue that the first of these 
routes is successful in delivering a kind of representational content, but one that 
cannot — at least not without substantive further theoretical commitments and 
exposition — explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. This 
amounts to a rejection of the intentionalist claim that the phenomenal character 
of experience supervenes upon representational content and so favours a non-
representational account of perceptual phenomenology. The second route aims 
to satisfy the recognisability requirement, but faces a further question with 
regard to the contribution of phenomenal character to perceptual awareness — 
the so-called ‘phenomenological objection’. I argue that this objection is not well 
motivated and so without substantial further argument does not necessarily 
represent a genuine problem for representationalism.
 In chapter 6, I address the question of whether any views that explain the 
individuation and recognisability of p-representational content via a single 
common element are able to meet the challenge posed by Travis. (Whilst it is 
difficult to rule out the possibility of independent explanations for these two 
aspects of perceptual experience, I argue that there are substantial theoretical 
barriers to doing so.) Teleosemantic and other externalist accounts of p-
representation are particularly problematic in this regard due to the externally 
individuated nature of the content that they posit. One solution to this is to 
adopt an externalist account of self-knowledge. This satisfies Travis’s 
recognisability requirement, but leads to a form of externalism about 
phenomenal character, or phenomenal externalism, that many philosophers find 
implausible or problematic. A more promising line of response lies with the 
conceptualism of McDowell (1998), Brewer (1999) and Schellenberg (2011a; 
2011b). By accounting for both the individuation of content and its subjective 
availability through a single common element — namely, so-called recognitional 
or discriminatory capacities — such accounts are potentially able to meet the 
challenge that Travis presents. However, this raises a series of further questions 
concerning the relation between the operation of such capacities and the 
resulting content. Depending on how these questions are answered, a 
comparable account may also be given by the anti-representationalist, making 
the role of such content less than fundamental. This may explain why such 
views have, to a large extent, been abandoned by their original proponents in 
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favour of moderate or strong versions of relationalism. Nevertheless, if these 
problems can be overcome, such views offer the potential of unifying 
representationalism and relationalism in a form of compatibilism that accounts 
for perceptual phenomenology in terms of both representation and the 
perceptual relation.
 I conclude that Travis’s arguments present representationalists with a 
challenge. They must either (a) abandon the recognisability condition, thus 
severing the link between representation and perceptual phenomenology, or else 
(b) explain how representational content is recognisable to the subject, 
supposedly on the basis of perceptual phenomenology, despite being subjectively 
indistinguishable from other such contents with differing accuracy conditions. 
This in turn highlights the need for advocates of representationalism to be more 
explicit about the explanatory role of the representational content of experience, 
which is often employed for multiple, sometimes conflicting, purposes. 
Relationalist accounts, on the other hand, do not aim to explain perceptual 
phenomenology in terms of representational content, and so do not face this 
dilemma. Furthermore, I argue that there is no reason why such accounts should 
be taken to be incompatible with the existence of representational content, 
provided that such content is not taken to explain perceptual phenomenology. 
This in turn opens up the possibility of hybrid or ‘compatibilist’ views upon 
which both representational content and the perceptual relation have distinct or 
combined explanatory roles. In the meantime, Travis’s objections pose a 
powerful and important challenge to representationalist views, as well as 
offering an important way of sharpening understanding of the debate whilst 
ruling out a number of otherwise apparently plausible views of perceptual 
content.
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2. The Silence of the Senses
The Case Against Representationalism
2.1. Introduction
Kant famously stated that ‘[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind’ (Kant 1998: A51/B75). In ‘The Silence of the 
Senses’, Charles Travis (2004; forthcoming)1 argues that perceptual experience 
is not only ‘blind’, but ‘silent’, in that it does not deliver representational 
content to the subject. Consequently, according to Travis, perception ‘is, in a 
crucial way, not an intentional phenomenon’ (ibid: 93). This chapter sets out the 
principal arguments that Travis presents for this view along with the conditions 
upon perceptual representation that he takes to underpin it. My aim here is to 
provide a clear expression of these arguments along with their relations to the 
various conditions upon representation that Travis describes. This in turn 
enables the construction a taxonomy of various forms of representationalism 
according to which of Travis’s premises and conditions they endorse. Responses 
and counterarguments, both simple and subtle, to these arguments are 
considered in subsequent chapters.
 I begin by outlining a notion of representation that I will call p-
representation, short for perceptual representation (2.2), which characterises the 
form of representation to which Travis takes many advocates of 
representationalism to subscribe. This is captured by a number of conditions 
that an adequate notion of perceptual representation must conform to in order 
to meet various demands that representationalists place upon it. The second half 
of the chapter presents a series of arguments that can be found in Travis (2004) 
for the conclusion that perception does not constitutively involve p-
representation (2.3). This helps identify a number of possible responses that the 
1 Where possible, citations below refer to the original 2004 version of Travis’s paper. I have, 
however, used the amended terminology and other clarifications of the revised version 
throughout, which at the time of writing had yet to be published.
representationalist might make, according to which of Travis’s premises or 
conditions upon p-representation they wish to reject. These responses are then 
taken up in greater detail throughout chapters 3 to 6, which evaluate the 
effectiveness and implications of these arguments.
2.2. Perceptual Representation
The primary target of Travis’s (2004) paper is the view that perceptual 
experience is essentially a representational phenomenon. This is the position 
characterised in chapter 1 as representationalism, or REP for short (1.2.4). Since 
Travis denies that perception is essentially representational, his position 
constitutes a form of anti-representationalism, or NREP (ibid.).2 Travis contrasts 
such representationalism with the view that perception simply presents the 
world to us (as opposed to representing it) thereby making concrete external 
objects and properties available for thought, belief, judgement, etc. On Travis’s 
preferred view, those aspects of experience which, according to 
representationalists, favour the existence of representational content are instead 
situated within the processes of judgement and/or interpretation that take place 
on the basis of experience, rather than forming part of experience itself. For 
example, Travis considers perceptual illusions to be cases in which the subject is 
misled by appearances rather than cases of misrepresentation since, according to 
him, perceptual experience does not involve any representation (2.3.1).
 Travis contrasts his view with those of Davies (1992), McDowell (1994), 
McGinn (1982; 1991), Peacocke (1992), Searle (1983), Tye (1995), and others 
who take perceptual experience to possess determinate representational content 
in both veridical and non-veridical cases.3  The analysis of both genuine 
perception and other perceptual experiences such as hallucination and illusion in 
terms of a single underlying ‘common factor’, i.e. their representational content, 
is one of the central features of the accounts of perception to which Travis is 
opposed. I will refer to this as the principle of intentionality, since it is 
equivalent to the claim that p-representations can occur in the absence of those 
objects that they are ‘about’; i.e. that they have intentional content. Not all 
representationalists would agree with this claim, at least its unqualified form. 
However, since providing a uniform account of veridical and non-veridical 
perceptual experiences is one of the chief motivations for endorsing 
representationalism, most if not all representationalists would subscribe to the 
following closely related principle:
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2  Whether REP is genuinely incompatible with the kind of presentational view that Travis 
favours is something I examine further in chapters 5 and 6. For the time being, I simply focus 
on explicating and evaluating his arguments against representationalism.
3  I use the term ‘determinate’ in contrast to ‘determinable’, and not to ‘vague’. Accuracy 
conditions that involve some degree of vagueness — about the precise number of items that 
are present, for example — can, on this usage, still be perfectly determinate.
Common Content: subjectively indistinguishable veridical and non-
veridical perceptual experiences share a common representational 
content.
This principle is weaker than a straightforward identity claim between the 
representational content of ‘good’ (i.e. veridical perception) and ‘bad’ (i.e. non-
veridical) cases. Indeed, such an identity is denied by those forms of 
representationalism whose contents incorporate an externally individuated or 
demonstrative aspect (6.3, 6.4.1). All of the above principles, however, are 
denied by Travis, who regards non-veridical perceptual experience as being 
explained by the phenomenon of misleading as opposed to the existence of any 
such common representational element (Travis 2004: 64).
 Travis characterises the target forms of representationalism as endorsing 
four key constraints upon the notion of representation that features in accounts 
of perceptual experience. These constraints, set out in detail below (2.2.1–4), are 
largely interrelated and collectively define the notion of representation to which 
Travis is opposed (2.2.6). To avoid prejudicing the issue of whether there exists 
any other form of representation that does not satisfy Travis’s constraints (see 
5.2.4), but which meets at least some of the representationalists’ requirements, I 
will call such representation p-representation. This term is intended to be 
suggestive of ‘perceptual representation’ and is a placeholder for the kind of 
representation that advocates of representationalism, pace Travis, hold to exist. 
According to Travis, only p-representation can support his opponents’ claims 
concerning the role of representation in perceptual experience (2.3). On his 
view, such a notion is unmotivated and the constraints upon it inconsistent, 
such that no form of representation could ever satisfy them. Consequently, there 
can be no such thing as p-representation. Travis's aim, therefore, is to 
demonstrate that representationalism, at least in its most common form, is 
incoherent, and so that perceptual experience cannot be p-representational.
 It is important to realise that Travis’s arguments do not rule out the 
possibility that there is some sense in which representational contents — in the 
form of phenomenal content, for example (3.2.3, 4.2.6) — may be associated 
with individual perceptual experiences; for the purposes of neuroscience or 
behavioural psychology, for example. Rather, the claim is that such content 
does not — indeed, according to Travis, it cannot — capture or exhaust the 
nature of perceptual experience. In particular, as will become clear in later 
chapters, these arguments present specific problems in accounting for the 
phenomenal character of experiences in representational terms — a position 
known as intentionalism. Furthermore, if such content fails to satisfy the 
conditions below, it would not, in Travis’s view, correspond to any familiar 
notion of representation, and consequently be unable to sustain the claims that 
representationalists make for their theories, such as the ability to explain the 
contents of perceptual beliefs, judgements or illusions. Such alternative uses of 
the term ‘representation’ are therefore besides the point, which is to exhaustively 
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characterise perceptual experience in terms of its representational content — 
something that Travis and other anti-representationalists hold to be impossible.
2.2.1. Representing such-and-such as so
The first condition by which Travis characterises his target notion of 
representation is that ‘[t]he representing in question is representing such-and-
such as so’ (Travis 2004: 58). Thus, p-representation represents the world as 
being some way or other; i.e. it has determinate representational content (1.2.3). 
Travis contrasts this form of representation with that of ‘an effect or trace of 
something’, such as the way that tree rings may be said to ‘represent’ the 
amount of growth or climatic conditions in a particular year, or some kind of 
‘stand-in, or substitute, for what is represented’ (ibid.). The former qualification 
rules out much of the kind of ‘representation’ that, for example, neuroscientists 
find in the brain and nervous system, which are mere causal traces of perceptual 
stimuli. Such traces cannot, by definition, occur in the absence of what they are 
causal traces of, and so do not accord with the principle of intentionality. Nor 
can such traces misrepresent. The latter qualification is intended to rule out the 
sense in which a piece in a game ‘represent[s] an infantry division in a game of 
strategy’ or ‘[a] squiggle on a map may represent the Lot’ (ibid.). Such 
representations provide a stand-in or proxy for another object by means of some 
established rule or convention (1.2.3). P-representations, on the other hand, 
possess content in virtue of their structure or logical form in a way that is not 
merely conventional, but revealed through their role in rational thought and 
behaviour, either by introspection or by reflection upon the nature and 
character of experience (see 2.2.4).
 Central to the idea of representing such-and-such as so is the notion of 
correctness or accuracy conditions. Such conditions specify the situation, or 
situations, under which the relevant content is accurate or veridical (1.2.3). In 
the case of a given perceptual experience, this occurs when the content of that 
experience corresponds to the way that things, independently of how the subject 
perceives them as being, actually are. P-representational content, then, must be 
assessable for truth or accuracy.4 That is to say, for any given representational 
content, there is a definite and principled answer as to whether it is accurate or 
not, depending upon its correspondence with the subject’s immediate perceptual 
environment. Thus, such states purport to represent the way that the subject’s 
environment objectively is, rather than how things subjectively seem or appear. 
(A state that represented only subjective features of the subject’s own mental 
state would not qualify as objective in the relevant sense — see 3.2.3.) 
Consequently, on the representationalist’s view, the phenomena of seeming or 
appearing  are a matter of the subject’s representing the world to be some 
particular way, rather than anything that features explicitly in the content of 
such representations. Appearing, we might say, is all in the attitude (cf. Travis 
2004: 60).
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4  ‘Truth’ normally indicates a bivalent notion of correspondence, whereas ‘accuracy’ may 
admit of degrees. For present purposes, it does not matter which of these terms we use.
 We can summarise this first condition upon the notion of p-representation 
as follows:
Objectivity: p-representation represents things as being objectively so in 
a way that is capable of being assessed for truth or accuracy.
 Note that Travis’s use of the phrase ‘representing such-and-such as 
so’ (Travis 2004: 58) might be taken to suggest that p-representational content 
must be propositional, and so by implication conceptual. However, since two of 
his stated targets — namely, Peacocke (1992) and Tye (1995) — both endorse 
notions of non-conceptual content, we can assume that Travis intends for his 
arguments to apply to both conceptual and non-conceptual content. Henceforth, 
I will use the term ‘propositional’ to cover any content that is assessable for 
truth, and ‘content’ as being assessable for accuracy, regardless of whether it is 
conceptual or otherwise. Thus, Travis may be taken to argue not only against 
the existence of conceptual p-representational content, but against any form of 
content that possesses determinate accuracy or correctness conditions.
2.2.2. Face value
Travis’s second condition upon p-representation is intended to capture the 
representationalist intuition that every perceptual experience has a univocal, i.e. 
single and determinate, face-value content. The condition is motivated by the 
intuitive notion that things can be just as they appear, and has two distinct 
aspects. The first relates to how the way that experience represents the world as 
being — its representational content — can be ‘read off’, as it were, the 
experience itself. This corresponds to Travis’s Recognisability condition below 
(2.2.4). It is not uncommon, however, to talk of taking experience ‘at face 
value’, meaning that one simply accepts the diktats of experience without 
doubting that things are in fact the way that they appear. The prevalence of 
such expressions might be taken to suggest that there is some particular way (as 
opposed to many different ways) that any given experience represents the world 
as being. It is this aspect of the ‘face value’ claim that is captured by Travis’s 
second condition, which may be summarised as follows:
Face-value: p-representations have a determinate and univocal ‘face 
value, at which [they] can be taken or declined’.5
This condition forms the basis for what is sometimes called Travis’s 
‘indeterminacy objection’ (Schellenberg 2011b: 7), and is a key premise in his 
argument from looks (2.3.2).
 Two aspects of the above condition are necessary for Travis’s purpose. First, 
and most importantly, it entails that p-representations have precisely one 
content, as opposed to many or none. Thus, each perceptual experience 
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5 Travis (2004: 63).
represents the world to be some particular way, and not a disjunction of 
possible alternatives, each of which shares the same perceptible appearance. For 
example, if there appears to be a lemon in front of me then, according to the 
representationalist, the representational content of my experience includes that 
there is a lemon, and not the open-ended disjunction there is either a lemon, a 
wax imitation lemon, a lemon-shaped bar of soap, or …, even if each of these 
alternatives would appear, from the same location and angle, perceptually 
indistinguishable from an actual lemon. An account that meets Face-value may 
therefore be contrasted with the view that perceptual experiences have 
disjunctive content in which a potentially infinite range of possible ways that the 
world might be are ‘represented’, but without any one of these possibilities 
being singled out as the content of experience.6 Travis claims that such a view
would make representation in perception incoherent, [therefore] not 
intelligibly representation at all. Too many things would thereby be 
represented as so at once. There are just too many things things look like.7
 The second aspect of Face-value is that p-representations have the kind of 
content that can either be accepted or rejected. Thus, when enjoying a given 
perceptual experience, a subject is not thereby committed to believing or judging 
that something in particular is the case. Instead, experience is supposed to 
provide the grounds upon which such beliefs or judgements may be formed or 
withheld according to the context and dispositions of the perceiver. This further 
consequence of Face-value is addressed below (2.2.3).
 In endorsing the Face-value condition, McDowell (1994: 26) states:
That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also 
be the content of a judgment. It becomes the content of a judgment if the 
subject decides to take the experience at face value.
Thus, when a perceptual subject has an experience with the content there is a 
greenish lemon in front of me, and where they have no reason to suspect the 
contrary, they will typically judge, and thereby come to believe, that there is 
indeed a greenish lemon in front of them. Conversely, in cases where one has a 
positive reason to doubt that things are as they appear — if one knew or had 
some reason to believe that the scene were illuminated by green light, for 
example — one might conclude that, contrary to the experience's ‘face value’ 
content, the lemon is not green, but some other colour, and only appears green 
due to the unusual lighting conditions. Alternatively, one may choose to 
withhold judgement altogether. Furthermore, McDowell takes the contents of 
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6 Such views should not be confused with the position known as disjunctivism,  which claims 
that perception and non-veridical perceptual experience are of fundamentally different 
psychological kinds.
7  Ibid: 87. The alleged ‘incoherence’ is presumably based on the fact that the various 
disjuncts would be inconsistent and the set of possible disjuncts too large to constitute any 
recognisable form of p-representation.
the experience and the corresponding judgement to be identical (though both 
are presumably more complex than in this simple example). In this way, 
individual experiences provide defeasible warrant for believing that things are 
‘just as they appear’, with their contents, or elements of it, figuring in the 
contents of perceptual judgements and beliefs. This further commitment, 
however, is not mandated by Face-value.
 No doubt the principle that the content of any perceptual judgement or 
belief is identical to, or straightforwardly derivable from, the content of the 
experience is appealing and would be endorsed by representationalists of 
various stripes. Such a principle offers a simple and straightforward explanation 
of how perceptual judgements and beliefs are formed: one simply comes to 
believe what one sees, hears, tastes, and so on. Indeed, this is one of the benefits 
that advocates of representationalism suppose to flow from it: that we can judge 
or believe things to be just as they appear. Perceptual judgement, for such 
representationalists, is simply a matter of a subject’s endorsing the relevant part, 
or parts, of the content of one’s perceptual experience. This may be contrasted 
with anti-representationalist accounts according to which the process of belief 
and judgement formation play a more substantive role, expanding to assume 
one of the functions that representationalists take to be fulfilled by experience. 
A commitment to such a principle, however, is unnecessary for Travis’s purpose 
or for p-representation, which turns on the presence of univocal face value 
content as opposed to the role that such content plays in judgement or belief. 
We must therefore be careful to avoid to avoid conflating Face-value with the 
stronger, theoretically distinct claim that the contents of experience are identical 
to those that figure in perceptual judgements and belief.
 Accounts of perceptual content that do not satisfy Face-value include the 
‘content pluralism’ of Chalmers (2006) and Crane (forthcoming), both of which 
entail that experience has not one, but many such contents, or ‘content 
relations’, each of which has a distinct explanatory role. Whilst such views are 
not obviously targets of Travis (2004),8  it is nevertheless possible to run the 
same arguments against them with respect to each individual content that such 
pluralists claim perceptual experience to have. In this case, the arguments will 
relate to the individual contents that occur within the context of some particular 
explanatory role, rather than the plurality of contents as a whole. This differs 
from the disjunctive form of content discussed above that takes experience to 
have only a single content with a disjunctive logical structure. In the latter case, 
Travis’s arguments will apply to the disjunction as a whole, as opposed to each 
of the individual disjuncts as in the case of content pluralism. Thus, Travis’s 
arguments may be taken to apply to any representational content that meets the 
conditions necessary for p-representation, even where no one content may be 
singled out as ‘the’ content of experience.
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2.2.3. Represention-to, not representation-by
The third of Travis’s conditions for p-representation distinguishes between two 
different forms, or roles, of representation, which Travis calls 
‘autorepresentation’ and ‘allorepresentation’ (Travis 2004: 61), respectively. 
Autorepresentation corresponds to ‘representing to … oneself’ (ibid.) or taking 
something to be so. It is therefore a form of representation-by a conscious 
subject. Examples of autorepresentation include belief, judgement and any other 
propositional attitude in which a subject accepts something to be true, or indeed 
false. Consequently, autorepresentation does not admit of a neutral attitude 
towards a content since to autorepresent p is already to accept (or reject) that p. 
Such representation is, as Travis puts it, ‘all in the attitude’ (ibid: 60). 
Allorepresentation, on the other hand, occurs when whatever is being 
represented can be either accepted or rejected; it is representation-to the subject. 
Travis goes on to identify two subspecies of allorepresentation, which he calls 
‘committed’ and ‘uncommitted’ allorepresentation. In committed 
allorepresentation, the content of the representation has some kind of authority 
which, all other things being equal, recommends it to the subject, as in the case 
of testimony from a normally reliable source. Uncommitted allorepresentation, 
on the other hand, has no such authority, there being nothing in the means of 
representation to determine or suggest that things are one way rather than 
another — English sentences being a case in point.9  Travis argues that only 
committed representations can have a face value in the relevant sense, since 
uncommitted representation involves no commitment to any particular state of 
affairs being the case, and thus is incapable of providing a reason for belief or 
judgement (ibid. 62).
 The term ‘representation’ may be used to denote both auto- and 
allorepresentation, and is therefore ambiguous. The location of a marker on a 
map, for example, may (allo)represent one’s own location, whereas one can 
(auto)represent something to be the case by deciding that it is so, the difference 
being in whether the thinker is the ‘consumer’ or ‘producer’ of the 
representation.10 The key point, however, is that since Face-value provides for 
the rejection as well as acceptance of contents (cf. 2.2.2), the relevant form of p-
representation cannot be autorepresentation. In contrast to judgement (at least 
on some accounts), we cannot choose or decide what we perceive in experience, 
but rather its representational content is (on the representationalist view) in 
some sense ‘given’ to us. We simply find ourselves, to use McDowell’s phrase, 
saddled with content.
 We can capture this condition upon p-representation as follows:
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9 Travis does not deny that such sentences can have truth or accuracy conditions, merely that 
the means of representation (i.e. English) does not itself recommend nor guarantee its 
representational content to be true (ibid. 61).
10 Cf. Millikan 1989.
Givenness: p-representation consists in content being ‘given’ to the 
subject (representation-to), not in subjects taking things to be the 
case (representation-by).
P-representations are thus defeasible in the sense that, in circumstances where an 
ideally rational subject has reason to believe their experience to be deceptive — 
when viewing a familiar perceptual illusion, for example — they can judge that 
things are not the way that their experience represents them to be. Similarly, if 
the subject has reason to believe that their perceptual experience may be 
misleading or faulty — when undergoing a blind clinical trial for a 
hallucinogenic drug, for example — they may choose to withhold judgement as 
to whether their experiences accurately reflect the way things are. Conversely, 
where the subject is aware of no such reasons, they will typically judge that 
things are the way that they appear.11 This reflects the committed nature of p-
representation, which possesses a form of authority that, under normal 
circumstances at least, recommends its content to the subject.
 Givenness comes into play in Travis’s argument from recognisability (2.3.3) 
and entails that experiences are not perceptual ‘takings’. As such, whatever fixes 
the content of experience cannot solely depend upon how that experience is 
interpreted, or what it is taken it to indicate. This would in any case arguably be 
inconsistent with the role of perception as the basis for judgement or belief, 
which places the order of explanation precisely the other way round. If the 
content of experience were itself to depend upon such ‘takings’, this would give 
rise to a circularity since perceptual takings, in the form of perceptual belief or 
judgement, themselves depend upon experience. On accounts of experience in 
which perceptual belief and experience are separate and distinct mental states, 
the former is generally held to be explanatorily dependent upon the latter, 
precluding the possibility of the reverse dependence. This does not rule out the 
possibility that experiences may be identified with dispositions to believe, or 
‘potential beliefs’ as suggested by Armstrong (1968: 242), provided that such 
dispositions are not themselves beliefs; i.e. they are not perceptual ‘takings’. In 
either case, however, what a given experience represents is supposed to be 
intrinsic to that very experience, with its content being simply ‘given’ to the 
subject.
 Note that the notion of givenness employed here need not fall into the so-
called ‘Myth of the Given’ (McDowell 2008) since there is no suggestion that 
experiential contents are independent of the subject’s cognitive capacities (the 
thing that is supposed to make McDowell’s ‘Given’ mythical). Rather, the idea 
is that, according to representationalism, the faculty of perception is what gives 
us representational contents that we are subsequently able to judge as true or 
false, guide our actions, and so on. In McDowell’s terms, p-representational 
content is ‘given’ with a small ‘g’, not a capital ‘G’. Similarly, we should not 
conclude that in order for the contents of experience to be given to the subject in 
the relevant sense, there must be some entity over and above experience itself 
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that does the giving. Just as an arrow on a map can ‘give’ us a spatial location 
relative to the features it depicts, perceptual experience itself can give us 
information about how things are in our immediate surroundings. The sense in 
which p-representational content is ‘given’ is one that holds between an 
experience and a subject, rather than between two subjects in the manner of, for 
example, verbal testimony. The relevant representing is done by experience itself 
ra ther than, for example , any fur ther sub-personal agent or 
‘representer’ (though neither does this rule out the existence of such agents).
2.2.4. Recognisability
The fourth and final condition that Travis places upon p-representation is that 
the contents of experience must be recognisable to the perceptual subject. This is 
perhaps the most important and contentious of Travis’s conditions, and consists 
of two main claims. First, perceptual experience must be recognisable as a form 
of representation since ‘you cannot represent things to people as so in a way 
they simply cannot recognize as doing that’ (Travis 2004: 63). This is not to say 
that we are always, or even normally, aware of being represented to in 
perception, or that perceptual subjects are necessarily capable of accurately 
describing the nature and content of their experiences — something that is 
clearly not the case. Rather, it must at least be possible in principle — perhaps 
through philosophical reasoning and reflection — to recognise the 
representational nature of experience as such.
 Second, and more importantly for present purposes, we must be capable of 
recognising the content of our experiences. That is to say, we must be able to 
know what it is that is being represented to us, or equivalently, what it would 
take for any given perceptual experience to be veridical. Again, this does not 
mean that we are in practice able to determine whether the relevant state of 
affairs obtains, or to elucidate the relevant accuracy conditions in a formal 
manner. Indeed, these tasks may require considerable conceptual and/or 
empirical investigation. Rather, the suggestion is that we must be able to grasp 
or recognise how the world would need to be in order for perceptual experience 
to accurately represent it. When perceptually encountering an object that looks 
like a lemon, for example, it should be apparent to the subject — that is to say, it 
is cognitively available to them — that their experience is as of a lemon, or that 
the experience should lead them to form beliefs concerning lemons and not, say, 
potatoes or bars of soap. If the object turned out to be a potato or a ringer for a 
lemon, such as an identical looking lemon-shaped bar of soap, then this 
discrepancy would be something that is at least potentially discernible to the 
subject, perhaps by occasioning surprise or disbelief upon discovering the 
unexpected object.
 We can characterise this condition upon p-representation as follows:
Recognisability: perceptual subjects must be capable of recognising the 
representational content of any given p-representation solely in 
virtue of having that very experience.
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By this we mean that the subject must be able to recognise both what their 
perceptual experience represents to be the case, and how the world would have 
to be in order for their experience to be veridical; i.e. having some intuitive or 
implicit grasp of their experiences’ accuracy or truth conditions. This leaves it 
open both whether they know that the relevant conditions obtain (something 
that cannot be required for perceptual experience alone), and in what such 
knowing consists.
 The condition is motivated by epistemological considerations concerning 
Face-value and Givenness since if experience presents the world to the subject as 
being some particular way (Objectivity), then it must be possible to recognise 
what way that is on the basis of that experience (5.2.1). This marks out p-
representation as occurring at the personal, rather than sub-personal, level, 
making experience on the representationalist model analogous to testimony. 
Experiences, we might say, testify or report to the subject how things are, with 
the contents of these reports corresponding to individual p-representational 
contents. Of course it is precisely this analogy with testimony that anti-
representationalists are concerned to reject, since they deny that experiences 
have any such content.
 For the time being, I will leave the sense of ‘recognition’ with which Travis 
is operating as largely intuitive, though this will require further clarification in 
due course (5.2). The relevant sense must allow for the possibility of subjects 
being capable of coming to know both the contents of their experiences and that 
their experience is representational. However, it need not be defined in terms of 
explicit knowledge. Rather, some form of tacit understanding or grasp of the 
conditions required for an experience’s accuracy will suffice. These may be 
cashed out in terms of practical or cognitive abilities, i.e. knowledge-how rather 
than knowledge-that. In particular, such recognisability may (though need not) 
manifest itself in the phenomenology of experience, as reflected by its 
phenomenal character; e.g. in an object’s looking red or as located at a 
particular point in egocentric space.
 A notable aspect of the above condition is that the content of perceptual 
experience must be recognisable ‘in virtue of the experience itself’. This is 
intended to rule out the possibility that such content is recognisable on the basis 
of prior or subsequent knowledge, expectations or behaviour, since if this were 
the case then it would be unclear in what sense this shows experience to be 
representational as opposed to that other thing. Similarly, it cannot be the case 
that one recognises the content of experience solely as a result of beliefs and 
judgements formed on the basis of it. This would serve to demonstrate that 
belief or judgement were representational, but not experience, since it would 
give no reason to attribute the representational content to the latter, other than 
perhaps as an explanation of how the former get their content, which is 
precisely the kind of error that anti-representationalists accuse their opponents 
of making. Furthermore, since such forms of autorepresentation entail that the 
subject already accepts their contents as true, Givenness would fail to obtain. 
Perceptual belief and judgement alone therefore appear to be incapable of 
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making the representational contents of perception (if there are any) 
recognisable in the relevant sense. Rather, Travis argues, there must be some 
special feature or aspect of perceptual experience in virtue of which its 
representational content is apparent, as discussed below (2.2.5).
 The precise formulation of Recognisability, along with the precise sense of 
‘recognition’ in this context, is central to Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2), 
much of which rests upon it. Indeed, if a representationalist were to reject this 
condition outright, then this argument (though not some of Travis’s subsequent 
arguments) would fail to go through.12 However, such a rejection is not without 
its costs, since the basic principle is closely connected not only with Face-value 
and Givenness, but with the connection between representational content and 
perceptual phenomenology (5.2.3). Indeed, it is a consequence of some forms of 
intentionalism that the elements of p-representation that figure in phenomenal 
character are in some sense ‘recognisable’ to the subject. Thus, to give up on 
Recognisability would entail a denial of some forms of intentionalism.13 
Furthermore, without Recognisability it is difficult to see what work the notion 
of representation is supposed to be doing, except as a placeholder or term of art. 
Such ‘non-recognisable’ forms of p-representation would not constitute a 
familiar form of representation as such. If the notion of representation that 
representationalists employ is supposed to be the familiar one that we apply to 
maps, photographs, language, etc., it would present a serious issue if the content 
of perception turned out to be opaque to the experiencing subject. As Travis 
(2004: 86) puts it,
[T]hat we are represented to in experience is meant to be a familiar 
phenomenon; something we can tell is happening. It is not just events 
occurring in visual processing mechanisms of which we are all ignorant. It 
should not come to us as a complete surprise someday, to be sprung on us 
by future neurophysiologists, that we are thus represented to (uselessly, of 
course, since we were all ignorant of it).
 Travis’s claim, then, is that p-representational content must be grounded in 
a subject’s ability to recognise what is represented to them in experience, which 
in turn grounds any subsequent judgements or beliefs made on the basis of it. 
Furthermore, there must be some principled way of determining in any 
particular case precisely what the content of a given experience is. If not, then 
we leave open the possibility that it is the contents of judgements or beliefs that 
fix the content of experience, rather than, as representationalists typically claim, 
the other way around.
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content in chapter 5.
13  Intentionalists who hold a supervenience rather than identity thesis of phenomenal 
character can endorse the Face-value condition whilst rejecting Recognisability since not 
every difference in representational content need be reflected in perceptual phenomenology.
2.2.5. Looks-indexing
Having argued in favour of Recognisability, Travis goes on to ask what feature, 
or features, of experience could make p-representational contents recognisable 
in the relevant sense. In the case of visual perception, it seems plausible that this 
should be the way that things look. On this view, p-representational content is 
recognisable to the subject — or ‘indexed’ to use Travis’s expression — on the 
basis of how, in the relevant visual experience, things look to the subject.14 
Travis notes that the relevant sense of ‘looks’ should not be conflated with the 
contents of p-representations themselves, stating (ibid. 63):
I take it that it would be cheating if, say, ‘looks like things are thus and so’ 
turned out just to mean ‘things are represented to the perceiver as being thus 
and so’. Looks in that sense might be representational content; but they 
could not be that by which an experience is recognizable as having the 
representational content that it does.
Looks, therefore, are supposed to be what enables us to recognise the contents 
of experience, thereby making those contents available to the subject. We can 
summarise this condition as follows:
Looks-indexing: the content of any given p-representation must be 
recognisable to the subject solely in virtue of how, in the relevant 
experience, things perceptually seem to that subject.15
 It is important to realise that Looks-indexing is a provisional and temporary 
assumption not to be confused with Recognisability itself (2.2.4). Rather, Travis 
makes this assumption on behalf of the representationalist as a means of 
explaining how Recognisability may be met, but it is ultimately dropped in the 
final section of Travis’s paper. This presents the representationalist with a 
number of options. First, they may wish to endorse both of these conditions and 
so specify a notion of ‘looks’ or appearances that satisfies them without falling 
prey to the arguments that Travis presses (2.3.3). This is the route that Siegel 
(2010), Schellenberg (2011a; 2011b) and others take, and which Travis claims is 
impossible to maintain, as I discuss in chapters 3 and 4. Alternatively, the 
representationalist may reject Looks-indexing, but retain or reformulate 
Recognisability, in which case the onus is upon them to specify an alternative 
way of satisfying the latter. This appears to be Byrne’s (2009) preferred option 
(chapter 3). Finally, they may reject Recognisability outright, yielding a form of 
representational content that is not available to the subject on the basis of 
reflection alone, as per Burge (2010). Further variations are possible by 
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15 In general, where Travis uses the term ‘looks’ with specific reference to visual experience, I 
will prefer the more generic ‘seems’ or ‘appears’, which I take it also apply to each of the 
other sensory modalities.
weakening or strengthening the notion of ‘recognition’ that is employed by these 
conditions accordingly (5.2.2).
 A corollary to Travis’s point about looks is that what enables us to 
recognise the content of perceptual experience need not be the same as what 
fixes or determines that content. Whilst the first requirement is cognitive or 
epistemic, the second is semantic, and so the two may come apart. Whilst Travis 
does not always clearly distinguish between these different aspects of perceptual 
experience, Recognisability is clearly concerned with the former. This leaves 
room for forms of representationalism in which what fixes the content of 
experience is distinct from whatever makes that content recognisable — one may 
be internally individuated and the other externally individuated, for example. 
The coherence and plausibility of such views will be addressed in chapter 6 
where I argue that only those forms of representationalism that explain both 
content and recognisability in terms of a single common factor are likely to be 
capable of avoiding Travis’s arguments from looks and recognisability. These 
arguments may therefore be seen as providing constraints upon the forms of 
representationalism that are capable of satisfying some form of Recognisability 
condition.
2.2.6. P-representation
Excluding Looks-indexing, the above conditions jointly characterise the form of 
representation that Travis takes representationalists to think is involved in 
perceptual experience, namely p-representation. These conditions are not 
intended to be exhaustive or definitional, but rather identify key theoretical 
commitments that are either explicitly or implicitly endorsed by many, though 
not all, representationalists. This in turns helps to differentiate p-representation 
from other forms of representation, such as those I reject in 1.2.3. Moreover, 
each of these conditions is individually necessary for p-representation insofar as 
it underpins the explanatory role that such representations play in 
representationalist accounts of perception. Without Objectivity, for example, 
perceptual experience could not form the basis for knowledge of objective 
aspects of the external world. Without Face-value it would be impossible to 
accept or reject the content of perceptual experience. Without Givenness, we 
would be incapable of judging or believing on the basis of experience. And 
without Recognisability, we would be unaware of being represented to at all, or 
be incapable of grasping on the basis of first-personal reflection or perceptual 
phenomenology what it is that our experiences represent.
 To summarise, then, p-representation is a form of representation in which 
things are represented to the subject as being some particular way (Objectivity 
and Face-value). Moreover, it does not commit the subject to believing or 
judging that things are that way, since such contents may be either accepted or 
rejected (Givenness). Where such a judgement is made, its content may, 
according to some versions of representationalism, be identical to or else 
straightforwardly derivable from the content of the corresponding perceptual 
experience, though this is not required for Travis’s purposes. The 
Chapter 2, The Silence of the Senses  27
representational content of experience, however, must be discernible — e.g. 
knowable — on the basis of first-personal reflection upon the experience itself or 
perceptual phenomenology (Recognisability), though this does not require that 
subjects are necessarily able to articulate or ascertain the satisfaction of its 
accuracy conditions in practice. In the case of visual perception, and mutatis 
mutandis for each of the other sensory modalities, this plausibly occurs on the 
basis of how, in the relevant experience, things look (Looks-indexing), though 
again this condition is not essential to Travis’s argument — indeed, he later gives 
reasons for rejecting it.
 Travis aims to show that the above notion of p-representation is incoherent, 
and so unable to fulfil the explanatory role that representationalists assign to it. 
Consequently, given that some variant of this form of representation is defended 
by many leading representationalists, perception cannot on those accounts be 
representational. This argumentative strategy admits of several possible 
responses. First, representationalists may choose to deny the validity, or one or 
more of the premises, of Travis’s arguments, as detailed in the following section. 
Second, they may deny that one or more of the above conditions are necessary 
for p-representation. Travis’s responds to the latter by stating that such 
representationalists are not his target (Travis 2004: 82, 86), observing that the 
first two conditions are taken directly from the work of prominent 
representationalists, including McDowell, Peacocke, Davies, Tye and McGinn 
(ibid. 86). However, it is arguable that such a denial would result in a notion of 
representation that is too weak to fulfil the representationalist’s purpose in 
providing an adequate explanation of various perceptual phenomena, such as 
illusions, or the links between perceptual experience and judgement or belief. 
The notion of p-representation is therefore closely connected with the 
explanatory purposes of representationalism and its alleged benefits — purposes 
upon which Travis’s arguments place strict limits.
 The arguments in ‘The Silence of the Senses’ do not, however, rule out the 
possibility that perceptual experience might involve some other form of 
representation than p-representation, such as the causally covariant, 
information-theoretic notion identified in the previous chapter. I return to this 
question in chapter 5 when I consider Burge’s rejection of Recognisability. For 
the time being, however, I will assume that, if successful, Travis’s arguments 
only secure the weaker conclusion that perception does not constitutively 
involve p-representation, rather than ruling out any form of representation 
whatsoever. Arguably, such ‘representations’ do not warrant use of the term, at 
least in its familiar sense. Terminological quibbles aside, however, I will argue 
that Travis’s arguments constitute a powerful case against many otherwise 
seemingly plausible accounts of perceptual representation, and so present a 
serious and important challenge to representationalism about experience in 
general.
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2.3. The Case Against Representationalism
For present purposes, I will concentrate upon four main arguments that may be 
found in Travis’s ‘The Silence of the Senses’ (Travis 2004). Each is directed 
against a particular motivation towards or kind of representationalism. 
Together, the arguments provide a case against representationalism. Probably 
the best known and widely discussed (though not always understood) argument 
is Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2), which aims to establish that it is 
impossible to ground p-representational content in visual appearances or how 
things look. This argument assumes Looks-indexing, and so is vulnerable to 
forms of representationalism that reject either this or the Recognisability 
condition outright. Such forms of representationalism are instead addressed by 
what I will call the argument from recognisability (2.3.3). Additional arguments 
are intended to show that the mere existence of perceptual illusions does not 
present any particular advantage to representationalism over anti-
representationalism (2.3.1), and that representational content is incapable of 
providing the perceiver with unmediated awareness of an object (2.3.4), 
respectively.
2.3.1. The argument from misleading appearances
The first and simplest of Travis’s arguments concerns the significance of 
perceptual illusion in the debate about perceptual representation. Historically, 
Hume’s argument from illusion and others like it have been powerful weapons 
in the representationalist’s arsenal (cf. Smith 2002). The traditional argument 
from illusion purports to show that the objects of perception cannot be the 
external physical objects or events that we ordinarily take experience to involve, 
but must be mental entities such as sense impressions or ‘ideas’. Although the 
resulting ‘theory of ideas’ has long since fallen into disrepute (cf. Reid 2002: 
II.ix, 136; Snowdon 1990), vestiges of it can arguably be found in the 
representationalist theories of perception that took its place. However, few 
representationalists take representations, as opposed to external objects, events 
and their properties, to be the objects of perceptual experience. Rather, 
representing is supposed to be the means by which external physical objects and 
events are perceived. Thus p-representation does not function as an epistemic or 
perceptual intermediary between the subject and the external world. Rather, 
representational content is intended to capture what is common to both 
perceptions and their phenomenally matching counterparts, such as 
hallucinations and illusions.
 Travis’s argument from misleading appearances does not engage directly 
with Hume’s traditional argument. Instead, it seeks to counter the view that the 
phenomenon of perceptual illusion — i.e. experiences in which a subject 
‘misperceives’ the state of the environment — provides any advantage to the 
representationalist view. Byrne (2009), for example, considers the existence of 
such illusions to be a positive motivation for endorsing representationalism, as 
considered in the next chapter (3.2.1) — a suggestion which Travis rejects. 
Typically, such representationalist arguments depend upon some version of 
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what M.  G.  F.  Martin calls the common kind assumption, which he states as 
follows: ‘whatever fundamental kind of mental event occurs when one is 
veridically perceiving some scene can occur whether or not one is 
perceiving’ (Martin 2004: 40). This assumption, however, along with the 
Common Content condition that flows from it (2.2), need not be accepted by 
the anti-representationalist on the basis that perceptual illusion may be 
considered parasitic upon veridical perception, and not assimilable to it. 
Consequently, perceptual illusion and hallucination may require different forms 
of explanation to veridical perception.16 Anti-representationalists, who reject the 
common kind assumption, therefore offer alternative accounts of illusion that 
may be evaluated upon their own merits.
 This argumentative strategy is captured by Travis’s argument from 
misleading appearances as follows:
   MA1 ! Representationalism can explain the existence of perceptual 
illusions in terms of misrepresentation.
MA2 ! Anti-representationalism can explain the existence of perceptual 
illusions in terms of misleading or misinterpretation.
   MA3 ! The mere existence of perceptual illusions provides does not 
constitute a reason to suppose veridical perceptions to be 
representational. (From MA1 and MA2)
MA1 grants that the representationalist is able to explain perceptual illusions in 
terms of inaccurate, i.e. non-veridical, representations. This explanation, 
however, is placed on a level with the anti-representationalist account in MA2. 
This generates the conclusion in MA3 that, since that both accounts are able to 
offer an explanation of perceptual illusion, the mere existence of illusory 
experience does not favour either view. In essence, the availability of an 
alternative anti-representationalist account of illusion is held to neutralise the 
representationalist’s alleged advantage in this regard.
 Of course, it is open to either side to argue that their explanation is better 
than their opponent’s on grounds of consistency, parsimony, etc. This is 
precisely Byrne’s (2009) strategy, as discussed in the following chapter.17 For the 
time being, however, it will suffice to note that there are explanations of illusion 
available to anti-representationalists that are perfectly consistent with their 
explanation of veridical perceptual experience, but that do not depend upon the 
notion of representation. Such explanations generally account for misleading 
perceptions in terms of misinterpretation or misjudgements that individual 
perceptual experiences indicate something that they do not. That is to say that 
under normal circumstances an appearance of some particular type T which 
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perception, the former may share the same explanatory structure as the latter, as described in 
3.2.1.
17 For the converse claim, see Brewer 2006: 90–91.
reliably indicates that things are some particular way P may easily be mistaken 
for a similar appearance T′ that does not indicate P. Thus, by mistaking T′ for 
T, one is inclined to judge P when in fact not-P. For example, a navy-coloured 
jacket might appear black under fluorescent lighting, but blue in natural light. It 
is therefore easy to misjudge the former appearance as indicating that the jacket 
is black when in fact it is blue. Many such perceptual illusions may be explained 
in terms of their subjective similarities to experiences of objects or properties 
that, by custom, habit or inclination, we take them to resemble.
 The main difference between the above explanation and the 
representationalist’s relates to where one places the error. Representationalists 
typically take perceptual illusions to be errors of perception that furnish the 
subject with false or inaccurate representations — or rather misrepresentations. 
The resulting experiences are therefore in some sense erroneous. Anti-
representationalists, on the other hand, typically regard perception as a success 
term, and so there can be no errors of perception as such.18 Instead, illusions are 
cases in which we are misled by appearances, or fail to interpret them correctly, 
and thus the error is not one of experience per se, but of discrimination or 
judgement. In effect, whatever significance the representationalist places upon 
the notion of misrepresentation, the anti-representationalist attaches to 
whatever cognitive faculty ‘downstream’ of experience — judgement, 
discrimination, etc. — is responsible for misleading without any need to appeal 
to representation. The force of the representationalist’s objection from illusion 
can thus be seen to rest upon their commitment to the common kind assumption 
and the representational nature of experience, thus rendering their argument 
inconclusive. The anti-representationalist, on the other hand, can appeal to 
subjective similarities between objects and their ‘ringers’ (relative to human 
discriminatory capacities) as the reason for which we can be misled by 
experience without claiming that experience is thereby erroneous. Naturally, 
there may be differences between the sorts of similarities that individual 
perceivers find misleading, since their perceptual sensitivities may differ, but 
such errors are not errors of perception in the strictest sense.
 Travis’s argument from misleading appearances addresses the phenomenon 
of perceptual illusions, but does little to explain the nature of hallucinations. 
These cases, in which no perceptual object — or at least none of the ordinary 
kind — is present, can be explained by representationalists in a similar manner 
to illusions, i.e. as cases of misrepresentation. It is unclear, however, that anti-
representationalists need commit themselves to a substantive account of the 
nature of perceptual hallucinations other than that these constitute a form of 
perceptual experience that is easily mistaken for genuine perception. That is to 
say, hallucinations are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual 
experiences, but do not share the same categorial grounds. This position is 
defended by Martin (2004) as part of his ‘phenomenal disjunctivism’ (Byrne & 
Logue 2008: 68) as well as some representationalists, such as Williamson (2000) 
and McDowell (1994). The existence of hallucinations thus presents a further 
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opportunity for representationalists to press their case, with the argument 
proceeding in a manner analogous to the question concerning illusion. This no 
doubt presents a serious challenge to anti-representationalism. However, if the 
disjunctivist is right, this challenge need not undermine their account of the 
central cases of perception, which are taken to have explanatory and conceptual 
priority. Such arguments reveal a difference in the methodologies of 
representationalists, who aim for the most general account of perceptual 
experience possible, including hallucinations and illusions, and anti-
representationalists, who arguably offer a more parsimonious account of 
veridical perception upon which their accounts of illusion and hallucination are 
parasitic.
2.3.2. The argument from looks
The best known, but perhaps most misunderstood, of Travis’s arguments 
purports to show that (i) the notion of p-representation plays no fundamental 
role in a philosophical account of perception, and (ii) the Face-value and Looks-
indexing constraints that many representationalists place upon p-representation 
are inconsistent, and so that there can be no such form of representation. Byrne 
(2009: 14–15), for example, sets out Travis’s argument in terms of providing an 
account of illusion, thereby portraying it as aiming to secure the weaker 
conclusion that representationalism lacks support, whilst Siegel (2010: 60–65) 
takes it to be primarily about the semantics of ‘looks’. Travis, however, clearly 
takes himself to be arguing for the much stronger conclusion that ‘perception is 
not [p-]representational’ (Travis 2004: 57), and so ‘is, in a crucial way, not an 
intentional phenomenon’ (ibid. 93). The truth, I will argue (5.2.4), lies 
somewhere in between these two extremes.
 Travis’s argument from looks proceeds on the assumption that what makes 
the representational content of perceptual experiences recognisable to a subject 
must, by hypothesis, be the way that things in that experience appear, i.e. 
Looks-indexing. In the case of visual perception, this corresponds to how things 
look to the subject, raising the question of whether any notion of looks is 
capable of indexing representational content. As such, this argument does not 
rule out forms of representationalism that reject Face-value, Recognisability or 
Looks-indexing.19 Rather, it aims to establish that p-representation cashed out 
in terms of mere appearances, i.e. looks, cannot perform the function that many 
representationalists assign to it, and so cannot constitute an adequate 
explanation of experience.
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(2.3.3).
 The argument may be summarised as follows:
        L1! The content of any given p-representation must be recognisable 
to the subject solely in virtue of how, in the relevant experience, 
things perceptually seem to that subject. (Looks-indexing)
L2 If visual experiences were p-representational, then their contents 
would be indexed according to the way that things look [to the 
subject]. (Corollary of L1)
L3! Visual (i.e. comparative) looks are unfit to index representational 
content since they are indeterminate between multiple contents, 
which would contravene Face-value.
L4! Thinkable (i.e. epistemic) looks are unfit to index 
representational content since they cannot be determined solely 
on the basis of what is perceptually available to the subject in 
experience, which would contravene Recognisability.
L5! No further notion of looks is capable of satisfying both Face-
value and Recognisability.
L6! The contents of visual experiences cannot be indexed according 
to the way that things look [to the subject]. (From L3 to L5)
        L7! Visual experiences are not p-representational. (From L2 and 
L6)20
 The transition from L1 to L2 is justified by inference to the best explanation 
as the most plausible account of how visual experiences are able to satisfy 
Recognisability. Travis’s notion of ‘indexing’ relates to whatever feature of 
perceptual experience is supposed to make its representational content 
recognisable to the subject. Thus, the content of any perceptual experience that 
is looks-indexed is recognisable in virtue of how, in it, things visually appear to 
the subject (2.2.5). L3 and L4 are concerned with the various notions of looks 
that might perform such perceptual indexing. Here, Travis identifies two distinct 
forms of looks, claiming that neither is capable of performing the required 
function. From this, along with considerations about the conflicting demands 
upon the notion of looks (L5), Travis draws the conclusion that visual 
experience (L6) — and by generalisation all forms of perception — cannot be p-
representational (L7).
 The argument from looks presents the representationalist with an apparent 
dilemma. They must either (a) elucidate a notion of ‘looks’ that is capable of 
indexing the relevant representational content, thereby rejecting one of L3, L4 
or L5, or else (b) reject Looks-indexing, Face-value or Recognisability. Rejecting 
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20  Although the argument is presented in terms of visual perception, it is presumably 
intended to generalise to cover other perceptual modalities.
Looks-indexing places the onus upon the representationalist to find some other 
way of satisfying Recognisability, or else justify dropping this apparently 
plausible condition upon p-representation. (Travis has a separate argument 
against such views that I discuss in 2.3.3.) Rejecting Face-value, on the other 
hand, loses one of the supposed benefits of representationalism, namely that 
perception represents the world as being some particular way. To understand 
why the dilemma is pressing, however, it is necessary to gain a clear 
understanding of the notions of  visual and thinkable looks that Travis 
considers,21  along with the reasons why he considers it impossible that any 
further notion of looks could meet the representationalist’s requirements.
 The first notion of looks that Travis considers is what are more commonly 
called comparative looks (cf. Chisholm 1957: 45). Such looks involve some kind 
of explicit or implicit comparison with the visual appearance of another object, 
or objects, and are characterised in terms of what something ‘looks like’ in order 
to appear the way it does (Travis 2004: 69–70). Thus, they are visual looks 
(Travis forthcoming: §3). For convenience, I will abbreviate this as looksv. For 
example, if the object before me looksv like a lemon, then it has the 
characteristic look that lemons have — call this looking lemonish. Furthermore, 
since many things share that very same way of looking, anything that looks 
lemonish also looks like a wax imitation lemon, or (to the untrained eye under 
appropriate circumstances) like a yellowish lime, the front surface of a 
hollowed-out lemon, a lemon-shaped bar of soap, and so on. In fact, there are 
innumerable ways that something can look like a lemon. Thus, for all that 
things lookv a particular way, there are any number of ways that the world 
might actually be, all of which share the same visual appearance.
 Importantly, the corresponding resemblance relationships are symmetrical; if 
something looksv like a wax lemon then a wax lemon also looksv like it. 
Consequently, claims Travis, there can be nothing about an object’s lookingv 
like p that identifies the content of that experience as representing p; for 
example, that there is a lemon before me. Rather, the very same perceptual 
experience might equally be said to represent any (or all) of the numerous ways 
in which it can lookv to me just like there is a lemon before me — that there is a 
wax lemon, for example. As per L3, comparative or visual looks fail to meet the 
Face-value condition (2.2.2), since they ‘do not decide any particular 
representational content for any given experience to have’ (Travis 2004: 69). 
Visual looks, in this sense, are equivocal.
 The second notion of looks that Travis considers is what are generally called 
epistemic looks (cf. Chisholm 1957: 44). Whereas visual looks relate to 
resemblances between appearances, epistemic looks are ‘very much a matter of 
what can be gathered from, or what is suggested by, the facts at hand, or those 
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21  Travis (2004) uses the terms ‘looks like’ and ‘looks as if’ in place of visible and thinkable 
looks, but this is apt to generate the impression that the argument concerns the semantic 
properties of certain linguistic forms rather than two roles that such appearances can play. I 
therefore adopt the terminology of Travis (forthcoming) in order to remain neutral about the 
nature of looks and their semantics, which are considered in greater depth in chapter 4.
visibly (audibly, etc.) on hand’ (Travis 2004: 76). They are what might be called 
thinkable looks (Travis forthcoming), or lookst for short. Thinkable looks refer 
to a specific way that things are in order to look the way that they do. Thus, 
they are ideally suited to indexing p-representational contents like ‘there is a 
lemon before me’. Indeed, thinkable looks just are those contents that 
perceptual experiences incline a perceiver to believe or judge under the relevant 
circumstances.22 Whereas one might say, for example, that a particular painting 
looksv like a Vermeer despite our knowing that it was in fact painted by van 
Meegeren (an artist with an indistinguishable visual style), we would not 
normally say that it lookst as if it is a Vermeer since we already know that it is 
not (ibid. 75).23
 It is doubtful, however, that the contents that are indexed by or identical to 
thinkable looks are recognisable to the subject solely on the basis of information 
that is perceptually available to them in experience. For example, if Amy sees 
what she takes to be a lemon in front of her, then there is a sense in which the 
relevant object lookst to her as if it is a lemon (which it is). But for all that 
things look that way, she might equally have taken the same object to be a 
lemon-shaped bar of soap had she had a subjectively indistinguishable 
experience of it in a different context — upon walking into a chemist’s shop, for 
example. This is not due to any difference in the information that is perceptually 
available to the subject, but rather a matter of what she takes to be the case on 
the basis of that information. Plausibly, what is different about these two 
situations is not a matter of how things look in any perceptual sense, but of 
what the subject is inclined to infer from their total evidence base under the 
circumstances. Such inferences are a matter of judgement and not of experience, 
which conveys only how things appear. It is therefore unclear how one could 
differentiate solely in virtue of perceptual experience, as Recognisability 
requires, which of various otherwise indistinguishable possibilities are p-
represented. Moreover, thinkable looks are a form of autorepresentation which, 
Travis argues, cannot be ‘given’ to the subject since its content is already 
accepted as true (2.2.3). Thus thinkable looks are in danger of collapsing into 
what Travis (2004: 67) calls mere ‘indicating’. That is, as suggesting to a subject 
that, under the circumstances, p may be the case. But this cannot be what makes 
representational content recognisable for similar reasons. Thinkable looks 
cannot index p-representational content on the basis of how things perceptually 
seem to the subject since the information that distinguishes them is not 
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22  Travis (2004) associates thinkable looks with the English locution ‘looks as if’ in the 
indicative mood, as distinct from ‘looks like’, which is typically (though not always) 
comparative.
23  The issue is complicated by the fact that several different locutions of ‘looks‘ — including, 
on occasions ‘looks like‘ — can be used to signify either comparative or epistemic looks. 
Travis (2004) claims that ‘looks as though … were …’ in the subjunctive mood only ever 
expresses the former notion, whereas ‘looks as if … is …’ in the indicative mood only 
expresses the latter. His argument, however, does not turn on this point, and the linguistic 
claim is dropped in Travis (forthcoming).
perceptually available to them, either in experience or otherwise, and thus 
Recognisability fails. Thinkable looks are not perceptual looks.
 It is important to emphasise that Travis’s argument from looks is not a 
merely semantic dispute about the meaning of ‘looks’, ‘appearance’, ‘seems’ and 
their cognates. As such, the point of the argument is not that there is no widely 
accepted meaning of ‘looks’ that individuates perceptual content. Rather, the 
intended point is that there can be no such notion of looks on the basis that the 
very idea of a univocal, objective and wholly perceptual ‘look’ is itself 
incoherent. Either (a) looks are visual, in which case they fail to pick out any 
specific way that the world must be in order for things to look that way, i.e. 
they are equivocal, or (b) looks ‘index’, or are identical to, thinkable contents 
about the subject’s perceptual environment, in which case they are not wholly 
perceptual, since nothing that is perceptually available to (as opposed to 
knowable by) the subject could pick out such univocal content.
 Having established the two horns of the dilemma that Travis presses, the 
question naturally arises as to whether some other notion of looks is able to 
index representational content in a way that both has face value and is 
perceptually available to the subject. As Travis (2004: 79–82) makes clear in his 
discussion of McDowell’s notion of ‘ostensible seeing’, however, his answer to 
this question is emphatically negative. According to McDowell’s disjunctive 
notion of looks — call this looksd — every possible state of affairs matching the 
relevant perceptible appearance is said to be represented. This either robs p-
representation of its univocality, since experience does not represent things to be 
a determinate way, or, if the disjunction itself is the face value, it removes the 
possibility that such content can misrepresent, thus undermining standard 
representationalist explanation of perceptual illusion (2.3.1).
 In essence, the need to satisfy Recognisability pushes towards visual looks, 
which contravene Face-value, whilst attempts to satisfy Face-value push towards 
thinkable looks, which contravene Recognisability. The requirements to 
establish both univocal representational content (Face-value) and to make that 
content recognisable solely in virtue of how things appear to the subject (Looks-
indexing) thus work against each other in a way that is, according to Travis, 
fundamentally irreconcilable. Thus there cannot be any intermediate notion of 
looks or middle ground between these two alternatives, and so the idea of looks-
indexed p-representation is incoherent.24 Nevertheless, many of Travis’s critics 
(e.g. Byrne 2009 and Schellenberg 2011b) take there to be a further ‘non-
comparative’ notion of looks that shares the relevant features of visible and 
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24  One way around this would be to abandon the notion that p-representational concepts 
concern the subject’s perceptual environment in favour of their being facts about the 
experiences of subjects (cf. Glüer 2009). But this robs representationalism of much of its 
explanatory power, since the resulting propositions are no longer capable of grounding 
objective knowledge or belief about external objects.
thinkable looks in order that both Face-value and Looks-indexing may both be 
met.25 Such rejections of L5 are examined in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4.
 An alternative response to Travis’s argument from looks is to reject Looks-
indexing in favour of the weaker Recognisability condition, or else to reject 
Recognisability outright. The former option places the onus upon the 
representationalist to explain how perceivers are able to recognise the contents 
of their perceptual experiences in a way that does not fall foul of Travis’s 
argument from recognisability (2.3.3). It is, however, difficult to see how this 
can be done other than through Looks-indexing, at least in the case of visual 
perception. This response may be combined with a rejection of one or more of 
Givenness, Common Content or Face-value, each of which is independently 
plausible for reasons given above. The second option of rejecting or 
reformulating Recognisability is more radical, though once again raises the 
question of in what sense the resulting states would involve a form of 
representation as opposed to mere causal covariance. Nevertheless, if p-
representational content is thought to be externally individuated, then one might 
not expect it to be recognisable — at least not in the standard sense — to the 
subject, depending upon how this condition is formulated. This possibility is 
examined in greater detail in chapters 5 and 6.
2.3.3. The argument from recognisability
The third of Travis’s main arguments against representationalism appears in the 
final section of his paper.26 This argument, which I will refer to as the argument 
from recognisability, is directed against those representationalists who reject 
Looks-indexing (L1 of the argument from looks) in favour of the weaker 
Recognisability condition. As noted above, Travis does not take his case against 
representationalism to depend upon Looks-indexing and, whilst the appropriate 
formulation of Recognisability is a matter of some delicacy, it seems at least 
superficially plausible that the content of p-representation might in some sense 
be recognisable directly from experience, as opposed to how things look 
(appear, seem, etc.) in it. Perhaps, as Travis puts it, ‘we can just tell how things 
are thus represented to us; there is no saying precisely how we can tell’ (Travis 
2004: 84). In other words, even if there were no rule-based algorithm describing 
how we are able to recognise the content of perceptual experiences — on the 
basis of looks, for example — we nevertheless possess some innate or acquired 
capacity to do so. Travis raises two questions for such views: (i) precisely which 
contents do such experiences have, where the explanation for this must give 
some principled reason for thinking that one answer to this question can be 
correct here over another, and (ii) what is the relation between our being 
represented to in this way and our seeing (hearing, tasting, etc.) the things we 
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25  Byrne (2009) claims to reject Looks-indexing, but it is unclear that he takes it to play the 
role that is described here (3.2.1).
26  Mislabelled section 4 (actually section 5) in Travis (2004: 82–93), or section 6 in Travis 
(forthcoming).
do, since if there is no such relation, then representing would be nothing but ‘a 
(very annoying) wheel idling’ (ibid. 86)?
 In relation to the first of these questions, Travis presents the following 
argument:
R1! Perceptual subjects must be capable of recognising the 
representational content of any given p-representation solely in 
virtue of having that very experience. (Recognisability)
R2 The notion of representation that is involved in perceptual 
experience should be one that is familiar to us.
R3! The contents of p-representations cannot be recognisable by their 
(external) objects since, according to the principle of 
intentionality, there may be no such objects.
R4! The contents of p-representations cannot be recognisable by what 
the subject takes to be the case, since for perceptual takings to be 
part of experience would contravene Givenness.
R5! The contents of p-representations cannot be recognisable by what 
they indicate, or are taken to do so, since indicating and 
expecting are not wholly perceptual, which would contravene 
Recognisability.
R6! P-representational content cannot be recognisable by what 
experience is like (i.e. its phenomenal character), since this is 
indeterminate between multiple contents, which would 
contravene Face-value.
       R7! No other feature of p-representation is capable of satisfying all of 
the above constraints.
R8! We cannot recognise the representational nature and content of 
p-representation solely in virtue of having that very experience. 
(From R7)
       R9! Perceptual experiences are not p-representational. (From R1 and 
R8)
 The structure of the above argument closely mirrors that of the argument 
from looks (2.3.2), with Looks-indexing (L1) replaced by Recognisability (R1), 
and R5 and R6 corresponding to L4 and L3, respectively. Additional premises 
(R3 and R4) deal with the recognition of p-representational content via its 
external (i.e. intentional) objects and the notion of indication discussed above 
(2.3.1, 1.2.3). In addition to drawing upon all four necessary conditions for p-
representation (2.3.1–2.3.4), the argument also assumes what I have called the 
principle of intentionality (2.2) — a consequence of the representationalist’s 
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explanation of illusion in terms of misrepresentation (2.3.1). Rejecting this 
would therefore undermine both the relevant explanation of illusion and R3, 
yielding an externalist form of content disjunctivism in which the external 
objects of experience individuate its content. However, this still presents the 
difficulty of explaining precisely how such content may be recognised on the 
basis of its objects, as discussed in chapter 6.
 Travis motivates R2 on the basis that ‘[i]t should not come as a complete 
surprise [to us] that we are thus represented to’ (Travis 2004: 86). This ties in 
with the justification of Recognisability as a consequence of Face-value and 
Givenness, since it is the subject of experience, as opposed to some sub-personal 
mechanism, that is supposed to be presented with representational content. The 
relevant notion of representing is therefore supposed to be something that is 
already clear, or else graspable on the basis of reflection, perhaps of a 
philosophical nature, upon ordinary experience. This restricts the range of 
possible answers to the question of what feature, or features, of experience 
make its contents recognisable to the subject — or, alternatively, to what makes 
it the case that there is a correct answer to what the content of a given 
experience is — to a relatively small number of candidates. These are then 
considered and rejected by Travis in R3 through R6 as follows:
    (R3) If the objects of perceptual experience (i.e. concrete external objects and 
their properties) were what made experiential content recognisable, then 
it would only be possible to satisfy Recognisability if these were proper 
parts of experience. However, the representationalist explanation of 
illusion in terms of misrepresentation means that one can have a type-
identical experience in the absence of the relevant objects. Thus they 
cannot be what explains the corresponding content’s recognisability, 
since it would still remain to be explained what makes the illusory 
experience’s content recognisable, and where such an explanation would 
render the original explanation superfluous.27
(R4)      The feature of experience that makes p-representational content 
recognisable cannot be that the subject takes that content to be true 
since, according to Givenness, p-representation does not involve taking 
anything to be the case. Rather, such content is ‘given’ to the subject; i.e. 
p-representation is allorepresentation, not autorepresentation (2.2.3). If 
this were not the case, it would reverse the order of explanation between 
perceptual content and judgement or belief, since subjects are supposed 
to make such judgements on the basis of perceptual experience, and not 
the other way round, generating a potential circularity in the justification 
of perceptual belief. Consequently, recognisability cannot depend on the 
subject’s taking or judging things to be the case.
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dialectical force, however, due to the representationalist’s endorsement of the principle of 
intentionality, whereas the anti-representationalist is committed to no such principle.
(R5)      If p-representational content cannot be recognised on the basis of what 
the subject takes to be the case (R4), then perhaps the relevant feature is 
a matter of indicating. This would make p-representation akin to 
thinkable looks (2.3.2) which indicate what the subject would be 
justified in believing under the circumstances, but can still be accepted or 
rejected as per Givenness. The problem with this suggestion is that, like 
thinkable looks, such indications cannot be recognised solely on the 
basis of what is given in experience, as Recognisability demands, since 
they are not wholly perceptual, but rely on the subject’s additional 
background knowledge or the context of the experience. Therefore the 
relevant feature of p-representation cannot be indication.
(R6)      Finally, p-representational content is not recognisable on the basis of 
‘what experience is like’, i.e. its discernible phenomenal character, 
because perceptual phenomenology alone fails to identify any univocal 
way that the world might objectively be. This parallels Travis’s argument 
against visual looks (2.3.2) as the locus for univocal content in L3 of the 
argument from looks. If what experience ‘is like’ were to represent every 
state of affairs matching the phenomenology of that experience, then 
‘[t]oo many things would be represented as so at once’, making p-
representation ‘incoherent, thus not intelligibly representation’ (Travis 
2004: 87); i.e. it would have massively disjunctive contents. Since 
phenomenal character contravenes Face-value, it cannot be what fixes 
representational content, nor can it be what makes such content 
recognisable.28
 Having ruled out the obvious candidates for the recognition of p-
representational contents solely on the basis of experience, and in the absence of 
any other plausible options, Travis concludes that p-representation simply has 
no such feature (R7). Consequently, subjects cannot recognise p-
representational contents solely in virtue of having the relevant perceptual 
experiences, and so those experiences cannot be p-representational (R9).
 Much as Travis’s argument from looks aims to characterise p-representation 
as an intermediate notion between visual and thinkable looks, the argument 
from recognisability aims to characterise it as intermediate between taking 
something to be the case (i.e. autorepresentation) and indicating. In both cases 
the problem, according to Travis, is that there is and can be no such 
intermediary. Just as McDowell’s attempt to combine the two notions of looks 
into a single notion of ‘ostensible seeing’ collapses (Travis 2004: 81), the idea 
that experience represents something to us on the basis of what experience 
makes perceptually available is either incoherent or superfluous. It is incoherent 
because, on the one hand, the need for univocal face value pushes us towards 
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28 The type of content that perceptual phenomenology does gives rise to, namely phenomenal 
content, cannot be considered univocal since it does not identify any particular way for 
things to objectively be. Rather, it individuates how things are with the subject, irrespective 
of the external world. For further argument on this point, see 3.2.3.
forms of autorepresentation that contravene Givenness. On the other hand, the 
notion of indicating is essentially context-dependent and so cannot be solely a 
matter of what is perceptually available to the subject in experience. 
Furthermore, if p-representation were ‘a mere re-rehearsing of what experience 
has otherwise made plain’ (ibid. 88), then there would be no further role for it 
to play, and so such representation would be otiose (see 2.3.4). In order to play 
the relevant explanatory role, p-representation must be what conveys the 
contents of experience to the subject, which, by Travis’s lights, it cannot do. The 
present argument may therefore be regarded as a stronger and more general 
form of the argument from looks, whose structure it entails.
 The above argument leaves it open to the representationalist to avoid its 
conclusion by denying one of Travis’s conditions upon p-representation, such as 
Recognisability, or by proposing some other method or notion of recognition 
that is capable of respecting these conditions. To deny Givenness would result in 
a doxastic account of perceptual content, with all the problems that this 
entails.29  Denying the principle of intentionality undermines the 
representationalist’s account of illusion, which relies upon the notion that 
perception is an intentional phenomenon and so the relevant representational 
elements can occur in the absence of the objects or properties that it represents 
(2.3.1). A similar problem occurs if the representationalist denies that the 
relevant representing should be something that is familiar to us (R2). In both 
cases, it is no longer clear what work the role of representation is supposed to 
do in the explanation of perceptual experience, except perhaps as a placeholder 
for some technical notion quite unlike the ordinary use of this term. Face-value 
is, as we have seen, a prerequisite for many representationalist accounts of 
experience, including some that allow for disjunctive content (2.2.2). None of 
these responses is therefore without its problems.
 Finally, the formulation and necessity of Recognisability itself may be called 
into question. For example, if what is meant by recognise the content of 
experience is to be able to know what is represented therein, then it is possible 
to give an externalist account of knowledge that satisfies this condition without 
contravening R2 (6.3.2). Such a move towards externalism, however, may end 
up entailing much the sort of relation between subject and object that anti-
representationalists argue is necessary for perceptual experience, and so 
constitutes a kind of hybrid position. Any view that denies Recognisability 
outright entails rejecting the link between representation and phenomenal 
character altogether, and thus rejects intentionalism. These issues are taken up 
in detail in chapters 5 and 6.
2.3.4. The argument from unmediated awareness
Travis’s fourth and final argument against representationalism addresses the 
second of the above questions concerning the relation between the role of p-
representation and perceptual states like seeing, hearing, tasting, and so on. The 
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argument falls into two distinct parts. The first part aims to show that if 
experience involved p-representation, then this representation must be the sole 
source of perceptual information available to the subject. That is, in the case of 
veridical perception, representation should not be an unnecessary ‘wheel 
idling’ (Travis 2004: 86). The second part of the argument concludes that any 
awareness of an object in virtue of p-representation would at best be mediate 
awareness. Such awareness is comparable to testimony, and is constituted by the 
representation of content plus the satisfaction of ‘certain quite substantial 
contingencies’ (ibid. 89), such as believing the content to be true, the obtaining 
of the relevant correctness conditions, the reliability of the source, and so on. 
However, many representationalists think that perception delivers unmediated 
awareness. Seeing the pig constitutes a form of awareness of the pig that being 
told there is a pig does not — at least not until the various contingent conditions 
are satisfied, and perhaps not even then. What remains mysterious is how a state 
(i.e. p-representation) one can be in without the presence of its intentional 
objects — in hallucinations, for example — can play an explanatory role in the 
awareness of those objects in the ‘good’ case. Rather, whatever is doing the 
explanatory work must be something over and above p-representation, thereby 
rendering its content if not unnecessary then at least lacking in explanatory 
value.
 The first part of this argument can be summarised as follows:
       U1 ! P-representation is either (a) a separate source of perceptual 
information to seeing30 or (b) constitutes one’s perceptual 
awareness.
U2  If p-representation were a separate source of perceptual 
awareness to seeing, then it would be unnecessary for the 
awareness of objects simpliciter.
U3  We have no phenomenological evidence for the existence of 
multiple sources of perceptual information in visual experience.
       U4 ! P-representation and seeing are not separate sources of 
perceptual information.
Travis’s rejects the ‘two-source’ model of perceptual awareness on the basis that 
if p-representation and seeing were separate sources of information, the latter of 
which was sufficient for perceptual awareness, then p-representation would be 
effectively redundant (U2). (The relevant notion of ‘source’ here is proximal, not 
distal, and so is more akin to an informational conduit than a causal origin.) 
Therefore p-representation and seeing are not separate sources of perceptual 
information (U3), and so p-representation must be constitutive of the perceptual 
awareness of objects, as per U1(b).
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 Having argued for a ‘one-source’ model of perceptual awareness, Travis 
aims to establish that p-representation can only ever furnish us with ‘mediated’, 
as opposed to ‘unmediated’, awareness of objects. He argues this on the basis of 
the following principle or test (Travis 2004: 89):
As a rule, awareness of something else plus satisfaction of surrounding 
conditions cannot add up to that awareness of [the presence of o] which we 
have in seeing [o] (to be there) — in my terms, unmediated awareness. Or, 
more exactly, if X is something there might be even without Y, then 
awareness of X (and whatever accompanies it per se in a particular case) 
cannot qualify as unmediated awareness of Y — the sort one might have in 
seeing Y.
In familiar forms of representation, such as testimony, it may be represented to 
the subject that X. However, since such representations can occur even though 
not-X — e.g. in the case of false testimony — such representation cannot 
constitute unmediated awareness due to the presence of a representational 
intermediary, in this case a report. According to Travis, what goes for testimony 
goes for perception since, as we have seen, the representationalist also allows 
that representational content may be present without its corresponding 
intentional objects. Thus, awareness of a particular content cannot constitute 
unmediated awareness of an object since the same state can occur in the absence 
of that object.
 We can formalise the second part of the argument as follows:
       U5 ! Subjectively indistinguishable veridical and non-veridical 
perceptual experiences share a common representational content. 
(Common Content)
U6  In non-veridical experience, p-representation cannot yield 
unmediated awareness of intentional objects, since there may be 
no such objects.
U7  The same representational content cannot explain the 
unmediated awareness of objects in some cases, but not in others.
       U8 ! P-representational content cannot yield unmediated awareness of 
an object in veridical perception. (From U5, U6 and U7)
This yields a kind of reverse argument from illusion that combines 
representationalist’s account of illusion (U5) with a ‘base case’ (U6) and 
‘generalising’ or ‘spreading step’ (U7) to force the conclusion that p-
representational content cannot yield the unmediated awareness of objects (U8) 
even in the ‘good’ case (cf. Snowdon op. cit.). More schematically, if a given 
representational content does not constitute unmediated awareness in non-
veridical experience, then it cannot constitute unmediated awareness in veridical 
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perception either.31  Since many representationalists hold that such 
representations, or their constituent elements, can also occur in the absence of 
that which they represent — indeed, this is often supposed to be one of the 
strengths of representationalism — then the argument from unmediated 
awareness, if successful, would render perceptual awareness mediate in a similar 
way to testimony.
 It is important to note that the term ‘mediated awareness’ does not imply 
that one is aware of the intermediary; i.e. it is not indirect or secondary 
epistemic perception in Dretske’s sense (1969: 79). Rather, the claim is that this 
is not the kind of awareness that we take ourselves to have in perceptual 
experience. Perceptual awareness cannot, according to the present view, be 
factorized into p-representation plus the satisfaction of some additional 
surrounding conditions such as taking something to be the case, factivity, 
reliability, entitlement, and so on (Travis 2004: 89). This claim has important 
epistemological consequences since if to see x is to have unmediated awareness 
of x or to have one’s cognitive responses shaped by x’s presence, then ‘no 
substantial entitlement is needed … to take there to be [x]’ (Travis 2004: 90). 
Unmediated awareness of objects is therefore uniquely suited to yielding 
knowledge of the world in a way that mediate, that is to say representational, 
awareness is not — at least not without the satisfaction of a host of as-yet-
unspecified, and quite possibly unspecifiable, further conditions.
 The argument from unmediated awareness is completed by the following 
premises:
       U9 ! Visual experience (seeing) is a source of information that yields 
unmediated awareness of objects.
     U10! Visual experience is not p-representation. (From U4, U8 and U9)
In summary, and generalising to cover other sense modalities, if p-representation 
were our sole source of perceptual information but cannot deliver unmediated 
awareness of objects, then perceptual experience cannot be p-representational.
 As with the historical argument from illusion (2.3.1), Travis’s argument 
from unmediated awareness may be challenged at several key points. Why, for 
example, should the representationalist accept that the same p-representational 
content cannot yield unmediated awareness in some cases and not in others 
(U7)? On the face of it, this principle seems intuitive, but if p-representation 
were ‘narrow’ in the sense of being internally individuated, whilst the mental 
state of awareness were ‘wide’ or externally individuated, then the same narrow 
content could be present in both cases without ruling out that it could also 
feature in the explanation of unmediated awareness in the veridical, but not the 
non-veridical case. Similarly at the level of content, some but not all 
representational elements may be common between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases, 
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generating a form of content disjunctivism or indexicality. This is perfectly 
consistent with Common Content and would explain the immediate awareness 
of objects in terms of those representational elements or contents that are 
present in the ‘good’ case, but not the ‘bad’.
 Such responses, however, suggest there must be more to unmediated 
awareness than perceptually experiencing an appropriately caused p-
representation of an object. This ‘something more’ is arguably precisely the 
relation between subject and object that anti-representationalists claim is 
fundamental to perceptual experience, and which appears to be omitted from 
the representationalist model. This in turn suggests that representationalism 
gives at best a partial characterisation of perceptual experience with much of the 
explanatory work being done by the relational element. This suggestion is taken 
up further in chapters 6 and 7, which explore the possibility that 
representationalism and relationalism may in some sense be two sides of the 
same coin.
2.4. Conclusion
Travis’s case against representationalism consists of a series of arguments, each 
of which targets the view that perceptual experience constitutively involves a 
particular form of representation — namely p-representation. Such 
representations meet the conditions of Content, Face-value, Givenness and 
Recognisability set out above, each of which is individually necessary for p-
representation. In responding to Travis, the representationalist must therefore 
either challenge the soundness of these arguments or else provide an alternative 
notion of representation that rejects one or more of these conditions upon p-
representation whilst maintaining the distinctive thesis that perceptual 
experience may be characterised in essentially representational terms, i.e. REP. If 
Travis is right, then perceptual experience cannot simply be a matter of a 
perceiver’s being in a particular representational state, but rather constitutively 
depends upon the subject’s relation to the objects they perceive, i.e. REL. On this 
view, the notion of p-representation omits the very aspect of perception, namely 
‘openness to the world’, that explains its ability to make an objective world 
available to us in conscious thought and experience.
 The following chapters examine a range of responses to Travis’s anti-
representationalism. These range from positing a third, ‘non-comparative’ 
notion of looks (chapters 3 and 4) to rejecting Recognisability (chapter 5) or 
positing an alternative mechanism for its satisfaction (chapter 6). Even if Travis 
arguments were successful, however, this would not show that there is no 
notion of representation that is applicable to perception. Rather, Travis’s claim 
is that such a notion would be (a) unrecognisable to us as representation; i.e. it 
would be a form of ‘quasi-representation’ that shares some of the properties of 
p-representation but, for example, does not show up in conscious perceptual 
experience; or (b) unable to support many of the claims that representationalists 
typically make for their theories — as a means of explaining phenomenal 
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character (i.e. intentionalism) or what is common to both experience and 
judgement, for example.
 The challenge for representationalists, then, is to elucidate the 
representational ‘language’ of the senses without thereby committing to the 
existence of the kind of perceptual relation that many anti-representationalists, 
typically relationalists, take to be essential to perceptual experience. If it is the 
relationality, and not the representational content of experience, that accords 
perception its special role within the philosophy and epistemology of mind, then 
representation simply drops out of the picture since the senses would, as Travis 
claims, be ‘silent’.
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3. The Sound of Silence
Three arguments from perceptual appearances
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter I examine three arguments in favour of perceptual experience 
having p-representational content. Although each is presented in connection 
with a particular philosopher in the literature — namely, Alex Byrne (2009), 
Susanna Siegel (2010) and Susanna Schellenberg (2011b) — they all exemplify a 
common approach or assumption concerning experience. That is, they take the 
nature or phenomenology of perceptual appearances to be decisive in 
establishing the existence of representational content. Furthermore, despite 
ostensibly responding to Travis (2004), each of these arguments fails to engage 
with central aspects of the case against representationalism by underestimating 
its force and generality. Consequently, these arguments fail to address the 
central issues that Travis raises, rendering them unsuccessful as responses to 
anti-representationalism or in establishing the existence of p-representational 
content. Whilst this does not rule out the possibility that experience may indeed 
have representational content, or that certain forms of relationalism about 
experience may be compatible with this view — as Siegel and Schellenberg, for 
example, claim — to establish this, a better way of adjudicating between the 
relevant positions will need to be found.
3.2. An Argument from Non-Comparative Looks
The first argument in favour of representationalism I wish to consider involves a 
third notion of looks — namely, non-comparative or phenomenal looks — which, 
unlike Travis’s visible and thinkable looks, is supposedly capable of grounding 
representational content. A recent exponent of this approach is Alex Byrne 
(2009), who argues in favour of non-comparative looks (3.2.2). Byrne’s 
principal criticism of Travis’s anti-representationalism is that it fails to provide 
an adequate account of perceptual illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer figure (ibid. 
445). Representationalism, on the other hand, is tailor-made to provide such an 
explanation in terms of the notion of misrepresentation, as previously discussed 
in chapter 2. However, Byrne’s argument on this point begs the question by 
characterising anti-representationalism as involving a ‘factive propositional 
attitude’ (ibid. 437) when the existence of any such attitude in experience is 
precisely what anti-representationalists like Travis deny (3.2.1).
 Furthermore, I argue that Byrne fails to elucidate a coherent non-
comparative notion of looks, arguably committing him to a form of phenomenal 
content that is unable to support the standard representationalist account of 
illusion since it entails that any experience that has the relevant content is 
necessarily veridical simply in virtue of being experienced (3.2.3). If so, Byrne’s 
own account of experience suffers from precisely the difficulty that he levels at 
Travis since it is incapable of explaining how the relevant perceptual content is 
able to misrepresent in the case of perceptual illusion. Given that, according to 
Byrne, this was supposed to be one of the main benefits of representationalism 
about perceptual experience, and the reason for which he rejects Travis’s anti-
representationalism, this renders his response to Travis seriously flawed, or at 
least incomplete. Thus I argue that the attempt to ground representational 
content in ‘non-comparative’ looks fails to establish representationalism (3.2.4).
3.2.1. ‘Zeeing’ and the problem of illusion
Byrne begins his argument by spelling out the thesis to which Travis is opposed, 
which he refers to as the Content View.1 After rejecting an initial formulation of 
this thesis on the basis that it involves a ‘special philosophical sense’ (ibid. 433) 
of perceptual experience that Byrne rejects, he settles on the following 
characterisation of the view (ibid. 437):
CV′ Perception constitutively involves a propositional attitude rather like 
the non-factive attitude of believing.
According to this thesis — a form of representationalism — whenever one 
perceives, one is in a contentful representational state that does not entail the 
truth of its contents.2  Thus ‘perceiving’ is akin to ‘believing’ or ‘hoping’, and 
unlike ‘knowing’, which is generally taken to be factive. From this, we can infer 
that Byrne endorses Travis’s Objectivity condition, since propositional attitudes 
‘represent things as being so’, and are therefore assessable for truth or accuracy 
(2.2.1).
 In order for there to be some particular way that things are represented as 
being, however, this content must have a single face-value content, and so CV′ 
may also be taken to entail Face-value. Whether Byrne endorses Givenness is 
less clear, since his analogy with belief might be taken to suggest that the 
relevant propositional attitude entails a level of commitment compatible with 
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2 Byrne’s use of the term ‘propositional attitude’ is intended to be neutral between conceptual 
and non-conceptual content, and so CV′ should not be taken to entail a purely conceptual 
view of perceptual content (ibid.).
perception being autorepresentation, or representation-by. However, as Travis 
argues, perception cannot be autorepresentation since only committed 
allorepresentation — i.e. representation-to — can have a face value (2.2.3). I will 
therefore assume for the sake of argument that Byrne also endorses Givenness, 
though nothing in what follows turns on this. Finally, I argue below that Byrne 
endorses a form of Looks-indexing, which in turn entails Recognisability, albeit 
under a different notion of looks than the ones Travis considers (3.2.3). As such, 
the content of a perceptual state must be accessible to the subject solely in virtue 
of their being in that very state. From this, we can conclude that the content of 
the propositional attitude to which Byrne refers is a form of p-representation, 
and thus a potential target of Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2).
 In order to determine whether CV′ is true, it will be necessary to compare it 
with the corresponding anti-representationalist position from some suitably 
neutral standpoint. Byrne’s attempt to do this centres upon his analysis of 
perceptual illusion in terms of the propositional attitudes of ‘exing’ and 
‘zeeing’ (Byrne 2009: 437).
 Byrne’s positive argument for representationalism takes the form of an 
inference to the best explanation. The idea is to show that there are theoretical 
considerations that count in favour of CV′ — a claim which Byrne takes Travis 
to deny — thereby providing a counter-argument to Travis’s argument from 
misleading appearances (2.3.1). He begins by characterising anti-
representationalism in terms of a factive attitude — ‘zeeing’ — which is 
somewhat akin to knowing (ibid.). According to this view, perceptual illusion 
may be explained in terms of misinterpreting one’s ‘zeeing that p’ as indicating 
q, and thus arriving at a false conclusion on the basis of one’s perceptual 
experience. Since zeeing is factive, zeeing that p logically entails p, and so any 
error that occurs must be one of interpretation or judgement, rather than of 
perceptual experience per se. This is compatible with Brewer’s (1999: 169) 
maxim that ‘[e]rror, strictly speaking … is never an essential feature of 
experience itself’ on the basis that one can only perceive, or ‘zee’, what is 
actually there. Byrne characterises representationalism, on the other hand, in 
terms of CV′, which claims that perception constitutively involves a non-factive 
attitude — ‘exing’, intended to suggest ‘experiencing‘ — somewhat akin to 
believing (Byrne 2009: 437). On this view, perceptual illusions occur just in case 
a subject ‘exes that p’ when in fact not-p; i.e. it is the content of the perceptual 
state that is in error rather than the subject’s interpretation of it. Byrne argues 
that this explanation of illusion is simpler than the anti-representationalist’s and 
so should be preferred upon grounds of parsimony.
 Byrne’s formulation of the dispute is misguided in several respects. Firstly, 
anti-representationalists not only deny that perception constitutively involves a 
non-factive propositional attitude, but that it involves any propositional attitude 
at all. Indeed, this is precisely the conclusion that Travis’s arguments aim to 
establish. Since the factive attitude of zeeing is as much a contentful, and 
therefore representational, state as exing, these arguments would count as much 
against the former as it as they do against Byrne’s representationalism. The 
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characterisation of anti-representationalism as constitutively involving a factive 
propositional attitude is therefore both beside the mark and question-begging. 
The point here is not whether the attitude involved in perception is factive or 
non-factive, as Byrne appears to suggest, but whether it involves any 
propositional attitude at all. Consequently, an argument against zeeing is not an 
argument against anti-representationalism, because anti-representationalism 
involves no such attitude.
 As we saw in chapter 2, anti-representationalists typically explain perceptual 
illusions in terms of misleading or misinterpretation of perceptual experience 
(2.3.1). It is therefore instructive to compare the explanatory structure of 
genuine and illusory perceptual experiences on the resulting account. In the case 
of perception, a subject is presented with an object o which she judges to be F. 
Since o is in fact F, the experience is veridical and may subsequently form the 
basis for a judgement to this effect. In the illusory case, on the other hand, the 
subject is similarly presented with an object o that she judges to be F. However, 
in this case o is not F, and so the judgement is incorrect. Again, this is not a 
matter of ‘zeeing’ o to be one way and then judging it to be another, as Byrne 
describes it, but of mistaking the look of o under the relevant circumstances as 
indicating that it is F when it is not. In neither case does any representation — 
accurate or otherwise — form a part of the experience. Instead, representation 
only comes into play at the level of judgement and belief. Put this way, the anti-
representationalist account of illusion can be seen to be no more complex than 
their account of perception — or, for that matter, than Byrne’s own 
representational account. The only significant difference lies in where one places 
the ‘error’. For Byrne, such errors lie in the subject’s representational state, 
which fails to accurately reflect how things are in the world. For the anti-
representationalist it lies with whatever faculty is responsible for interpreting 
perceptual experience, i.e. belief- or judgement-formation. Byrne’s assertion that 
the representationalist account of illusion is simpler and more parsimonious is 
therefore false.
 A further point worth noting is that even if Byrne’s characterisation were 
correct, it is unclear why this should constitute a problem for the anti-
representationalist. Whilst parsimony is undoubtedly a virtue of philosophical 
or other theories, it is not the final arbiter of truth. Given that many anti-
representationalists take illusory or hallucinatory experiences to be parasitic 
upon perception, rather than the central cases with which a theory of perception 
should be concerned, it would be considered no defect if their theory were to 
handle the former in a different and potentially more complex way than the 
latter (although, as shown above, this is not necessarily the case).3 Indeed, for 
anti-representationalists who take ‘perception’ to be a success verb, illusions and 
hallucinations are not, strictly speaking forms of perception at all, but rather 
experiences that can easily be mistaken for perception. Provided that a theory of 
perception is compatible with the existence of illusions and hallucinations — a 
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fact that all parties accept — it is not mandatory that such cases be explained in 
precisely the same manner as genuine perceptions (though they may be). It is 
therefore difficult to see why Byrne takes this to be a decisive factor in the 
debate, especially if anti-representationalism were, as some of its proponents 
suggest (e.g. Brewer 2006; 2008), able to offer a more plausible account of 
veridical perception.
 If Byrne’s aim is to show that the existence of perceptual illusion offers more 
support to CV′ than it does to anti-representationalism then it fails because, 
without begging the question against the latter, he has not demonstrated that 
this is the case. As Travis points out, this motivation for supporting 
representationalism is neutralised by the availability of an alternative 
explanation for such phenomena in the form of the misinterpretation of 
perceptual appearances (2.3.1). Admittedly, this approach, which dates back to 
Berkeley and Reid, is not without its problems, but these do not appear to be 
Byrne’s target. Furthermore, even if the anti-representationalist explanation of 
illusion were more complex than that offered by representationalism, then this 
cannot be taken to settle the matter. Thus, whilst the availability of a simple 
account of the nature of illusions might be taken as a motivation for endorsing 
representationalism, it cannot be the decisive factor in the present debate. 
Rather, it is one issue among many that must be taken into consideration when 
evaluating a theory of perception.
3.2.2. Non-comparative looks
The remainder of Byrne’s response to Travis focuses upon the various notions of 
looks that Travis employs in connection with the ‘indexing’ or recognition of 
perceptual content. In particular, Byrne rejects premise L5 of Travis’s argument 
from looks, claiming that there is a third notion of looks that is capable of 
meeting both Face-value and Looks-indexing, thereby defusing Travis’s 
dilemma. Indeed, he claims that the need for such a notion is apparent from 
Travis’s (2004: 69–70) own definition of visible looks (‘looking like’), which is 
as follows:
[S]omething looks thus-and-so, or like such-and-such, where it looks the 
way such-and-such, or things which are (were) thus-and-so, does (would, 
might) look.
Unpacking the somewhat convoluted grammar of this passage, it is apparent 
that ‘looks’ appears in both the explanandum (‘looks thus-and-so, or like such-
and-such’) and explanans (‘looks the way … does’). The latter form of looks 
must therefore be distinct from the former or else Travis’s definition would be 
circular. Byrne takes this to show that, even by Travis’s lights, a third notion of 
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looks is required — a notion which, following Chisholm (1957), he calls non-
comparative looks.4
 Byrne describes non-comparative looks, or ‘looksnc’ (Byrne 2009: 443), as a 
kind of ‘Gestalt’ (ibid.) for which the subject possesses some innate or learned 
recognitional capacity (cf. Chisholm 1957; Jackson 1977). Thus red things 
looknc reddish, cows looknc cowish, old things looknc oldish, and so on, where in 
each case the explanans picks out a non-comparative look that is typically 
possessed by things of the relevant kind. Furthermore, Byrne contends that 
looksnc are explanatorily prior to both looksv and lookst, thereby avoiding the 
alleged circularity in Travis’s account.
 Breckenridge (2007) makes a similar proposal, characterising looks as 
properties of perceptual events (‘lookings’) that correspond to the manner in 
which things, according to them, look. However, the resulting ‘adverbial’ 
account (ibid.  4) suffers from the same problem as Travis’s visible looks, since 
such ‘ways of looking’ would be incapable of indexing content that is any more 
finely grained than those very looks. For example, many things lookv like a 
lemon, only some of which have the property of being  a lemon. Either each of 
these either counts as the same way of looking, or it counts as a different way of 
looking. If each counts as the same way of looking — looking lemonish, as it 
were — then this way of looking cannot index the proposition that something is 
a lemon, since, despite having this look, the object might equally well be said to 
exhibit the appearance of a lemon-shaped bar of soap or innumerable other 
things. Thus Face-value cannot be met. Conversely, if each of these possibilities 
is to count as a different way of looking — the look of a lemon, the look of a 
lemon-shaped bar of soap, and so on — then such looks are epistemic, and so 
not discernible on the basis of perceptual information alone since they are 
perceptually indistinguishable. Thus Looks-indexing cannot be not met. We are 
back with Travis’s original dilemma. Consequently, if looksnc are supposed to 
solve this problem, then they cannot be adverbial ways of looking.
 Unfortunately, whilst Byrne’s overall strategy is clear, he fails to provide an 
adequate account of just what he takes looksnc to be, and how they are 
supposed to individuate the sort of content that representationalists posit — 
namely, p-representation. In the absence of such an account, ‘non-comparative 
looks’ becomes a mere placeholder for some notion of looks that both has 
univocal face-value and is recognisable, as per McDowell’s ‘ostensible 
seeing’ (2.3.2). However, such a stipulation does not solve the problem that 
Travis raises, but merely restates it since it remains unclear how the alleged 
looks could be something that is perceptually given in experience.
 Byrne goes on to reject the notion that content is ‘looks-indexed’, 
concluding (Byrne 2009: 444):
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relevant similarities, and so does not require an additional sense of ‘looks’ (cf. Brewer 2011: 
§5.3; Martin 2010; 4.2.3).
The upshot is that Travis is in one way right. Perceptual content, if there is 
such a thing, is not ‘looks-indexed’, at least as that notion has been 
explained here. But Travis is wrong to conclude that our ordinary talk 
provides no support for [representationalism].
Of course, Travis argues for no such conclusion. Rather, as described in chapter 
2, he argues that the very notion of p-representation is incoherent. Furthermore, 
it is unclear that Byrne really does oppose Looks-indexing  as Travis formulates 
it. Rather, he takes this term to mean that there is some sense of the word 
‘looks’ that is ‘best understood as implicitly reporting the content of the exing 
attitude’ (Byrne 2009: 439). Whilst it is true that there may be no such sense, 
this does not undermine Looks-indexing, which relates to the recognisability of 
perceptual content and not its expression in everyday language.5  Indeed, Byrne 
goes on to defend looksnc as constitutive of p-representational content (ibid 
443). Despite the above denial, then, I take it that Byrne does endorse a form of 
Looks-indexing, at least for the particular notion of looks he describes — i.e. 
looksnc — even if it has no common expression in everyday language.6
3.2.3. Phenomenal content
Byrne claims that, given its role in explaining illusion, we should ‘expect 
perceptual content to be relatively thin’ (Byrne 2009: 449; 450).  By ‘thin’, 
Byrne means that p-representational content would not contain cognitively 
sophisticated concepts like lemons, pigs or Vermeers, but instead relates to more 
‘primitive’ sensory concepts, such as yellow or square. This contrasts with 
theorists like Siegel (2010), who argue that experience has ‘rich’ content that 
involves precisely such natural-kind properties. On Byrne’s view, the 
propositional content arising from non-comparative looks would, like Jackson’s 
‘phenomenal looks’ (Jackson 1977: 33), ‘concern properties like shape, motion, 
colour, shading, orientation and the like, not properties like being tired, 
belonging to Sarah or being a lemon’ (Byrne 2009: 449). The difficulty for this 
view, however, arises when we try to spell out precisely which properties are 
represented in perceptual experience.
 Representationalists typically claim that the contents of perceptual 
experience concern, amongst other things, the appearance-independent 
properties of objects, such as being yellow, being round, and so on. On this 
view, that objects look yellow or look round, etc. to a subject is supposed to be 
explained in terms of the subject’s representing them to be yellow, round, etc. 
That is, an object o appearing to be F to subject S is explained in terms of S’s 
representing that o is F, in accordance with Travis’s Objectivity condition 
(2.2.1). Seeming or appearing is therefore a function of the propositional 
attitude under which the relevant content is entertained — ‘exing’ in Byrne’s 
terminology (3.2.1) — as opposed to something that features explicitly in the 
content of experience itself.
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6 A more detailed analysis of the semantics of ‘looks’ is given in chapter 4.
 What Byrne and others appear to overlook, however, is that the argument 
from looks applies equally to so-called perceptual primitives like being round 
and being yellow as it does to cognitively sophisticated ones like being a lemon 
or being a Vermeer. This leaves such views open to the following form of 
objection: it is not S’s propositional attitude towards the representational 
content of experience which makes it the case that o appears F — being yellow, 
for example — to S, but rather the properties that are represented in that 
content; i.e. they are appearance properties. In order for the representationalist 
explanation of illusion to go through, every case in which o appears F to S must 
involve the same content regardless of whether or not o actually is F. Only in 
this way can the relevant content be said to misrepresent. However, according 
to the present objection, if non-comparative looks index anything, it is how 
things appear to a subject and not how things are in the world. That is to say, 
the content that S’s perceptual experience makes recognisable is not that o is F, 
but rather that o appears F. Thus, instead of appearances being a matter of the 
subject’s representing that p under a particular propositional attitude, they 
become embedded into the contents of the relevant p-representations, yielding 
what I will call phenomenal content.
 Why should we think that non-comparative looks index properties of the 
subject’s experience, rather than those of the external objects that give rise to 
them? After all, it is part of the representationalist’s view that things appear to 
be, for example, yellow by representing them to be yellow, not by representing 
them to look yellow. The problem stems from the nature of looks-indexing and 
the need for the relevant content to be recognisable to the subject. If what is 
supposed to make the relevant content recognisable is the way that things 
looknc, then this must be (as one might expect) common to both epistemically 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ cases. A subject who undergoes a perceptual illusion is just as 
aware of experiencing a yellow non-comparative ‘look’ as one who sees a ripe 
lemon under normal lighting — they are, according to Byrne, experiencing the 
same phenomenal look. The point that the objection presses is: what is it about 
such looks, which are common to both good and bad cases, that makes the 
content o is yellow recognisable, as opposed to o looks yellow? Since both cases 
involve the same phenomenal look, then why should we think of the look as 
favouring one case — e.g. (the object’s being) yellow — over the other, i.e. that it 
(merely) looks yellow)?
 The above point is precisely the one that Travis presses against visual, or 
comparative, looks. Given all that Byrne has said about non-comparative looks, 
it is as yet unclear how they could index propositions concerning the way the 
world objectively is since there is no determinate state of affairs that must 
obtain in order for things to look the way that they do. Something that looks 
yellow, for example, could just as well indicate a white object illuminated by 
yellow light as it does something being yellow. That is, there is no specific way 
that a given object must be in order for it to look the way that it does, and thus 
nothing objective to represent, except perhaps a disposition to cause a certain 
type of experience. Moreover, the presence of any given non-comparative look 
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co-varies not with o’s being F, but with o’s looking  F. Thus, if looksnc index 
some content, i.e. make it recognisable to the subject, then it should concern 
whatever property of experience corresponds to this look, and not the properties 
of the external objects that cause it. What is required here, and what Byrne’s 
account fails to provide, is an explanation of how the appearance-independent 
properties of objects such as being yellow come to figure in the contents of 
perceptual experience at all. The representation of such objective properties 
cannot simply be taken for granted by the representationalist since this is 
precisely what is at issue in Travis’s argument from looks.
 At first blush, representing that objects look thus-and-so rather than being 
thus-and-so, may seem unproblematic, at least for Byrne who denies that 
perceptual content need play any strong epistemic role (Byrne 2009: 450). 
However, if non-comparative looks, and therefore p-representations, relate only 
to the subjective appearances of objects (how they look) rather than their mind-
independent properties (how they are), then it becomes impossible for the 
resulting content to misrepresent. An object o that looks yellow to S, for 
example, cannot fail to have the property of looking yellow to S under those 
particular circumstances, quite independently of whether it is yellow or not. 
This difficulty arises from the fact that being yellow and looking yellow can be 
regarded as two distinct properties, one of which relates to the objects of 
experience and the other to experience itself. The fact that the English locutions 
that describe these properties both happen to include the word ‘yellow’ is a 
contingent feature of surface grammar that does not itself ground any deep 
philosophical connection between the two. Consequently, it is easy to overlook 
the fact that, for all that Byrne has said, there is nothing to connect looking 
yellow with being yellow — they are, to all intents and purposes, quite separate 
and distinct properties.
 Byrne effectively concedes this when he states that ‘perceptual content, if 
there is such a thing, goes with the way things look when they looknc F, which 
need not include Fness’ (Byrne 2009: 443). Just as yellow objects do not always 
look yellow, non-yellow objects can sometimes look yellow — when viewed 
under yellow light, for example. Thus something can look yellow without being 
yellow, and vice versa.7 Moreover, since being yellow is a monadic property of 
objects, whereas looking yellow to S is a relational property whose relata 
include both subject and object, the two properties cannot be numerically 
identical. Rather, they must be connected in some other manner. The objection 
to Byrne’s account is that it fails to specify what this connection is, thus 
rendering it at the very least incomplete, and at worst incoherent since in any 
experience in which things seem to S to be F, it is true that they seem this way to 
S, and so perceptual experiences effectively become their own truthmakers.
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7  Lest the metaphysics of colour be thought to present a particular problem in this regard, 
compare the case of circular objects, which can sometimes exhibit a ‘non-comparative’ 
elliptical look when viewed at an angle. This is not to say that circular objects look to be 
elliptical when seen at an angle. Rather, they look like ellipses do when seen face-on such 
that they might, under certain circumstances, be mistaken for an ellipse on the basis of this 
shared visible look.
 The form of objection sketched above does not deny that representational 
contents may be individuated by something other than looks. Rather, it shows 
that p-representational contents that are indexed — that is to say, made 
recognisable — by looksnc alone cannot privilege the representation of objective 
properties, i.e. being F, over phenomenal properties, i.e. (merely) looking F. 
Consequently, the resulting p-representations cannot misrepresent; they 
constitute phenomenal content. This counts against the view set out in Byrne 
(2009) to the extent that it supports Looks-indexing, linguistic objections 
notwithstanding. It is particularly pressing given that the ability to account for 
illusion is the reason Byrne gives for favouring representationalism over Travis’s 
anti-representationism (3.2.1). If, on the other hand, Byrne rejects Looks-
indexing, the problem is circumvented, but this leaves him without an account 
of p-representation since the notion of non-comparative looks would then be 
explanatorily inert. The objection therefore counts against any theory that takes 
p-representational content to be grounded in non-comparative looks. This 
includes both Siegel (2010) and Schellenberg (2011b), who explicitly cite Byrne 
(2009) as a proponent of this form of content, and whose arguments I examine 
in further detail below.
3.2.4. Responses
Having established a potential objection to the non-comparative looks based 
view, I will now consider some responses that a proponent of such a view might 
give to the above argument, along with the reasons why they are unsatisfactory.
 The most plausible line of defence is perhaps that the semantics of p-
representational content is quite independent of an account of how such content 
is recognised by the subject. The former determines how content is fixed or 
individuated, whilst the latter explains how it is accessible to the subject. For 
example, one might adopt a counterfactual (Dretske 1994), informational 
(Fodor 1987) or teleosemantic (Millikan 1993) account according to which the 
contents of perceptual experience refers to the mind-independent properties of 
objects and not their looks. On this view, what makes it the case that a subject 
represents, for example, the presence of a lemon, as opposed to something that 
merely looks like a lemon, is explained in terms of something external to 
experience itself, such as the evolutionarily selected ability to represent lemons 
as a source of nutrition.
 The problem with this approach, however, as Travis points out, is that it 
fails to explain how such content is recognisable to the subject. According to the 
Recognisability condition, the representational content of experience — i.e. what 
would need to be the case in order for that content to be veridical — is supposed 
to be recognisable to the subject in virtue of having that very experience (2.2.4). 
This is just part of what it means to be represented to, i.e. Givenness. However, 
if the accuracy conditions of p-representations depend upon evolutionary 
contingencies, counterfactual possibilities or informational links with the 
environment, it is difficult (though not impossible — see 5.3) to see how this 
condition can be satisfied. More generally, if what makes such contents 
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recognisable differs from what fixes that content, it remains to be explained 
how the former is able to track the latter. Travis aims to drive a wedge between 
these two requirements by arguing that whatever makes content recognisable 
(e.g. non-comparative looks) will dictate the kind of content that one can 
thereby recognise (i.e. phenomenal content) instead of the kinds of contents that 
representationalists typically claim experiences to have. I will return to this 
point in chapters 5 and 6.
 An alternative response that Byrne might (and indeed does) give is that for 
something to look yellow is just for it to ‘look the way that yellow things are’.8 
This might be taken to mean one of two things, the first of which is trivially true 
and the second of which is question-begging. If ‘the way that yellow things are’ 
is taken to mean the property that, as a matter of necessity, all yellow things 
have in common — namely, their yellowness — then the point is trivial, since it is 
hardly explanatory to say that ‘to look yellow just is to look yellow’. 
Alternatively, if Byrne intends for his maxim to establish some kind of 
connection between looking yellow and being yellow, as his argument requires, 
then being yellow must itself be a way of looking yellow. To the extent that this 
is true — something that is far from clear since things that are yellow need not 
look it — then this is presumably just one of the ways in which things can look 
yellow, since many non-yellow things also look yellow under appropriate 
circumstances: a white piece of chalk in yellow light, for example. In order for 
the relevant experiences to represent being yellow rather than being white in 
yellow light, there must be something that privileges the former content over the 
latter. This cannot simply be the fact that one is true and the other false in any 
given experience, since the content of experience being satisfied is supposed 
determine whether or not that experience is veridical, and not the other way 
round. Thus Byrne’s response either falls under the previous point concerning 
the recognisability of perceptual content, or else assumes the very thing it is 
supposed to explain — namely that to look yellow is to represent something as 
being yellow. I therefore conclude that the response is unsuccessful and that 
non-comparative looks, or looksnc, like visible looks, are equivocal and so unfit 
to index representational content.
3.3. An Argument from Visual Appearances
The second argument for representationalism I will consider is Susanna Siegel’s 
‘Argument from Appearing’ (Siegel 2010: 44). Like Byrne, Siegel takes Travis to 
be making a ‘semantic objection’ (ibid. 59) against the claim that looks report 
the content of visual experiences. However, instead of focusing upon the kind of 
‘non-comparative’ looks that Byrne describes, Siegel presents an argument for 
the view that all experiences have representational content — a position which 
she, like Byrne (3.3.1), calls the Content View, or CV for short. According to 
Siegel, however, even proponents of relationalism about experience are 
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8 Alex Byrne in conversation at the SNNP Emotion and Perception Workshop, University of 
Glasgow, October 2010.
committed to CV. If correct, this would mean that representationalism and 
relationalism are not competing theses, as is often assumed, but compatible. By 
arguing that perceptual experiences have accuracy conditions regardless of 
which account of experience one adopts, Siegel aims to establish CV as common 
ground between representational and relational accounts of experience, thereby 
altering the terms of the debate.
 In this section I assesses whether Siegel’s Argument from Appearing is 
successful in establishing her claim that proponents of relationalism are 
committed to CV. I argue that her account begs the question against 
relationalism at more than one point — particularly in the way she characterises 
the phenomenology of visual experience as involving the presentation of 
properties, where this is conceived of in terms of property-types and not 
property-instances (3.3.2). Consequently, the Argument from Appearing fails to 
provide any reason for thinking that relationalism entails CV, though neither 
does this rule out their compatibility. Thus, whilst there may be arguments that 
can adjudicate between or demonstrate the compatibility of relationalism and 
CV, this is not one of them. Possible rejoinders to these objections are discussed 
in 3.3.3.
3.3.1. Siegel’s Content View
In her book The Contents of Visual Experience, Susanna Siegel aims to alter the 
terms of the present debate by arguing that what she calls the Content View 
(CV) applies equally to both representational and relational accounts of 
experience, i.e. REP and REL (1.2.4). According to Siegel (2010: 28), for an 
experience to have content is just for it to be capable of accuracy or inaccuracy 
according to a set of accuracy conditions that are conveyed to the subject of that 
experience. The accuracy conditions for a visual experience as of a red circular 
object, such as one might experience upon seeing a tomato, for example, would 
include (amongst other things) there being a circular red object — e.g. a tomato 
— at the relevant egocentrically defined spatial location. If the object were not 
red, or were in a different location from where it was perceived to be, then this 
content would be inaccurate, and therefore non-veridical (cf. 1.2.3). 
Nevertheless, the same experience may correctly predicate other aspects of the 
object — for example its shape. Thus CV can account for the sense in which an 
experience can be ‘more’ or ‘less’ accurate according to how much or how little 
of its content is veridical (ibid. 32).
 According to Siegel, content may be conveyed to a subject in one of three 
ways (ibid. 51). First, it may become, or be systematically related to, the content 
of an explicit belief — ‘there is a red tomato’, for example — that it is natural for 
the subject to form as a result of having had the relevant perceptual experience. 
Second, experiential content may guide conscious bodily action, such as 
reaching out to grasp an object in the appropriate manner. Third, the content of 
experience may be consciously available to the subject through the faculty of 
introspection. In each case, however, the content of the experience is in some 
sense ‘conveyed’ to the subject in thought or action, and not a merely formal or 
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theoretical feature of experience as described from a third-personal point of 
view. This is in keeping with Travis’s Recognisability condition, though it is 
unclear why first two cases should be taken as the evidence of representational 
content of experience, rather than of belief or action, since such evidence would 
also be compatible with anti-representationalist accounts of experience. 
Nevertheless, the issue for the CV theorist will be to explain both how and why 
such conveying is possible.9
 Contents, for Siegel, ‘are a kind of accuracy condition’ (ibid. 30). Thus, she 
argues, if it can be shown that perceptual experiences have the right kind of 
accuracy conditions, i.e. those that are conveyed to the subject in experience, 
then it will have been shown that experiences have contents. This is exactly 
what the Argument from Appearing aims to achieve (3.3.2). This argument is 
itself a refinement of a simpler argument, called the ‘Argument from 
Accuracy’ (Siegel 2010: 34), which is as follows:
C1! All experiences are accurate or inaccurate.
C2! If all experiences are accurate or inaccurate, then all experiences 
have accuracy conditions.
C3! All experiences have accuracy conditions.
 The Argument from Accuracy is unsatisfactory because, as Siegel herself 
admits, it fails to secure the right kind of accuracy conditions for experience. 
For any given experience e, there exists a trivial accuracy condition, namely that 
e is accurate if and only if e is accurate. Such accuracy conditions correspond to 
the application of the predicate ‘x is veridical’ and are not conveyed to the 
subject via experience, which was one of the requirements for establishing the 
existence of content, and therefore CV. The problem is that the application of a 
predicate — in this case accuracy — does not itself entail the existence of content. 
If it did, then the application of any predicate, such as being blue or being tall 
would also entail the existence of content (cf. ibid. 30). Such trivial accuracy 
conditions, however, are unable to differentiate between the contents of one 
experience and another, since all experiences would have precisely the same 
veridicality condition — namely, that the experience is accurate (blue, tall, etc.) if 
and only if it is accurate (blue, tall, …) — and so the same ‘content’. 
Consequently, we cannot conclude from the mere existence of accuracy 
conditions that experiences have contents, since C1 might be true solely in virtue 
of such conditions and yet CV be false since the relevant conditions are not 
conveyed to the subject via experience.
 The Argument from Accuracy fails to establish the desired conclusion that 
all experiences have content (i.e. CV) as it is unable to yield the kind of content 
— namely, representational content — that CV requires. It therefore needs to be 
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9 Not all representationalists accept that perceptual representations need be conveyed to the 
subject. Burge (2010), for example, rejects this in favour of non-conscious representational 
content (5.2.4).
refined not only to rule out such trivial accuracy conditions, but to explain both 
why experiences are assessable for accuracy in the first place, and how these 
conditions are conveyed to the subject (ibid. 44). Siegel’s Argument from 
Appearing attempts to remedy these flaws.
3.3.2. The Argument from Appearing
Siegel’s argument begins with a supposedly uncontentious premise concerning 
the phenomenology of visual experience. This is followed by a series of steps 
which aim to derive the existence of accuracy conditions that are conveyed to 
the subject, and so content. The idea is to show that advocates of REL, who 
accept that we perceptually experience the properties of objects, are thereby 
committed to experience having accuracy conditions that are conveyed by that 
experience, and so content that is discernible to the subject. To do this, the 
argument must derive CV from suitably neutral assumptions concerning the 
nature of perceptual experience that are acceptable to proponents of REP and 
REL alike. If successful, this would establish CV as common ground between the 
representational and relational accounts, thus redefining the terms of the debate 
concerning the nature of perceptual experience. I will argue that the argument 
fails to do this.
 Though Siegel’s articulation of the argument is somewhat complex, its 
general structure is reasonably straightforward, proceeding from the presence of 
visual properties in experience to the existence of representational content and 
the Content View. Although I will mainly be concerned here with only the first 
three premises, the entire argument is reproduced below for completeness (Siegel 
2010: 45; minor formatting changes only).
A1 ! All visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as 
being instantiated.
A2 ! If an experience e presents a cluster of properties F as being 
instantiated, then:
A2b Necessarily: things are the way e presents them only if property-
cluster F is instantiated.
A3 ! If necessarily: things are the way e presents them only if property-
cluster F is instantiated, then:
A3b  e has a set of accuracy conditions C, conveyed to the subject of 
e, such that: C is satisfied in a world only if there is something 
that has F in that world.
A4 ! If e has a set of accuracy conditions C, conveyed to the subject of e, 
such that e is accurate only if C, then:
A4b! e has a set of accuracy conditions C*, conveyed to the subject 
of e, such that e is accurate iff C*.
A5 ! All visual perceptual experiences have contents. (CV)
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 The first thing to note about this argument is the formulation of its initial 
premise. Based on phenomenological reflection upon how visual experience 
seems to us, experiences are said to ‘present clusters of properties as being 
instantiated’. What precisely does this claim amount to, and what grounds does 
Siegel offer for accepting it? Perceptual experience, it can be agreed, presents 
objects. In most, if not all, cases those objects are perceived as possessing 
particular properties: colour, shape, spatial location, and so forth. Moreover, it 
is plausible that the function of experience is to make external objects and their 
properties available to the subject in a way that enables them to form 
appropriate beliefs, judgements, intentions, carry out actions, and so on. As 
Siegel (ibid. 46) points out, objects are never presented in experience as bare 
particulars, shorn of all their properties. This certainly constitutes grounds for 
thinking that both objects and their properties — themselves, at least on some 
views of what it is to be a property, aspects of objects — are presented in 
experience. When we see a red tomato, we see both the tomato (an object) and 
its redness (a property). Indeed, one might hold that it is only because we see the 
tomato’s shape, location, and so on that we can be said to see the tomato, even 
though seeing each of these individual properties may be neither necessary nor 
sufficient for seeing tomatoes in general. Does this demonstrate that perceptual 
experience presents properties ‘as being instantiated’? It is not clear that it does.
 Firstly, it is not at all obvious what A1 is supposed to mean. Siegel notes 
that this premise admits of both de re and de dicto readings. According to the de 
re reading, which is the intended one, ‘for each visual perceptual experience, 
there are some properties (colour, relative location, etc.) such that the 
experience presents those properties as instantiated’ (ibid. 47). On the de dicto 
reading, ‘there need be no specific properties such that [each experience] 
presents them as instantiated’ (ibid.). However, this fails to explain what it is for 
a property to be ‘presented as instantiated’. Given that the argument is supposed 
to be neutral between REP and REL, it cannot be that for a property to be 
presented in this way is for experience to have a predicational structure, since it 
is a feature of relationalism that experience need have no such structure. More 
importantly, given the vanishingly small distance between having a predicational 
structure and having representational content, this would render A1 
objectionable on grounds of circularity. Since experience having representational 
content is supposed to be the conclusion of Siegel’s argument and not one of its 
premises, we must therefore assume that A1 cannot mean (though it may entail) 
that experiences have predicational structure.
 A second possibility is that ‘as being instantiated’ is supposed to indicate 
that perceptual experience is in some sense committal. That is, that the 
experience of a red circular patch is not neutral concerning the way the world is, 
in the manner of a supposition or imagining, but that it carries some kind of 
prima facie epistemic force or authority. Of course, perceptual experience is not 
committal in the same manner as judgement or belief, since we can doubt that 
things are the way that they appear — when we experience a familiar visual 
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illusion, such as the Müller-Lyer, for example.10 That is to say, p-representation 
is not autorepresentation (2.2.3). Rather, the intended distinction is supposed to 
be something like the difference between merely entertaining some association 
between an object and a property and the sense in which perceptual experience 
might be thought of as reporting the way that things are, making it analogous to 
a kind of testimony. This analogy with testimony, however, is problematic, since 
if perceptual experience is a kind of report then it trivially has representational 
content — namely, what is reported — and so the argument would again assume 
that experience was representational from the outset. Indeed, whether 
perceptual experience is in the relevant sense analogous to testimony is precisely 
what is at issue between proponents of REP and REL, since the suggestion that 
experience has face-value content is exactly what many relationalists, including 
Travis, deny.
 There is, however, one sense of ‘presentation’ in which relationalists can 
agree that experience presents properties. This is the sense in which instances of 
properties such as redness, roundness, egocentric location, and so on, are 
presented in (veridical) perception. This is not the same as the claim that these 
properties are represented in experience, since relationalists also hold that 
experience cannot be exhaustively characterised in these terms. Nevertheless, if 
objects and their properties are relata or constituents of perceptual experiences, 
as REL claims, then it makes sense to say that they are presented to the subject in 
experience. If ‘presented as being instantiated’ just means for instances of those 
properties to be presented in experience, then it is unobjectionable, since this 
claim is neutral between REP and REL. If, on the other hand, to be presented in 
this way is to be predicated of an object, or to have propositional structure, then 
A1 must be rejected as begging the question against REL. I will therefore assume 
the following reading of A1, this being the one that is compatible with both 
relational and representational models of experience, upon which I will proceed 
to evaluate the remainder of the argument accordingly:
      A1"! All visual perception involves the presentation of clusters of 
properties in experience.
3.3.3. Property-types and property-instances
The subsequent premises of Siegel’s Argument from Appearing are supposed to 
constitute independently plausible claims about the notions of instantiation, 
accuracy conditions and content. A2 makes the transition from the presentation 
of properties in experience to a notion of accuracy that is based upon whether 
those properties are instantiated. Roughly: things are the way that a visual 
perceptual experience presents them as being only if the property-clusters that it 
presents are actually instantiated. A3 moves from this to accuracy conditions 
that are conveyed to the subject, claiming that if things are the way that a visual 
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such way that perceptual experience portrays the world as being (2.3.2).
perceptual experience presents them as being only if the property-clusters that it 
presents are instantiated — i.e. A2b — then that experience has accuracy 
conditions that are conveyed to the subject. Finally, A4 makes the transition 
from accuracy conditions to content. Assuming Siegel’s definition of content as 
a kind of accuracy condition that is conveyed to the subject in experience, as is 
required for the validity of the argument, this step is relatively trivial.
 To evaluate each of the above claims, we must consider the ways in which 
properties may be presented in experience, which will differ between 
representational and relational views. According to the representationalist, 
properties are presented in experience by being represented to the subject. Since 
such representations can be either true or false, there is a clear sense in which 
the relevant properties are either instantiated or not, according to whether they 
are possessed by the object or objects in question. Thus the representation of a 
property and the instantiation of that property are separate and distinct entities. 
The former constitutes part of the representational content of the subject’s 
mental state, and is thus mental. The latter (or absence thereof) is some aspect 
of the external world to which that representation is answerable, and is thus 
non-mental.11  Under REL, however, the relevant property-instances (or those 
aspects of an external object which correspond to the instantiation of its 
properties) are directly present in experience. On this picture, there is no 
difference between the property as presented in experience and its instantiation 
in the world — they are one and the same thing. This makes A2 trivially true on 
the relational view for all veridical perceptions, since such experiences 
necessarily involve the presentation of property-instances and not of property-
representations or types as is the case for the representational view.
 The problem for Siegel’s argument is that it trades upon an equivocation 
between these two senses of ‘presenting properties’. An advocate of REL will 
accept the reading of A1′ according to which visual perceptual experiences 
present property-instances since on their view objects and their properties are 
themselves constituents of experience. The sense upon which the presentation of 
properties would deliver accuracy conditions that are conveyed to the subject, 
however, is the representationalist reading. To assume such a reading from the 
outset would beg the question in favour of CV, since this assumes that 
experience has a propositional structure, and so need not be endorsed by the 
proponent of REL.
 Furthermore, on the relational reading of A1′, only instantiated properties, 
i.e. property-instances, are presented in the relationalist’s sense of ‘presentation’. 
Thus A2 comes out as necessarily and trivially true for all veridical visual 
perceptions, since all of the properties that are (according to REL) presented in 
experience are instantiated, since only property-instances can be presented in 
this way. On the relationalist reading of A2, then, A2b may be taken to mean:
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11  On a nominalist account of properties, for a property to be instantiated just is for the 
relevant objects to fall within the extension of the predicate that is represented. Siegel (2010: 
58) also claims that a similar modification to the theory may be made to accommodate trope 
theory, though I dispute this modification below (3.3.4).
A2b′     Necessarily: things are the way e presents them only if property-
cluster F consists of property-instances.
which, in the case of veridical experience, is always true. However, on the 
corresponding representationalist reading, A2b means:
A2b″   Necessarily: things are the way e presents them only if the 
property-types in property-cluster F are instantiated by the 
relevant object(s).
But being a property-instance in A2b′ and being instantiated by an object in 
A2b″ are two quite different concepts; the former signifies that a particular falls 
under a general metaphysical kind — i.e. the category of instantiated properties 
— whilst the latter indicates the satisfaction of a predicate by an object. Indeed, 
it is only due to a play on words that A2 can be taken to encompass both 
readings. The term ‘instantiated’ as it appears in A2 is therefore also equivocal. 
This presents a problem for Siegel’s argument because A3 only obtains if we 
assume the representational reading of A1 and A2, i.e. A2b″, which take 
‘properties’ to mean property-types. But on a non-question begging reading of 
the argument, the relationalist will take ‘properties’ to mean property-instances, 
in which case A2 is trivially true and A3 is false, since such accuracy conditions 
are not conveyed to the subject by experience (see below). This renders the 
Argument from Appearing invalid either due to (a) circularity, if the question-
begging reading of A1 is assumed, or (b) equivocation over the meaning of 
‘presenting properties’.
 Equivocation aside, however, there is a more fundamental problem with the 
above reading of Siegel’s argument. If the relevant property-instances are only 
‘instantiated’ in the metaphysical and not the representational sense, then the 
argument fails to deliver the kind of accuracy conditions that CV requires. Recall 
that contents, for Siegel, are a kind of accuracy condition that is conveyed to the 
subject. But whether perceived instantiations of properties are in fact property-
instances (as opposed to being subjectively indistinguishable from presentations 
of property-instances—see 3.3.4) is not conveyed to the subject in experience. 
For this to be the case, perceptual experiences would, according to the 
relationalist interpretation of Siegel’s argument, have to pronounce upon 
whether they were veridical or not — something that both sides agree they do 
not.12  Consequently, the only kind of accuracy conditions that the above 
reading of the argument entails are of the trivial kind, the likes of which Siegel 
rejects in her Argument from Accuracy (3.3.1). Without a representational 
understanding of ‘presenting properties’ and ‘instantiation’, the Argument from 
Appearing fails to deliver or explain the link between the phenomenology of 
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12  Even those theorists who take perceptual contents to be presented as if they are veridical 
would not endorse this stronger claim since non-veridical experiences are subjectively 
indistinguishable from the corresponding veridical experiences.
perceptual experience and its content, and so fails to show why an advocate of 
REL should endorse CV.
 It is important to understand precisely why the presentation of property-
instances, as opposed to property-types, cannot deliver the required accuracy 
conditions. If, as relationalists claim, all that experience delivers is a collection 
of objects and/or property-instances without thereby representing those entities, 
then it would be impossible from a first-personal perspective to discern what the 
accuracy conditions for that experience were. This is not to deny that such an 
experience has accuracy conditions. But, as Siegel’s Argument from Accuracy 
shows, the mere existence of accuracy conditions is not sufficient for content. In 
this case, the resulting accuracy conditions will be of the form: experience e is 
accurate if and only if e presents those particular (i.e. numerically identical) 
objects and/or properties. Such conditions, which correspond to the experience’s 
identity conditions, are not conveyed to the subject in experience, and thus do 
not constitute content in Siegel’s terms. Without a specification of the types that 
each individual property-instance must fall under, there is no way of deriving 
accuracy conditions of the form ‘o is red’, as would be required to establish CV. 
Thus the only accuracy conditions that the relationalist need admit that 
experiences have are its identity conditions, which are insufficient to establish 
the existence of content as they are not conveyed to the subject in experience. 
Thus A3 is false.13
 Furthermore, the relational reading of A1′ is only true for veridical 
perception since, according to REL, non-veridical experiences do not present 
property-instances. Rather, such experiences are subjectively indistinguishable 
from experiences in which properties-instances are presented. Indeed, for 
disjunctivists such as Martin (2004) this may be the only positive 
characterisation we can give of them. Presumably, however, Siegel does not 
intend for ‘visual perceptual experiences’ to include only veridical perception, 
but also non-veridical experiences, such as hallucinations and illusions.14 
Unfortunately, when we take these into account, the proposed reading of A1 
breaks down since under REL, non-veridical experiences cannot be 
straightforwardly characterised in terms of the presentation of the properties of 
objects on the grounds that there may be no such objects. This is not necessarily 
a problem for REL, which supports other ways of accounting for illusions (e.g. 
Martin op. cit; Brewer 2008), but makes it impossible to evaluate Siegel’s 
argument according to A1′. We must therefore either reject this reading of A1, 
or reject A2 as false under the relational account since it only holds for veridical 
perception.
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13  One might object that for every property-instance that is presented in experience, there 
must be some corresponding property-type of which it is an instance. I consider this 
objection below (3.3.4).
14 Indeed, she explicitly states in her defence of A1 that ‘[t]hese considerations about the kind 
of visual phenomenology involved in seeing ordinary objects … apply equally to cases of 
merely seeming to see objects’ (Siegel 2010: 48, my italics).
 The problem for the Argument from Appearing at this point may be stated 
in the form of a dilemma. If we confine the argument to veridical perceptual 
experience (this being the set of experiences for which A1′ holds), then the 
argument only succeeds in showing that perceptual experiences have the kind of 
trivial accuracy conditions that indicate whether they are veridical or not. This 
is precisely the reason for which Siegel rejected the Argument from Accuracy, 
since such accuracy conditions fail to explain how or why experiences should 
convey the kind of propositional contents to the subject that CV requires (3.3.1). 
If, on the other hand, we do not confine the argument to veridical perceptual 
experience, as appears to be Siegel’s intention, then it is unclear how A1 can be 
understood in a way that is neutral between Siegel and her opponents without 
begging the question against REL. This renders the argument circular, and 
therefore ineffectual. As it stands, then, the Argument from Appearing is 
unconvincing because it fails to connect with the very view it is designed to 
engage — namely, REL. Nor, it seems, is this dilemma easily resolvable without 
substantial reformulation of the argument.
3.3.4. Responses
Having established the structure of, and some problems with, Siegel’s Argument 
from Appearing, I now wish to consider a number of possible rejoinders on 
behalf of the Content View. I will argue that none of these is satisfactory, and 
consequently that Siegel’s argument should be rejected.
 The first kind of response concerns the nature of CV itself. As formulated 
above, CV is a claim about the presence of content in visual experience. 
However, or so the response goes, this need not be understood as 
representational content. Rather, the mere presentation of property-instances 
itself constitutes a form of content, and so Siegel’s argument goes through even 
on a relationalist understanding of perceptual experience. Whilst it is certainly 
the case that philosophers have used the term ‘content’ in widely differing ways 
— McDowell (2008) being a case in point — Siegel quite clearly ties the notion 
of content to the existence of accuracy conditions that are conveyed to the 
subject. Since such accuracy conditions are tantamount to representational 
content as it is here conceived, the issue is not merely terminological. On the 
above reading, the Argument from Appearing fails to demonstrate the existence 
of such accuracy conditions, and so fails to establish CV, regardless of the notion 
of content that Siegel takes herself to be employing. Furthermore, Siegel’s 
characterisation of CV meets each of the conditions — including Face-value — 
that Travis sets out for p-representation (2.2), and so is a legitimate target for 
Travis’s arguments against representationalism. Plausibly, Siegel’s content is just 
representational content, and the initial response is misplaced.
 A second worry is that Siegel’s argument is based upon the phenomenology 
of vision and so metaphysical concerns about the nature of experience are beside 
the point. Whilst I do not wish to claim that representationalists and 
relationalists experience differing visual phenomenology, there remains the issue 
of how we are to understand the claims that Siegel is making, particularly in A1 
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of her Argument from Appearing. That theorists from both camps can sign up 
to the same form of words is not sufficient to make the argument valid if, as I 
have argued, it relies upon an equivocation over the meaning of ‘presenting 
properties’, which is ambiguous between presenting property-instances and 
representing property-types. Thus my objection is not that these two views of 
perceptual experience deliver different verdicts about ‘what vision is like’, 
phenomenologically speaking. Rather, my claim is that, to the extent that 
Siegel’s phenomenological claim can be considered neutral between these two 
views, it fails to establish what she thinks it does. Moreover, if ‘properties’ is 
understood in the way that is required for the argument to go through, then its 
initial premise can be rejected by the relationalist as question-begging. 
References to the metaphysics of experience are merely intended to make this 
fact conspicuous, rather than biasing the argument one way or the other.15
 A more substantive response on behalf of Siegel at this point would be to 
reformulate A1 using a disjunctive sense of ‘presenting properties’ that 
accommodates both veridical and non-veridical experiences — call this 
presents*. For something to present* F as being instantiated is just for it to 
present F as being instantiated or to be subjectively indistinguishable from an 
experience that presents F as being instantiated. Making the appropriate 
substitutions, this results in the following reading of A1:
     A1*! All visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as 
being instantiated or as subjectively indistinguishable from 
experiences that present clusters of properties as being 
instantiated.
Whilst this premise is true even under REL, according to which ‘present[ing] 
clusters of properties as being instantiated’ would be interpreted to mean 
presenting a series of property-instances, this generates problems later on in the 
argument. If we take the consequent of A2 and antecedent of A3, for example, 
to mean:
   A2b*! Necessarily: things are the way e presents* them only if property-
cluster F is instantiated.
then according to the disjunctive reading of presents*, A2b* will be true for 
both veridical and non-veridical experiences, as expected. It does not follow 
from this, however, that the resulting accuracy conditions will be conveyed to 
the subject. This would only be the case if some set of property-types were 
presented to the subject in experience, as occurs on the representationalist view. 
The proponent of REL, on the other hand, need not be committed to this, which 
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15 A related objection is that my objection to Siegel draws upon a particular understanding of 
the metaphysics of properties. However, this is arguably more of a problem for Siegel, who 
employs the notion of ‘property-clusters’ without adequately specifying what she means by 
this, leaving room for a level of ambiguity upon which, I claim, her argument depends.
goes beyond the claim that there are some sets of property-instances that, if 
presented, would be subjectively indistinguishable from the corresponding non-
veridical experience. This is not the same as saying that any specific property-
types are presented in non-veridical experiences, since there could be an 
innumerable number of experiences of properties-instances that were 
subjectively indistinguishable from that experience, none of which would qualify 
as the content of the experience. This is just another form of the dilemma that 
Travis presses. In any case, the argument still conflates the representational and 
relational senses of ‘presentation’, making A3 false on the disjunctive reading of 
A1 given above.
 A fourth response on behalf of the representationalist is that even if we 
accept that property-instances and not property-types are presented in 
experience, as per the relationalist account, for every property-instance 
presented there must be some corresponding property-type of which it is an 
instance that is thereby also present in experience. That is, one cannot have a 
property-instance that is not an instance of some determinate type, and it is 
these types, not their instances, that give rise to the experience’s accuracy 
conditions. Siegel hints at this when she states that ‘[i]t is hard to see how … 
accuracy conditions could fail to be conveyed to the subject in whatever way the 
properties they derive from are’ (Siegel 2010: 53) as well as in her trope 
formulation of the argument (below). This response is appealing because it 
acknowledges the relationalist account of experience whilst allowing Siegel to 
argue that such experience nevertheless has accuracy conditions and therefore 
content.
 The objection, however, now becomes one of which property-types are 
represented in experience. According to Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2), 
there is simply no good answer to this question since there are a multitude of 
properties that match any given visual appearance. The constraints upon what 
would constitute an answer are the familiar ones of Recognisability, Givenness 
and perceptual availability to the subject, thereby reinstating Travis’s dilemma. 
Unless relevant property-type is discernible to the subject, the corresponding 
accuracy condition cannot be said to be conveyed to the subject, and thus fails 
to establish the existence of content in Siegel’s terms (3.3.1). Even if it is 
discernible to the subject, then this cannot be solely on the basis of what is 
perceptually available to them, but rather must draw upon what they are 
inclined to believe or judge. This reintroduces circularity worries about the 
explanatory role of experience with respect to judgement and belief, since p-
representation is representation-to and not representation-by (2.2.3). This 
appears to be the route that Siegel herself favours (ibid.), but does not constitute 
a reason to suppose that experience, as opposed to belief, judgement or action, 
has content. It is therefore unclear that the original objection can be 
circumvented in this way.
 The final counter-argument that I wish to consider is that my objection to 
Siegel commits the relationalist to the existence of tropes. Relationalism about 
perception, as I have described it, involves the presentation in experience of 
property-instances where such instances are either concrete individuals (i.e. 
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tropes) or aspects of external objects. Thus, what is presented when visually 
experiencing a red tomato is not the abstract universal redness, but rather the 
redness of that tomato, where this is distinct from the redness of other objects, 
including other tomatoes that are of precisely the same colour. The existence of 
tropes is contentious and so not necessarily something the relationalist would 
want to commit herself to, and certainly not on the basis of visual 
phenomenology alone. Thus, so the counter-argument goes, the objection stands 
or falls with the existence of tropes. Moreover, Siegel claims that her argument 
‘could easily be reformulated to accommodate this position’ (Siegel 2010: 48) 
simply by substituting ‘clusters of properties’ for ‘cluster of F-tropes’, where F 
indicates the relevant trope types.
 Taking the latter point first, this way of stating the argument in terms of 
trope types begs the question discussed above of precisely which types are 
presented in experience. The point about invoking tropes from the relationalist 
perspective is that they show how particulars need not be presented as falling 
under any particular type. To assume that they are presented in this way 
without further argument is not a response to this objection. Indeed, if we take 
‘a cluster of F-tropes’ in the reformulated A3 to mean a cluster of those very 
tropes — i.e. a token- rather than type-identical experience — we arrive back at 
the original objection since the resulting accuracy conditions will be none other 
than the identity conditions for that very experience.16 Such identity conditions 
are not conveyed to the subject in experience, and so the argument fails to 
establish CV.
 On the former more substantive point, the trope-like formulation of the 
relationalist objection is merely intended to make explicit the commitment to a 
representationalist conception of properties and property-types that is required 
to make Siegel’s argument valid. Unfortunately for Siegel, this also undermines 
any possible dialectical force that it might have against anti-representationalism, 
which is its intended target. Another way of making the same point would be to 
claim that only objects, including those aspects of them that instantiate 
properties, are presented in experience. Such a formulation would be neutral 
with respect to the existence of tropes, but presses the same objection that 
objects need not be presented under a particular property-type in order for them 
to feature in perceptual experience. The presence of visual properties such as 
redness, roundness, being over here, and so on would then be explained in terms 
of our perceptual sensitivity to certain types of stimuli, but without the relevant 
types figuring at the level of perceptual experience. That such types may show 
up in the content of judgements and beliefs is not, on the relationalist picture, 
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16 Cf. ‘A trope version of [A3] would look like this:
If necessarily: things are the way E presents them only if a cluster of F-tropes is instantiated, 
then:
E has a set of accuracy conditions C, conveyed to the subject of E, such that:
C is satisfied in a world only if there is something that has a cluster of F-tropes in 
that world.’ (Siegel ibid. 58, fn. 29).
reason to attribute contents to experiences proper. Thus the relationalist need 
not commit herself to trope theory in order to make the relevant objection.
3.4. An Argument from Perceptual Seeming
The final argument in favour of representationalism that I wish to consider is 
Susanna Schellenberg’s ‘Master Argument’ (Schellenberg 2011b). Like Siegel’s 
Argument from Appearing (3.3), the Master Argument aims to derive the 
conclusion that perceptual experience has representational content that is 
assessable for truth or accuracy, this time from a supposedly neutral notion of 
perceptual awareness or ‘seeming’. As with Siegel’s argument, however, the 
relevant notions turn out to be far from neutral, instead being biased in favour 
of representationalism, thus rendering the argument circular and so 
unpersuasive.
3.4.1. Schellenberg’s Master Argument
The first part of Schellenberg’s argument, given below, is intended to establish 
the existence of content. This is followed by a second line of argument for the 
view that such content necessarily has accuracy conditions.17 Assuming that by 
‘content’ Schellenberg means representational content, the latter part of the 
argument is relatively uncontroversial since all parties can agree that perception 
has ‘content’ in the sense of the objects and/or properties that are in fact 
perceived. I will therefore restrict most of the following discussion to the part of 
the argument given in Schellenberg (2011b: 6).
      M1 If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering 
from blindsight etc.), then she is aware of the world.
M2 If a subject is aware of the world, then the world seems a certain 
way to her.
M3 If the world seems a certain way to her, then she has an 
experience with content C, where C corresponds to the way the 
world seems to her.
      M4 If a subject is perceptually related to the world (and not suffering 
from blindsight etc.), then she has an experience with content C, 
where C corresponds to the way the world seems to her.
 Taking each of the above premises in turn, M1 is intended to be something 
upon which all perceptual theorists can agree. Bracketing concerns with the 
formulation of this premise in terms of the subject’s relation to and awareness of 
‘the world’, as opposed to the objects and properties in it, this premise may 
therefore be endorsed by Schellenberg’s opponents. Schellenberg goes on to 
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17  This contrasts with Siegel’s Argument from Appearing (3.3.2), which takes the order of 
precedence to be the other way around.
claim that ‘[o]n the face of it, the fact that a subject is aware of the world entails 
that the world seems a certain way to her’ and that ‘there is no obvious reason 
why [pure] relationists should not accept [M2]’ (ibid. 8). However, again 
bracketing similar concerns about the precise formulation of these claims, it is 
far from clear that this is the case. The problem lies with an ambiguity in the 
word ‘seems’.
 There are two relevant readings of ‘seems’ in M2, neither of which appears 
capable of delivering the intended result. The first corresponds to the relatively 
uncontentious claim:
M2′      If a subject is aware of the world, then her experience has a 
certain phenomenal character.
That is to say that for every perceptual experience, there is something it is like to 
have that experience (1.2.2) — the particular reddish and roundish character of 
the experience that one typically has upon seeing a ripe tomato, for example. 
This reading does secure a notion of representational content (C), but it is a 
form of phenomenal content that corresponds to the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience — call this Cp — and not to the non-appearance properties 
of perceptual objects — call this Co.18 As I argued in relation to non-comparative 
looks (3.2.2), this notion of content does not secure any specific way that the 
world would need to be in order for an experience to be veridical. Rather, it 
delivers a ‘thin’ notion of phenomenal content that is indeterminate between 
innumerable ways that the world might be.
 This objection constitutes what Schellenberg, following Travis, terms the 
indeterminacy objection (ibid. 18). According to the objection, the accuracy 
conditions for Cp relate to properties of the subject’s experience and not the 
objective properties of the objects perceived. If the objection holds, then premise 
5 in the second part of Schellenberg’s argument is no longer coherent 
(Schellenberg 2011b: 6):
      M5 The world is either the way it seems to [the subject] or it is 
different from the way it seems to her.
since the accuracy conditions for Cp do not relate to the world in any objective 
sense, but rather to the subject’s experience of it. Consequently, these conditions 
cannot fail to obtain even in non-veridical cases (3.2.2). Thus, on the reading of 
‘seems’ given in M2′, Schellenberg’s Master Argument only succeeds in 
establishing that phenomenal content has accuracy conditions, and not that 
experience has any objective representational content.
 No doubt many representationalists would reject the above objection on the 
basis that the truthmakers for phenomenal content are not supposed to be 
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18  According to some theories of phenomenal character, such as Naïve Realism, these 
amount to the same thing. But this is a substantive claim that cannot simply be assumed 
from the outset.
experiences, but objective states of the world. Thus, even though such content 
may be individuated by the subjective phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience, it is still answerable to how things objectively are in the world for 
the satisfaction of its truth or accuracy conditions. However, this again raises 
the problem of precisely which contents experiences have. If they are supposed 
to have objective content, then the representationalist must show why they have 
those particular objective contents as opposed to any other which shares an 
indistinguishable perceptible appearance; i.e. Travis’s indeterminacy objection. 
If they are supposed to be satisfied by any perceptible objects that yield the same 
subjective phenomenal character then it is no longer clear how the relevant 
accuracy conditions can be specified independently of the subject’s experience. If 
they cannot, then the accuracy conditions for any given perceptual experience e 
are just that the world is such as to gives rise to an experience whose 
phenomenal character is subjectively indistinguishable from e. However, this 
cannot be the right way of specifying such content given that any experience 
could, under appropriate circumstances, give rise to such an experience — for 
example, if the subject had taken a hallucinogenic drug that predisposes her to 
hallucinate that P on the basis of seeing objects for which not-P. In order to 
circumvent this kind of objection, some kind of normative constraint must be 
introduced, such as whether such objects routinely give rise to P-experiences (cf. 
Siegel 2010: 57). The problem remains, however, as to how the phenomenal 
properties of experiences — reddishness, roundishness, and so on — can be met 
by some particular state of the world without simply assuming the point at 
issue; namely, that the relevant experiences have objective accuracy conditions.
 Although more could be said about the above issue, it is clear that the 
subjective phenomenal reading of ‘seems’ is not what Schellenberg has in mind. 
Rather, the relevant seemings are supposed to specify some objective state of the 
world (Schellenberg 2011b: 10). This suggests that M2 should instead be 
interpreted as follows:
M2″    If a subject is aware of the world, then there is some determinate 
and univocal way that the world seems to her to be.
The trouble with this interpretation of M2 is that it is unacceptable to any anti-
representationalist who, like Travis, denies that perceptual experiences have a 
univocal face value — that is to say, a way that the world, in the relevant sense 
seems to be (2.2.2). On this reading of ‘seems’, M2″ assumes precisely this 
principle from the outset. Thus, Schellenberg’s argument that experience has 
representational content assumes that her opponent’s position is false. This 
seriously undermines her argument against any anti-representationalist who 
denies Face-value, for whom this reading of M2 will be unacceptable. Given 
that Travis (2004) is such a representationalist, this renders Schellenberg’s 
Master Argument ineffectual against his position.19
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19  This is not, of course, to say that Schellenberg’s conclusion is false. Rather, the Master 
Argument is dialectically ineffective against Travis’s anti-representationalism.
 Schellenberg goes on to discuss this ‘seems-content link’ (Schellenberg 
2011b: 10) that is presupposed by M3 at some length. She concludes that the 
link holds in at least the case of non-comparative looks, and possibly also in the 
case of visual and thinkable looks if one rejects Travis’s argument from looks.20 
However, as we saw above, the link does not hold in the case of non-
comparative looks, which turn out to be as indeterminate between various ways 
that the world might be as Travis’s visual looks. Furthermore, Schellenberg’s 
grounds for rejecting Travis’s argument, which she takes from Byrne (2009), are 
problematic since Byrne appears to reject the very ‘seems-content’ link (i.e. 
Looks-indexing, 2.2.5) to which Schellenberg appeals on the basis of non-
comparative looks. This undermines Schellenberg’s claim that her Master 
Argument succeeds in establishing a form of objective perceptual representation, 
since it is precisely this link that secures the necessary reading of ‘seems’ in M2 
without which the move to M3 is blocked. However, even if, as I argued above, 
Byrne does endorse a version of Looks-indexing, this would only secure the 
existence of ‘thin’ phenomenal content, which is insufficient for the 
representationalist’s purpose. Thus, while the Master Argument may, according 
to the phenomenal reading of ‘seems’, be successful in establishing the notion of 
phenomenal content, it is unsuccessful in establishing the existence of objective 
representational content in perceptual experience.
 Furthermore, it is unclear from the above argument exactly what the 
argumentative force of M1 through M3 is supposed to be. There does not 
appear to be any logical reason to accept M2 on the basis of M1, or M3 on the 
basis of M2. After all, it is hardly part of our pre-theoretical intuitions that 
perceptual awareness entails the world’s seeming to be some particular way, or 
that such seeming entails representational content. Indeed, these are precisely 
the points that are at issue in Travis’s argument from looks. Rather, these 
premises appear to be intended as a kind of ‘intuition pump’ that facilitates a 
slide from ‘awareness’ in M1 to ‘content’ in M3. From there, it is possible to 
derive the conclusion for which Schellenberg is aiming in M4 and beyond.
 Alternatively, perhaps Schellenberg intends for her argument to allude or 
‘point’, in a more metaphorical sense, to some notion of content entailed by the 
notion of perceptual awareness. However, far from being the innocent moves 
that Schellenberg appears to suggest, M2 and M3 are highly contentious and, in 
the case of M2, potentially question-begging from the anti-representationalist’s 
perspective.21  It is therefore possible for the anti-representationalist to simply 
reject M2 on the basis that the required ‘way of seeming‘ — for example, 
epistemic seeming — is unavailable to the subject on the basis of perceptual 
experience alone, thus preventing Schellenberg’s Master Argument from getting 
off the ground.
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20  Indeed, the relevant readings of ‘seems’ are precisely those that are dealt with in Travis’s 
argument from looks (2.3.2).
21  Schellenberg herself assumes that M3 will be the point at which anti-representationalists 
seek to resist the argument, whereas M2 is clearly more objectionable by Travis’s lights.
3.5. Conclusion
I have argued that, in the face of Travis’s arguments against representationalism, 
none of the above approaches is successful in establishing that perceptual 
experience has representational content. Byrne’s ‘non-comparative’ looks only 
establish the existence of phenomenal content, i.e. content whose accuracy 
conditions vary with experience itself, rather than with the objects and 
properties towards which it is directed. Such content fails to meet Travis’s 
Objectivity condition and cannot be used to ground claims to objective 
knowledge or belief as it is necessarily veridical. Siegel’s Argument from 
Appearing suffers from a similar flaw as her Argument from Accuracy, since it 
fails to distinguish between the notion of accuracy conditions as a predicate and 
accuracy conditions as content (cf. Martin forthcoming b). Furthermore, it 
conflates a familiar fact about looks or appearances — namely that they may be 
paradigmatic of certain types of objects and their properties — with a 
contentious philosophical claim about the structure of perceptual experience, 
namely that it presents properties ‘as being instantiated’, where this is taken to 
presuppose a distinction between property-types and their instances. 
Consequently, the argument fails to have any dialectical force, being instead a 
‘dramatic expression of conviction’22  that merely asserts what 
representationalists already believe — i.e. that perceptual experience has 
representational content — without showing why anyone who does not already 
hold this view need be committed to it. Finally, Schellenberg’s Master Argument 
relies upon an equally question-begging notion of perceptual seeming, which 
presupposes exactly the contents whose existence it was supposed to 
demonstrate. As such, each of these arguments must be rejected as a means by 
which representationalism may be established from a neutral starting point.
 More generally, each of the above arguments can be seen as an instance of a 
tempting line of thought: namely, that the existence of accuracy or veridicality 
conditions, and therefore of representational content, can be derived from the 
mere existence of perceptual appearances. Unfortunately for the 
representationalist, as I argue in the following chapter, mere appearances — or 
‘looks’ — are neutral between representational and relational views of 
experience, and so cannot be taken to settle the debate one way or the other. 
Whilst none of this rules out the possibility that experience may indeed have 
representational content, demonstrating that is does so turns out to be a difficult 
philosophical problem that is not easily resolved by an appeal to appearances. 
For all that the arguments presented above show, Travis may yet be right that 
the senses are indeed ‘silent’, as he seeks to demonstrate.23
Chapter 3, The Sound of Silence  74
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23  Parts of this chapter have benefited from invaluable feedback and discussion on 
presentations given at the Universities of Oxford, Warwick, Columbia and Essex, including 
comments from Johannes Roessler and Anna Marmodoro.
4. Looks
A deflationary analysis
4.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I suggested that Byrne’s (2009) account of perceptual 
experience may commit him to a form of content, i.e. phenomenal content, that 
is incapable of meeting his own objection to Travis — namely, the need to 
provide a satisfactory account of perceptual illusion. In doing so, I identified 
two possible strategies by which this problem could be overcome whilst 
providing a satisfactory response to Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2): (i) by 
identifying a genuinely non-comparative notion of looks that supports both 
Face-value and Looks-indexing, and (ii) by defending an externalist account of 
how subjects are able to gain first-personal knowledge of the contents of their 
experiences. The first of these strategies is examined below whilst the second is 
discussed in chapter   6. Moreover, I argue that considerations concerning the 
nature and semantics of ‘looks’ are insufficient to establish the existence of p-
representation. Thus, representationalists require an alternative motivation for 
their position.
 According to Looks-indexing, p-representational contents must be 
recognisable to the subject in virtue of how, according to the relevant 
experiences, things appear — or in the case of visual perception, how things look 
(2.2.4). In order to refute Travis’s argument from looks without abandoning the 
notion of p-representation, the representationalist must therefore either (a) 
elucidate an alternative notion of looks that satisfies Face-value, but is not 
reducible to either visible or thinkable looks, neither of which is capable of 
indexing representational content on the basis of what is perceptually available 
to the subject (2.3.2), or (b) reject Looks-indexing (or the weaker 
Recognisability condition) outright, in which case Travis’s other arguments will 
apply — specifically, the argument from recognisability (2.3.3) and the argument 
from unmediated awareness (2.3.4), responses to which are examined in 
chapters 5 and 6.
 The first part of this chapter examines various notions and analyses of looks 
in order to establish whether there is a notion of ‘non-comparative’ or 
phenomenal looks that is capable of making representational contents 
recognisable (4.2). The second part of the chapter examines the prospects for an 
alternative ‘deflationary’ analysis of our everyday looks talk in purely 
comparative terms (4.3). By neutralising the challenge from looks-based 
accounts of visual experience, such an analysis would render the notion of non-
comparative looks effectively redundant, closing off a possible line of response 
to Travis by the representationalist about perceptual experience. This in turn 
forces the representationalist to find an alternative way of justifying their 
position (4.4).
4.2. The Varieties of Looks
Much of the terminology surrounding the various notions of looks originates 
with Chisholm (1957), who first proposed the distinction between epistemic, 
comparative and non-comparative looks. These roughly, though not always 
precisely, correspond to what I have been calling thinkable, visible and 
phenomenal looks, respectively. I now wish to present a more nuanced account 
of these distinctions that differentiates between the evidential and non-evidential 
senses of ‘looks’ (4.2.1), comparative and non-comparative analyses of 
‘looks’ (4.2.2), and the relation between looks and the phenomenal character of 
experience (4.2.4). I then consider whether the phenomenal use of ‘looks’ may 
itself be analysed in comparative terms, thus rendering it unsuitable for indexing 
the representational content of perception (4.2.6). Finally I conclude that, even 
if Jackson (1977) and Brogaard’s (forthcoming) arguments are successful in 
establishing a distinctive phenomenal usage of ‘looks’, this use is nevertheless 
insufficient for the representationalist’s purpose, thus making room for the 
essentially comparative or ‘deflationary’ analysis presented in 4.3.
 Before I proceed to examine these various notions, it is important to 
distinguish between, on the one hand, the semantic analysis of ‘looks’, ‘seems’, 
‘appears’ and their cognates and, on the other, the metaphysics of appearances 
and phenomenal character. In this chapter I concentrate mainly upon the 
former. In 4.3, however, I will argue that the availability of alternative analyses 
of ‘looks’ effectively blocks the use of such semantic analyses to draw 
conclusions about the metaphysics of experience concerning the existence and 
nature of representational content. Given the weight that some of the recent 
literature places upon the semantics of ‘looks’, and the misreading of Travis 
(2004) as making a narrow point about the meaning of ‘looks’ rather than 
about experience more generally, there is good reason to be interested in the 
semantic question in its own right. However, even if this were to suggest the 
existence of the kind of ‘non-comparative’ looks that Byrne and others describe, 
I argue below that it would be of little consequence to the argument over 
representationalism and, as such, the debate should be conducted upon other 
more fertile grounds.
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4.2.1. Evidential and non-evidential looks
The distinction between epistemic and comparative looks originates with 
Chisholm in connection with the evidential use of appearance expressions 
(Chisholm 1957: 44). However, as Chisholm also points out (ibid. 47), these 
two varieties of looks are closely related in that many sentences may be used to 
express either or both senses. For example,
(1) The ball looks red to S
can mean either that the subject, S, has ‘adequate evidence’ (ibid. 44) for the 
proposition that the ball is red (the epistemic use, or ‘thinkable looks’) or that, 
in respect of its colour, the ball visually appears to S the way that red things do 
(the comparative use, or ‘visible looks’). Indeed, that the ball in some respect 
visually resembles red things may itself constitute S’s evidence for the ball’s 
being red. In this case, the comparative reading of (1) is also being used 
evidentially, demonstrating that these two uses of ‘looks’ need not be mutually 
exclusive.
 ‘Looks’ can also be used in non-perceptual contexts, as in ‘It looks as if the 
government will be re-elected’ (Jackson 1977: 31). Such uses are clearly 
evidential, but need not be limited to just visual evidence as in the case of 
perceptual looks.1 The existence of the non-perceptual use, however, suggests a 
useful test for multiple senses of ‘looks’. As Brogaard (forthcoming: 18) points 
out, words may exhibit two distinct forms of ambiguity: (i) lexical ambiguity, as 
in the case of ‘bank’, which can mean either the edge of a river or a financial 
institution; and (ii) polysemy, as with ‘fine’ which has multiple related 
meanings, as in ‘a fine restaurant’ or ‘finely shaped features’ (ibid.). The former 
reflects a mere accident of syntax where two distinct concepts just happen to 
share the same spelling, though may be tokened by different words in other 
languages. The latter is ‘systematic’ in that the various meanings are 
semantically, and not just syntactically, related (ibid.). By mixing different uses 
of ‘looks’ within a single sentence we can identify whether this term is 
systematically ambiguous and what its various senses are.2
 For example, if one were reading a newspaper under green light, then the 
sentence
(2) It looks as if the government will be re-elected and the paper is 
green
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1 I take it that looks are a kind of appearance that, excluding non-perceptual uses, are visual 
in nature, just as tastes, smells, sounds, and so on, are forms of appearances to the other 
senses. In what follows, I will treat ‘looks’ and ‘visual appearances’ as synonymous.
2 Lexical ambiguity can be ruled out because there are many languages in which each of the 
uses of the English ‘looks’ may also be expressed using a single term (ibid. 19).
will have an infelicitous reading on which ‘it looks as if’ has wide scope and so a 
single instance of ‘looks’ is used to convey both perceptual and non-perceptual 
meanings. Similarly,
(3) It looks like the train is late and over there
has an erroneous reading on which ‘over there’ is used to demonstratively 
identify the relevant object (the train). (Its legitimate reading is one on which 
both conjuncts employ the evidential use of ‘looks’, as when reading the 
platform number and expected time of arrival from a departures board, for 
example.) The infelicity of such sentences suggests that there are (at least) two 
senses of ‘looks’, which I will refer to as its evidential and non-evidential senses, 
respectively.
 The evidential sense of ‘looks’ relates to what one’s total evidence base 
indicates to be the case, and so corresponds with Travis’s notion of ‘thinkable 
looks’ (2.3.2). For example, ‘seeing Luc and Pia’s flat strewn with broken 
crockery’ might, under certain circumstances, be taken to indicate that they have 
had a tiff (Travis 2004: 67). The evidential sense can be further subdivided into 
perceptual and non-perceptual uses, the former of which includes visual, 
auditory, tactile, and other sensory evidence. When ‘look’ is used in this sense, 
(1) means that, according to the visual or other perceptual evidence available to 
S, the ball looks to be red, giving epistemic support to the proposition
(4) The ball is red
This may be contrasted with the non-evidential sense of ‘looks’, according to 
which (1) is intended to be neutral as to whether the ball is red or not. On this 
reading, (1) merely states how the ball appears to S without any commitment as 
to how it actually is. This is what we might refer to as a mere look. Indeed, one 
could hold that the ball both non-evidentially looks red but that it is purple 
without contradiction. The non-evidential sense thus provides no epistemic 
support for (4) and is what a subject might retreat to when challenged about, or 
given reason to doubt the veridicality of, their experience. Upon discovering that 
the ball is not in fact red, for example, one might continue to assert that it looks 
red, meaning that it could easily be mistaken for such.
4.2.2. Comparative and non-comparative looks
Common locutions of the evidential sense of ‘looks’ include ‘looks as if’ — for 
example, ‘it looks as if it will rain’ — and some cases of ‘looks like’, such as ‘it 
looks like [it will] rain’. More commonly, however, ‘looks like’ introduces the 
comparative use of looks. The comparative use also has two forms: explicitly 
comparative and implicitly comparative. The former invites an explicit 
comparison between the appearances of two or more objects, as in
(5) Charles looks like the prime minister
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Here, the visual appearance of one object (Charles) is being compared with the 
appearance of another (the prime minister). Moreover, (5) has both comparative 
evidential and comparative non-evidential readings, which may be paraphrased 
as follows:
(5′       ) The [visual] evidence indicates that Charles is the prime minister
(5″      ) The look of Charles is similar to the look of the prime minister
The latter of which may be analysed as
     (5*) ∃x∃y (look(x) ∧ (has(Charles, x) ∧ (look(y) ∧ (has(The Prime 
Minister, y) ∧ SIM(x, y)))))
Note that (5*) need not predicate the same look of both objects. Instead, it 
posits a visually relevant similarity between the two (4.3). However, in cases 
where two objects share precisely the same look, we can simplify this to:
   (5**) ∃x∃y∃s (look(s) ∧ (has(x, s) ∧ has(y, s)))3
 The above analyses bring out two important features of comparative looks. 
First, they do not specify how a thing has to be in order to be the way it looks, 
merely that it shares some relevant feature, or features, with another object or 
look. Thus, the value of s in (5**) is not fixed by the semantic properties of (5), 
but rather relies upon various contextual factors, including the subject’s prior 
knowledge or perceptual abilities, to establish what the relevant similarity is. It 
is therefore a substantive question just what the referents or bearers of 
comparative looks are. Second, comparative looks are symmetrical in that the 
referents of (5′) or (5″) can be reversed without altering the statements’ truth 
values. This has important implications for the debate about looks-indexing, 
since if x comparatively looks like y then y also comparatively looks like x. 
Consequently, as Travis argues, comparative looks alone cannot make a specific 
univocal face-value content recognisable to the subject, since it is ambiguous 
whether it is x or y that is being represented. To that extent, a look that x is 
equally a look that y. An essentially comparative analysis of ‘looks’ is therefore 
unacceptable to any representationalist who accepts Looks-indexing since it is 
incompatible with the relevant content having a univocal face value, as per 
premise L3 of Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2).
 An implicitly comparative looks report, on the other hand, is one that does 
not exhibit the surface structure of (5) — i.e. ‘φ looks like ψ’ — but which is best 
understood in terms a comparison with some other object or look. For example,
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referring term. Such an assumption is not required for a comparative analysis of ‘looks’ and 
may be replaced with a suitable account of definite descriptions; e.g. Russell (1905).
(6) Johan looks Scandinavian
might plausibly be given an analysis of the form:
     (6*) ∃s (look(s) ∧ (has(Johan, s) ∧ has(φ, s)))
where φ is some real or imagined individual of characteristically Scandinavian 
appearance.4  As with explicitly comparative looks reports, implicitly 
comparative reports can have both evidential and non-evidential senses. More 
importantly for present purposes, as with explicitly comparative looks, 
implicitly comparative looks are symmetrical and so similarly incapable of 
indexing univocal representational content. One might object to this on the 
basis that φ has a specific privileged role, and so in the above example is 
capable of indexing the univocal content being Scandinavian. However, if φ is 
simply an exemplar of the relevant predicate then, assuming that (6*) is true, φ 
equally looks like Johan, comparatively speaking, as Johan looks like φ. That 
we don’t typically speak in this way is arguably more a matter of convention 
given our linguistic interests, than anything of deep metaphysical significance.
4.2.3. Senses, uses and the regress argument
The above considerations raise the question of whether everyday non-evidential 
comparative looks reports that are not explicitly comparative are implicitly 
comparative. If this were the case, then such looks would be unable to index the 
kind of univocal representational contents that representationalism requires. In 
order to resist this charge, the representationalist must provide a non-
comparative analysis of ‘looks’ that cannot be expressed in terms of an 
equivalent comparative looks report since, if such an equivalence were to hold, 
then ‘looks’ cannot index univocal content and Travis’s argument goes through. 
Conversely, if looks can be given an irreducibly non-comparative analysis, then 
premise L3 of Travis’s argument from looks is false since it is possible to meet 
Looks-indexing without contravening Face-value. I consider the case for and 
against such an equivalence throughout the rest of this chapter.
 The fact that both comparative and non-comparative looks can be evidential 
or non-evidential suggests that either (a) the comparative and non-comparative 
uses of ‘looks’ are not distinct senses, or (b) there are (at least) four senses of 
‘looks’ corresponding to each of the possible combinations of evidential or non-
evidential versus comparative or non-comparative looks. To resolve this 
question, we can carry out a similar test for the existence of comparative and 
non-comparative senses of ‘looks’ as for the evidential and non-evidential 
senses. For example,
(7) The bread looks burnt and like a brick
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seems perfectly felicitous, as does its evidential analogue:
(8) The president looks as if he will be re-elected and govern 
differently to his predecessor
As Brogaard (forthcoming: 21) points out, the acceptability of sentences like (7) 
may also be explained by providing a comparative analysis of both conjuncts. 
That is, there may be a reading of this sentence such that its first conjunct, 
which is not explicitly comparative, is analysed as:
     (7*) ∃s (look(s) ∧ (has(The Bread, s) ∧ SIM(Burnt, s)))
This would remove any potential ambiguity by making both looks comparative. 
A similar analysis, however, cannot be given for (8), since ‘being re-elected’ is 
clearly non-comparative. This suggests that the comparative element of ‘looks’ is 
a feature of its analysis or use, rather than a distinct sense in its own right. If 
this is correct, then the presence of an explicit or implicit comparative element 
should be considered an attribute of particular looks reports, rather than part of 
the meaning of ‘looks’ itself (cf. ibid.).
 One argument that is sometimes given for the primacy of the non-
comparative notions of looks over the comparative notion (e.g. by Byrne 2009: 
441 and Brogaard forthcoming: 22) is that the existence of the former is 
presupposed by the latter. Call this the regress argument. According to this 
argument, comparative analyses like (7*) presuppose that there is some way that 
things look — s in the above example — that grounds the truth or falsity of 
comparative looks reports. On pain of circularity, such looks cannot themselves 
be comparative, and must instead be some other, more primitive form of looks, 
namely non-comparative looks.
 The regress argument, however, is too quick. There is nothing to say that s 
in the above analysis must exclusively be a look, or if it is, that such looks must 
be analysed non-comparatively. All that is required to avoid the alleged regress 
is that s must not itself be the same comparative look, or some precursor of it, 
that is being analysed. This leaves considerable scope for such analyses to 
quantify over, for example, the external objects of perception or their properties 
(4.3). Furthermore, any look that grounds the truth of a comparative looks 
report may itself be comparative in nature. For example, if phenomenal looks 
turned out to be analysable in terms of visually relevant similarities between 
objects, then those similarities would ground the truth of the corresponding 
comparative looks reports. Since the notion of similarity is itself comparative, 
then looks of this kind would be irreducibly comparative as they cannot be 
expressed in terms of any more primitive non-comparative notion. Thus Byrne 
and Brogaard’s regress argument against the primacy of comparative looks fails 
to go through.
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4.2.4. Phenomenal and non-phenomenal looks
Having identified the existence of evidential, non-evidential, comparative and 
non-comparative looks reports, and the various combinations thereof, there 
remains the further question of which, if any, of these is used to give 
phenomenological reports. That is, are there uses of sentences like (1) — ‘The 
ball looks red to S’ — that report the phenomenal character of S’s perceptual 
experience, or are such sentences essentially descriptive of objects in the world? 
The prospects of a looks-indexed account of perceptual content will turn upon 
the answer to this question. Moreover, if any use of ‘looks’ is capable of 
indexing univocal perceptual content, then it will be the non-comparative use 
since, as we have seen, comparative looks are symmetric and so equivocal. A 
potential candidate for such a non-comparative use is Jackson’s 
‘phenomenological’ or ‘phenomenal’ use, which he describes as follows (Jackson 
1977: 33):
The phenomenal use is characterized by being explicitly tied to terms for 
color, shape, and/or distance: ‘It looks blue to me’, ‘It looks triangular’, ‘The 
tree looks closer than the house’, ‘The top line looks longer than the bottom 
line’, ‘There looks to be a red square in the middle of the white wall’, and so 
on. That is, instead of terms like ‘cow’, ‘house’, ‘happy’, we have, in the 
phenomenal use, terms like ‘red’, ‘square’, and ‘longer than’.
If this is correct, then sentences like
(9) It looks red and very old
should have an infelicitous reading since only ‘red’ and not ‘very old’ has an 
obviously phenomenal use.5 However, this does not appear to be the case. This 
apparent discrepancy can be explained either in terms of the corresponding 
comparative reading
(9′       ) It looks the way that red things look and the way that very old 
things look
‘obscuring’ the erroneous reading (Byrne 2009: 442), or by the phenomenal 
reading itself being analysable in comparative terms — a possibility that Jackson 
rejects for reasons I examine in the following section. For present purposes, 
however, it will suffice to clarify precisely what Jackson’s phenomenal use is 
intended to capture, and why one might be tempted to posit it as a means of 
indexing representational content.
 Perhaps the strongest argument for the existence of distinctly phenomenal 
looks comes from the following scenario described by Jackson (1977: 36). A 
‘super-achromatic-color-sorter’ (Martin 2010: 192) — call her Mona — is 
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entirely colour blind and sees only monochromatic degrees of luminosity 
without any polychromatic colour. Consequently, Mona has none of the visual 
phenomenology that we normally associate with seeing colours, or else she has 
very different visual phenomenology corresponding to her monochromatic 
experiences. Mona’s ability to discriminate luminance levels, however, is 
sufficiently acute that she can sort objects into categories by their colour — red, 
green, and so on — despite being unable to ‘see’ these colour in the conventional 
sense. Red objects, for example, appear to Mona as a particular shade of grey, 
or as having some unique surface reflectance property that differs from green 
and other coloured objects. Thus, by stipulation, all of Mona’s talk and 
behaviour concerning colour precisely matches those of a normally sighted 
subject. Furthermore, since red-looking objects look to Mona the way that red 
things normally look to her — that is to say, as a particular shade of grey — then 
they can be said to comparatively ‘look red’ to her. There is a sense, however, in 
which we want to say that nothing looks red to Mona, since she lacks the 
relevant phenomenology. This sense, argues Jackson, corresponds to the 
phenomenal use of ‘looks’.
 Despite its intuitive appeal, one might be tempted to doubt the coherence of 
the SORTER scenario. The term ‘red’ covers a wide variety of perceptible shades 
across an even wider range of environmental conditions, and it is implausible 
that an achromatic perceiver like Mona could differentiate unfamiliar red 
objects from similarly varying shades of other hues based upon their luminance 
and reflectance properties alone. Moreover, even if there were some uniquely 
identifying property of red appearances other than their subjective colour, it 
seems that such a perceiver would be tracking a different property of objects to 
the one picked out by normally sighted perceivers by the predicate is red, i.e. 
their colour. This is borne out by the counterfactual conditionals that hold for 
Mona, which include monochromatic-illusory cases in which objects merely 
appear to her to be red in virtue of possessing the relevant luminosity or 
reflectance profile, but which would not appear red to a normally colour-sighted 
perceiver.
 Even if we grant the coherence of SORTER, however, there is a further 
question concerning the connection between an object’s looking some particular 
way and the phenomenal character of that experience. Like many other views, 
representationalism typically holds that the properties of the objects of 
experience are distinct from the properties of experience itself (cf. 3.3.3). Whilst 
an object of experience can, for example, be square in the ordinary sense, an 
experience of that object can only be described as ‘square’ insofar as it 
represents something as being square. Thus, the experience is not itself square, 
but rather exhibits the phenomenal correlate of squareness — call this square*. 
Now, the connection between being square and square* is either contingent or 
necessary. If it is contingent, then there must be some further explanation as to 
why square* represents being square as opposed to some other property, such as 
being red. But even if this connection were to hold necessarily, then there is still 
a further question as to why an experience with a certain phenomenal character, 
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i.e. square*, should attribute the property of being square to some external 
object, given that, for all that has been said so far, the two are quite separate 
and distinct properties.
 Naïve Realists are able to avoid this objection by asserting the identity of 
these two properties since, for them, to experience something to be square is 
simply to be presented with its squareness. Sense-datum theorists make a similar 
manoeuvre but at the level of mental objects. The question for the 
representationalist, then, is to explain beyond mere causal covariance why a 
particular quality of experience should be taken to represent a given objective 
property.
 To illustrate by way of an example, if (1) were analysed as
(1′       ) The ball phenomenally looks red* to S
then would be unclear how a property of experience — namely, red* — can be 
attributed to a physical object (the ball) since only experiences and not objects 
can be red*. At this point, the representationalist has a number of options. First, 
(1′) may be read as saying that S has an experience of phenomenal redness (i.e. 
red*) that is, or appears to be, caused by the ball. Here, the connection between 
red and red* is contingent since, in a different perceiver, the same object might 
have caused an experience with a different phenomenal character, such as blue* 
or pain. This would make the correlation between red and red* a mere accident 
of grammar, since the only connection between the two properties is a 
contingent causal one. Consequently, on this view the claim that
(10) Things which are red look red
would, on the comparative use of ‘looks’, not be a necessary truth, but an 
‘empirical generalization’ (Chisholm 1957: 51). Such a claim would be 
equivalent to:
(10′     ) Things which are red phenomenally look red* in k
where k is the relevant set of conditions for seeing red things.
 Another option would be to say that S represents the ball as looking red by 
having an experience of red*. That is, experiences with a red* phenomenal 
character are intrinsically representational. The question of whether there are 
any intrinsically representational phenomenal characters lies outside the scope 
of this chapter. However, the suggestion seems to parallel at the level of 
properties, rather than objects, the representationalist notion that one 
experiences objects by representing them to be some particular way, and so is in 
keeping with the general tenor of the representationalist’s account.
 Finally, red* might be understood as a kind of narrow content that 
supervenes upon the properties of experience, but not its external objects. In this 
case, phenomenal looks provide a way of capturing the aspect of perceptual 
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experience according to which things appear to be some particular way to the 
perceiver without entailing that they actually are that way — surely the essence 
of the notion of ‘looks’.
 Although Jackson’s SORTER scenario does not provide us with any positive 
characterisation of, for example, red*, his intention, along with that of 
Chisholm (ibid.), seems to be to posit a use of ‘looks’ that is applicable only to 
experiences that have a certain phenomenal character. Since Mona’s experience 
lacks this character, nothing phenomenally looks red to her, despite red things 
having the relevant comparative look. It remains to be shown, however, that 
there is any connection between the proposed phenomenal use and our everyday 
looks talk. I argue below (4.3) that such talk can be explained equally well, if 
not better, without any reference to phenomenal looks. If this is correct, then 
the phenomenal use of ‘looks’, in so far as such a use exists, may be a distinctly 
philosophical one to which we only need appeal in order to describe various 
apparently logical possibilities, such as SORTER or inverted spectrum scenarios. 
Thus, even if there is a distinctly phenomenal use of ‘looks’, this in itself does 
not necessarily support the truth of representationalism (4.2.6).6
 A further account of ‘non-comparative’ looks offered by Byrne (2009: 444) 
seeks to extend Jackson’s notion of phenomenal looks to include more complex 
looks, such as looking old, cow-ish or Scandinavian. However, it does this by 
combining multiple phenomenal looks involving colour, shape and distance 
terms into more complex visual Gestalten which are recognisable on the basis of 
the relevant phenomenally basic looks. This renders Byrne’s phenomenally non-
basic non-comparative looks a form of linguistic shorthand for more complex 
combinations of phenomenally basic looks. As such, they are only as capable of 
indexing representational perceptual contents as the phenomenally basic looks 
that form their building blocks. I will therefore not give an extended treatment 
of them here since any argument against the latter will count equally against the 
former.
4.2.5. Non-comparative phenomenal looks
Having established the threefold distinction between evidential, comparative 
and phenomenal looks, I will now evaluate the arguments offered by Jackson 
and Brogaard in favour of the existence of non-comparative phenomenal looks. 
Both Byrne and Schellenberg, amongst others, claim that a non-comparative use 
of ‘looks’ may be used to ground the content of perceptual experience. Jackson 
(1977) presents several arguments that appear to support this, claiming that the 
phenomenal use is irreducible to either comparative or epistemic looks. 
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6  It is worth noting that the proposed equivalence between phenomenal and comparative 
looks in this scenario is only supposed to hold between looks to a subject. That is, there is 
nothing to say that looking red to Mona necessarily means the same as looking red to Mary 
(Jackson 1982) or any other perceiver. This in turn suggests that the flaw in the comparative 
analysis of phenomenal looks, if there is one, lies not in its comparative nature, but in its 
subject specificity. This suggestion is taken up by the alternative analyses of ‘looks’ described 
in 4.3, which primarily deal with objective looks, of which subject-specific looks turn out to 
be a special case.
However, as I argue below, these arguments are unconvincing, and the resulting 
non-comparative looks too thin to support the kind of representational contents 
that Byrne and others propose, as Byrne (2009: 444) himself admits. 
Furthermore, the availability of alternative comparative analyses of phenomenal 
looks removes the need to appeal to this notion in accounting for most, if not 
all, of our everyday looks talk, thereby neutralising the force of Byrne and 
Schellenberg’s arguments (4.3). Note that my intention in this section is not to 
offer arguments against Jackson’s own sense-datum account of perceptual 
experience, which he takes to be supported by the existence of phenomenal 
looks. Rather, I aim to refute the use of Jackson and Brogaard’s arguments in 
favour of the existence of phenomenal looks as a means of supporting 
representationalism.
 Jackson aims to establish that statements of the form:
(11) x phenomenally looks F to S
are not systematically equivalent to statements of the form:
(12) x comparatively looks the way things that are F normally look to 
S in k
where k is a specification of normal, ideal, current or some other kind of 
circumstances (Jackson 1977: 34). That is to say, Jackson rejects any 
equivalence between the phenomenal and implicitly comparative (or indeed 
evidential) uses of ‘looks’.7 Jackson’s objections to this equivalence are twofold. 
First, he presents a number of apparent counterexamples which purport to show 
that (11) may be true when (12) is false, or vice versa. Second, he argues that 
there is no relevant set of circumstances, k, such that the alleged equivalence 
always holds. I will address each of these objections in turn.
 Jackson’s first objection to the equivalence between (11) and (12) is that 
something can look F to S even when nothing is F. Such cases, he argues, render 
(12) false despite (11) being true, since nothing can normally look the way to S 
that things that are F do if there are no such things. For all we know, argues 
Jackson, this may be the case in our own world with respect to certain narrowly 
defined colour properties, which may never be instantiated despite the 
appearance of being so, as in the case of Hume’s ‘missing shade of blue’ (ibid. 
35).
 Jackson anticipates the obvious response to this objection, which is to 
replace (12) with the subjunctive conditional:
(13) x comparatively looks the way things that are F would normally 
look to S in k
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7 Jackson also rejects accounting for non-comparative looks in term of the sensory states that 
they typically evoke (ibid.). However, since this argument is of a similar form, I will not deal 
with it separately here.
Thus, even if no actual things are F, things can look the way that Fs would 
(under k to S) were such object to exist. According to Jackson (1977: 35), the 
problem with such an analysis is that
[T]o say that [x] looks red to me is to say something about how things 
actually are, it is not to say anything about how things would be if the 
world were different.
However, this response is based upon a misconception. How things would 
appear to S were she, per impossibile, to experience some red object is a fact 
about the actual world since it concerns the constitution and perceptual 
capacities of S. That this may be explained in terms of a modal notion seems 
beside the point.
 To illustrate this, consider Jackson’s DEMON scenario. This involves ‘a 
Cartesian evil demon who hates red things but tolerates non-red things looking 
red on odd occasions’ (ibid.). The demon’s dislike of red things is such that he 
prevents any such things from coming into existence. Furthermore, if even a 
single red thing were to come into existence, the demon would destroy the entire 
world along with everything in it. Consequently, nothing in this world can look 
the way that red things normally do, as per (13), since if any red thing were to 
come into existence then the entire world would cease to exist.
 Call the demon-world w and the closest possible world in which there are 
red things w′. Contrary to Jackson’s claim, the existence of an evil demon at w 
does not make (13) false; only the absence of red things in w′ could do that. But 
since w′ is the closest possible world in which there are red things, then (13) 
cannot be false unless no possible world contains red things. Given that our own 
world does contain red things, then (13) cannot fail to be true whenever (11) 
obtains. Thus Jackson’s counterexample to the proposed equivalence fails.
 The above response to Jackson might be considered uncharitable on the 
basis that his objection to (13) is less about semantics than the very idea that 
how things look in this world can be answerable to merely possible states of 
affairs rather than what is actually the case. After all, in the demon world, w, 
some things ‘look red’ to S despite there being nothing in that world that is red, 
and so nothing that such looks may be compared with. However, this objection 
is question-begging since it presupposes that we antecedently know what 
phenomenal looks are — or at least what they are not — within the context of an 
analysis of phenomenal looks. This suggestion cannot be given any weight 
unless some concrete reason to reject it is provided. Unfortunately, beyond the 
autobiographical statement that Jackson himself finds the view to be 
implausible, he says little to back up this claim, and so we must reject this 
objection for the time being.
 A similar issue is raised by another scenario described by Jackson (1977: 
35). This involves a subject — call him Frank — who is unusually sensitive to red 
light such that he is dazzled by anything that is red. On occasion, however, 
some non-red things — for example, white walls at sunset — look red to Frank, 
although nothing which is red looks this way due to his dazzlement. To a large 
Chapter 4, Looks  87
extent, this scenario relies for its apparent plausibility upon the value of k in the 
above formulation. For example, though red things may dazzle Frank where k is 
‘full sunlight’, the same objects would presumably look red to him under 
suitably low conditions of illumination. If not, and no red objects look red to 
Frank, as Jackson seems to suggest, then it is debatable to what extent anything 
can be said to look red to Frank, since he is presumably incapable of perceiving 
the relevant colour. At best, any looks that Frank might perceive under such 
circumstances would be akin to a kind of optical illusion in which certain 
conditions cause a phenomenally red experience in Frank. However, Jackson 
gives us no reason to suppose that this experience would in any way correspond 
to other perceivers’ experiences of red, i.e. red* (4.2.4), since it is entirely 
unconnected with the perception of any red object. To simply assume such a 
correspondence from the outset would be question-begging, since the existence 
of such phenomenal looks is precisely the point at issue, rendering the argument 
circular. Conversely, the comparative analysis of (11), i.e. (12), quite plausibly 
suggests that the phenomenal character of Frank’s experience would not be 
red*, but whatever property is shared by all the objects that look red to him — 
call this F*. Since any object that looks F* to Frank also looks the way that 
objects with the relevant property (whatever that might be) normally look in k, 
the proposed equivalence between (11) and (13) continues to hold without 
exception, and so Jackson’s scenario fails constitute a convincing 
counterexample to the comparative analysis.
 The problem with the above scenarios is that each attempts to divorce the 
phenomenon of looking red from things being red. This may be plausible for 
philosophers like Jackson who take there to be a distinctly phenomenal sense of 
‘looks’ such that one can have an experience of phenomenal redness (red*) quite 
independently of one’s capacity for seeing red things. However, this assumption 
is of dubious coherence, and potentially objectionable to any theorist who 
rejects the separation of phenomenal and comparative looks — or indeed the 
separation between the perceived properties of objects and the phenomenal 
character of experience. Thus the very plausibility of the alleged counter-
examples that Jackson describes depends on the assumption that phenomenal 
looks (e.g. looking red*) are distinct from comparative looks (looking like a red 
thing) — the very claim they are being used to demonstrate — and so must be 
rejected on grounds of circularity.
 Having established that none of the above scenarios are wholly convincing, 
this leads us to Jackson’s second objection concerning the specification of the 
conditions k required by (12) or (13), which he puts as follows (Jackson 1977: 
36, with appropriate modifications to the numbering):
In everyday chat about color, we take reasonably bright daylight as normal 
circumstances, but this quite obviously will not do in (12). (11) does not 
mean anything like
(14) x looks the way things that are F normally look to S in daylight.
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Jackson proceeds to consider several possible candidates for such ‘normal 
circumstances’ and finds each of them wanting. His discussion, however, 
conflates two different aspects of (12): (i) the specification of the relevant 
comparison conditions, k, and (ii) the meaning of the term ‘normally’. Jackson 
appears to take the value of k to be ‘normal circumstances’, which in most cases 
(according to Jackson) means in full daylight. However, in Chisholm’s original 
analysis of comparative looks, there is no suggestion that k must remain fixed 
across all experiences, or that it should represent normal conditions. Rather, as 
Chisholm (1957: 45–46) is at pains to point out, k is indexical and may vary 
according to context. This is hardly surprising given the context-dependence of 
other implicitly comparative expressions; e.g. ‘that animal is small [for an 
elephant]’. Jackson’s assumption that k may generally be taken to be 
‘reasonably bright daylight’ in everyday discourse, even if true, is therefore 
irrelevant to the evaluation of (13) in the scenarios he describes. Indeed, the 
circumstances under which (11) is true need not bear any obvious relation to the 
corresponding value of k in (13).
 Take the case of Frank. If this scenario is coherent, and I have argued that 
there is reason to doubt this, an object’s looking red to Frank can be analysed 
not in terms of (14), but as
(15) x looks the way things that are F [would] normally look to Frank 
in conditions of low illumination
where F is ‘red’. As I suggested above, if (15) is never true, then it would be 
questionable to what extent Frank is capable of seeing red at all. Conversely, if 
(15) is true under some set of conditions k, then (11) will be equivalent to (15) 
irrespective of the conditions under which non-red things look red to Frank. 
Thus k specifies the conditions under which Frank sees red things, not things 
that merely appear to be red.
 Allowing k to vary according to context removes much of the force of 
Jackson’s objection, but raises the further question of whether there is any 
principled, non-arbitrary way of determining the relevant conditions. After all, if 
we are free to choose whichever value of k makes (12) or (13) true in each 
individual case, then the above response begins to appear dangerously ad hoc. It 
is plausible, however, that for many subjects most of the time, (11) does mean 
the same as (13) when k specifies present conditions; i.e. the conditions under 
which x is seen. The divergence of Jackson’s and other scenarios from this norm 
is explicable purely in terms of the unusual nature of the subject or situation 
concerned, which thereby cause a different set of conditions to apply. Thus, for 
all that Jackson has said, there appears to be no reason to suppose that 
phenomenal looks reports cannot be analysed in comparative terms, calling into 
question the need for non-comparative phenomenal looks.
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4.2.6. Phenomenal content
I have argued that the evidential, comparative and phenomenal uses of looks, 
far from being mutually exclusive, represent orthogonal aspects of the analysis 
of looks reports (cf. Brogaard forthcoming: 21). As such, Jackson, Brogaard and 
Byrne’s arguments for the primacy and irreducibility of phenomenal looks may 
be seen as attempts to establish the existence of non-evidential non-comparative 
analyses of phenomenal looks. However, each involves a number of 
questionable assumptions, most notably Jackson (1977), who assumes that 
relevant conditions for perceiving appearances must remain fixed across all uses 
of ‘looks’ as opposed to varying with context — a natural consequence of any 
comparative analysis of looks. Indeed, the only one of the above arguments that 
offers any support to the proposed non-comparative analysis is Jackson’s 
SORTER scenario, which is itself of dubious coherence, raising serious issues 
concerning how phenomenal properties relate to the objects of experience. As 
noted above, this not a problem for Jackson himself, who is a sense datum 
theorist, but it presents a serious obstacle to those representationalists who wish 
to adopt Jackson’s account of looks whilst rejecting his conclusion, i.e. the sense 
datum theory. Even if we grant the coherence of non-comparative phenomenal 
looks reports, however, it remains to be seen whether such a use is capable of 
indexing objective representational content. If it is not, as I argue is the case, 
then Jackson’s argument offers no support to the representationalist.
 In order to index perceptual content, in Travis’s terms, a perceptual 
appearance must make exactly one such content recognisable to the subject, as 
per Looks-indexing  (2.2.5). This is the case because it is a necessary condition 
for autorepresentation (i.e. representing-to) that the content of any given 
experience be recognisable to the subject (2.2.4). Furthermore, in order to 
support a representationalist account of illusion, such contents must also be 
capable of misrepresentation — that is, of being false or non-veridical — this 
being one of the supposed benefits of representationalism (2.3.1). Now, if the 
proposed non-comparative phenomenal use of ‘looks’ relates to the presence of 
a given phenomenal character in experience — for example, red* — as opposed 
to a specific property of an object — i.e. being red — then neither of these 
requirements can be met. To see why this is the case, consider the following 
proposition as it applies to Mona, the super-achromatic colour sorter (4.2.4):
(16) The ball phenomenally looks red* to Mona
As it stands, (16) is false since, ex hypothesi, nothing looks phenomenally red to 
Mona as her experience lacks the relevant phenomenal character. This is true 
despite the corresponding comparative reading
(17) The ball comparatively looks the way that red things [would] do 
to Mona under relevant circumstances
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being true, and regardless of whether the ball in question is red or not. 
Conversely, for (16) to be true, Mona would need to experience red*, in which 
case the content would be veridical. Furthermore, (16) is true of ordinary 
perceivers in all cases where the ball appears red, regardless of whether it is red 
or not. Thus, the only content that (16) can make recognisable to the subject on 
the basis of phenomenal looks-indexing is not that the ball is red, but that it 
(merely) looks red; i.e. that the subject’s experience has a particular phenomenal 
character, just as Jackson suggests. There are two problems with this view from 
the representationalist’s perspective.
 First, the proposed content attributes a property to the subject’s experience, 
not to the objects of experience, or in the case of (16), the ball. If the 
representational contents of experience were of this kind, then they would fail to 
predicate anything of external objects since it is only the phenomenal character 
of the experience that would be represented. This is an even weaker notion of 
representation than Byrne’s ‘relatively thin’ content, since it does not yield the 
content that the ball is red, but rather that the ball (merely) looks red. On this 
view, what makes (16) true would be something like:
(18) Mona’s experiencing the ball involves phenomenal redness [red*]
Alternatively, if — by the application of an externalist theory of perceptual 
content, for example — (16) is supposed to represent the ball’s being red, then it 
remains to be explained how (16) could make that content recognisable given 
that phenomenal looks are equivocal between the ball’s being red and its 
(merely) looking red, not to mention the multitude of ways in which something 
can look to be red; e.g. by shining a red light on it.
 Note that simply insisting, perhaps on the basis of an externalist theory of 
content, that Mona’s experience represents being red and not her experience 
involving red* does not constitute an adequate response to the objection. The 
present argument concerns the content that Mona’s experience makes 
recognisable to her, rather than what content her experience can be described as 
possessing from some independent third-personal point of view.8  If the 
recognisability of experiential content is based upon phenomenal looks, 
themselves features of experience, then it remains entirely opaque how this 
could make content that is about the objects of experience available to the 
subject. At best, this approach yields phenomenal content (3.2.3) whilst failing 
to say anything about the objective world outside of experience.
 Second, and equally problematic for the representationalist, is that the 
resulting content is unable to support the standard account of perceptual 
illusion. Given that a subject’s experience involves phenomenal redness (i.e. 
red*) if and only if something looks phenomenally red to them, then (16) can 
only falsely represent in cases where the ball is represented as phenomenally 
looking red, i.e. (16), but where Mona’s experience lacks the relevant 
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8  Appeals to externalist accounts of self-knowledge, e.g. Burge (1979), on the other hand, 
insofar as these bear upon Looks-indexing, are relevant, and are dealt with in chapter 6.
phenomenal character, i.e. (18), is false. This form of illusion, if indeed it is 
coherent, is not perceptual but cognitive, since it describes a case in which the 
subject is mistaken about the nature of her own experience.9 Conversely, if the 
possibility of such illusions is rejected, as I believe it should be, then the 
resulting content, i.e. (16), can never be said to misrepresent, since the subject 
only ever represents something as phenomenally looking red* when they are 
experiencing a red phenomenal character, and so the content is necessarily 
veridical. Thus the content of (16) becomes its own truthmaker. Note that even 
if the possibility of misrepresentation is allowed for, it is not of a kind that 
would enable the representationalist to explain the existence of perceptual 
illusions, since at no point is any object represented as being red; merely that it 
looks so.
 Putting both of these points together, and in the absence of any convincing 
counter-argument, we can conclude that non-comparative phenomenal looks, as 
described, are unfit to index the representational content of perceptual 
experience. That is not to say that we cannot describe the phenomenal character 
of experience in representational terms. Rather, in providing a response to 
Travis’s argument from looks, such representational content (a) can only make 
the phenomenal character of experience recognisable and not the properties of 
external objects, and (b) fails to provide an adequate explanation of perceptual 
illusion. Indeed, this is precisely the notion of phenomenal content that was 
rejected in the previous chapter in connection with Byrne’s account of non-
comparative looks (3.2.3), and which Byrne (2009: 443) himself admits to be 
unsuitable for indexing the content of perceptual experiences. Thus, even if 
SORTER is taken to justify the existence of some form of non-comparative 
phenomenal looks — and it is far from clear that it should be — such looks 
cannot index the kind of content that many representationalists take perceptual 
experiences to have. This is not a problem for Jackson (1977: ch. 3), who argues 
that phenomenal looks justify the existence of sense data rather than 
representational content. It is, however, a problem for Byrne, Schellenberg and 
any other representationalist who wishes to ground their notion of p-
representational content upon it.
4.3. Parsimony about Appearances
Having established the difficulties with both Jackson’s phenomenal looks and 
Byrne’s ‘non-comparative’ looks for indexing representational content, I will 
now to turn to an alternative analysis of ‘looks’. According to this essentially 
comparative account, looks statements are grounded in primitive visually 
relevant similarities between objects, and not in additional appearance or 
phenomenal properties. It is therefore a deflationary analysis as it holds 
comparative, and not phenomenal, looks to be explanatorily more basic. 
Furthermore, this account treats both objective and subject-relative looks — i.e. 
Chapter 4, Looks  92
9  This is not the situation of Mona, to whom objects do not even phenomenally look red 
(compare: a subject representing the ball as being red when it is not).
‘looks F’ and ‘looks F to S’, respectively — as points on a single continuum 
(4.3.4). It is therefore not only more parsimonious (4.3.1), but also more 
powerful than Byrne and Jackson’s non-comparative accounts (4.3.2). Finally, I 
consider a potentially objectionable feature of the parsimonious account, along 
with how this might be resolved (4.3.3).
 Since this deflationary analysis is essentially comparative, it cannot support 
the indexing of representational content by looks in the way that 
representationism requires. Instead, it remains strictly neutral on the question of 
whether experience has representational content. The availability of such an 
account, however, suggests that representationalists should not seek to motivate 
their view via the semantics or metaphysics of ‘looks’ since, in the absence of a 
stronger argument than those considered above, there is no reason to suppose 
that a non-comparative account of looks must apply. Rather, one could equally 
adopt a comparative analysis of ‘looks’, thereby, in conjunction with Travis’s 
argument from looks, neutralising the force of the representationalist’s 
argument.
4.3.1. A deflationary analysis
One of the most thorough and detailed treatments of comparative looks in the 
recent literature comes from M. G. F. Martin, who claims that many of the 
cases of what Jackson takes to be paradigmatically ‘phenomenal talk’ are 
implicitly comparative (Martin 2010: 162). The central claim of his account is 
captured by the following principle, which Martin (ibid. 197) labels Parsimony:
Parsimony: looks statements are made true just by properties of objects 
that we need to appeal to in order to explain the truth of 
sentences that are not explicitly looks sentences.
According to Parsimony, there is no need to posit an additional phenomenal use 
of ‘looks’ or appearance properties to explain the meaning of looks statements. 
Instead, such statements are made true or false by an object’s ordinary 
appearance-independent properties, such as their shape or colour. In effect, the 
proponent of Parsimony claims that the role that was played by phenomenal 
properties above (4.2.4) can equally well be played by those appearance-
independent properties that give rise to the relevant looks; i.e. the intrinsic 
properties of shape, size, colour, and so on, that we ordinarily take physical 
objects to have independently of how they look. Consequently, there is no need 
to appeal to additional appearance properties or non-comparative looks in order 
to analyse many — or indeed most — everyday looks statements.
 Although Martin’s account of the semantics of ‘looks’ is characteristically 
subtle and complex, his central thesis is relatively straightforward and may be 
divided into two lemmas. First, instead of an object’s look (or looks) being some 
property distinct from its intrinsic properties, it is simply the product of its 
visually relevant similarities to other objects. For example, the ball’s looking red 
is just a matter of one object (the ball) bearing a certain visually relevant 
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similarity — i.e. its apparent colour — to the characteristic appearance of red 
things, regardless of whether it is red or not. On this view, looks are merely a 
way of quantifying over similarities between the multitude of ways that objects 
can appear to us.
 The second lemma is that what grounds the explanation of these visually 
relevant similarities is the mind-independent properties of the objects themselves 
— shape, colour, and so on — along with our perceptual sensitivities to them. 
What makes a property visually relevant is the way that it perceptually affects us 
through the sensory modality of vision, with the same applying mutatis 
mutandis for each of the other senses. Thus it is us and our sensory faculties that 
determine the similarities that we find visually salient, rather than anything 
peculiar to the objects of perception and their properties. Nevertheless, the 
objective properties of those objects are what ground such similarity relations. 
Consequently, according to Parsimony, our sensory faculties are capable of 
perceiving intrinsic properties of objects, including their shape, colour, and so 
on, along with similarities between these properties, without the need to posit 
additional appearance-dependent properties.
 According to Parsimony, then, sentences like (1) — ‘The ball looks red [to 
S]’ — means that a certain object (the ball) visually strikes S in a way that is 
characteristic of red things relative to a certain set of contextually defined 
conditions. Things ‘look red’ because they strike us in the way that is 
characteristic of objects that are red; i.e. it is the way that red things (typically, 
under circumstances that are conducive to perception) look. Whilst this requires 
that there be various ways in which things can visually strike us, i.e. 
phenomenal characters, these are not looks per se. Rather, it is the similarities 
between objects that ground the truth of looks statements. Since the account is 
based upon similarities, this yields the following comparative analysis of 
sentences like (1):
(19) ∃s (has(x, s) ∧ (look(s) ∧ φ(s)))
where x is some physical object (e.g. the ball) and φ is a function that identifies 
the relevant ‘way of looking’, such as looking red (Martin 2010: 172). This also 
leaves open what kind of entities s and φ pick out, each of which I address in 
turn below.
 Taking the function first, as we have already established, φ cannot itself be 
‘red’ since (1) does not mean that the ball is red, or that the relevant look is red 
(looks do not themselves have colours; they are of colours), merely that it 
appears that way. According to Jackson’s phenomenal account of looks, φ 
would take the value red*, or more generally ψ*, where this term identifies the 
phenomenal counterpart of ψ, the precise method of establishing which is 
unclear. Instead of specifying ways of looking in terms of some property, 
however — phenomenal or otherwise — Martin takes φ to be a similarity 
function, or SIM for short. This function takes a predicate (‘is red’) and a look 
(s), and obtains if and only if the latter is relevantly similar to those objects that 
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satisfy the predicate. For example, if s is a reddish look, then SIM(‘is red’, s) will 
be true. An additional getting-the-characteristic function, or C for short, is then 
required to map what Martin calls the ‘complement adjectival phrase’ (ibid.) of 
the looks predicate — in this case ‘red‘ — to the property of objects that is 
characteristic of that look under circumstances k. Thus, C(red, look, k) would 
return the property that is characteristic of things that look red under the 
relevant circumstances — namely being red.10
 Putting all the above elements together yields the following analysis:
(20) ∃s (has(x, s) ∧ (look(s) ∧ SIM(C(ψ, look, k), s)))
Thus (1) may be analysed as x (the ball) having a look that is relevantly similar 
to the look of things that are red (this being the property characteristic of things 
that have this look) under circumstances k, where ψ is the adjectival-phrase 
complement of ‘looks’ in (1), i.e. ‘red’. The apparent complexity of the analysis 
masks the underlying simplicity of the sense in which things that look red look 
like (a comparative notion) the red things, thus corresponding to Travis’s notion 
of a visible look (2.3.2).
 Before moving on to examine the consequences of Parsimony, it is 
important to note that (20) is intended as a logical, and not psychological, 
analysis of the semantics of ‘looks’. There is no suggestion that the process 
outlined above parallels some sequence of psychological events that we go 
through when evaluating looks statements, though in some cases it may do. 
Rather, it is intended to explain the underlying semantic structure of such 
statements in a way that reveals their essentially comparative nature, as distinct 
from the phenomenal analysis offered by Jackson and others (4.2).
 What Martin’s deflationary analysis shows is that both similarity 
judgements, in the form of SIM, and the properties that are characteristic of a 
given look, C, are central to the meaning of looks statements. Thus, it is not that 
there is any intrinsic connection between an object’s looking red and being red, 
but rather that being red is (under certain circumstances) a visually relevant 
characteristic of things that look red. This need not render judgements like (1) 
inferential or epistemically indirect since subjects may become expert at 
recognising such properties without the need to perform any such inference. 
However, such linguistic competence only becomes possible once one knows 
what red things ‘look like’ in the sense that one associates the appearance-
independent property of being red with the phenomenal character that one 
experiences upon seeing red objects.11
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10  Note that in many everyday cases the correspondence need not be trivial. A reddish look 
may, under certain lighting conditions, be characteristic of white objects, or someone who 
‘looks pregnant’ may have the property of being a particular shape (Martin 2010: 173).
11  As before, if the metaphysics of colour are thought to be problematic in this regard, 
consider the analogous case of shape.
4.3.2. What’s in a look?
In certain respects, Martin’s deflationary analysis of ‘looks’ is not dissimilar to 
Byrne’s ‘non-comparative’ looks (4.2.5). Both make reference to distinct 
properties, or sets of properties, that relate to a given look. However, whereas 
Byrne claims that such a set of phenomenal characters just is the look, according 
to Parsimony, looks are constituted by similarities between properties, and not 
those properties themselves. Thus, according to the parsimonious account, such 
looks are implicitly comparative. This does not yet explain, however, what kind 
of entities s and the results of the C function in the above analysis are. Indeed, it 
is possible that these are precisely the kind of phenomenal looks that Jackson 
and Byrne posit. On such a view, the visually salient similarities that SIM picks 
out would be between the bundle of phenomenal properties that the subject is 
experiencing and the bundle of phenomenal properties returned by C that is 
characteristic of the look in question; e.g. looking red. On this interpretation, 
Martin’s analysis would entail the existence of non-comparative looks. (I argue 
below that this view is incorrect, and so there is no such entailment.) In the case 
of complex looks, the main point of difference between Martin and Byrne is that 
to ‘look red’ is not to non-comparatively look red*, but to look relevantly 
similar to the characteristic look of red things, where a ‘look’ is something like a 
Kantian sensory manifold. This difference may seem somewhat obscure, but 
there is a further point that is central to Martin’s account.
 In contrast to Jackson, Martin argues that the sentence
(21) The spread looks splendid12
is ambiguous between the following readings:
(21′     ) There is a splendid look that the meal has
(21″    ) The meal has a look that is relevantly similar to the look of 
splendid things
Or, to put this more formally (Martin 2010: 185):
   (21*) ∃s (has(the meal, s) ∧ (look(s) ∧ splendid(s)))
 (21**) ∃s (has(the meal, s) ∧ (look(s) ∧ SIM(C(splendid, look, k), s)))
According to (21′), it is the look of the meal that is splendid. In (21″), the meal 
itself has a look that is relevantly similar to that of meals that are splendid. 
Conversely, however, Martin argues that comparable sentences involving shape 
or colour terms contain no such ambiguity. That is, (13) does not admit of the 
readings
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12 Martin uses the term ‘spread’ to mean a large and impressive meal.
(13′     ) There is a red look that the ball has
(13″    ) The ball has a look that is relevantly similar to the look of red 
things
Instead, according to Parsimony, the two readings effectively collapse into (13″) 
since to have a red look just is to have a look which is relevantly similar to the 
look of red things. Unlike ‘splendid’, which conceivably applies to both looks 
and objects, a look is not the sort of thing that can itself be red; in (13′), for 
example. Rather, it is the look of something red.13
 Parsimony entails that quantification over the looks of objects does not 
require those objects to possess any particular properties other than looking that 
way; i.e. there need not be any red thing that is seen in order for something to 
look red. This runs counter to Jackson’s account, which posits the existence of 
precisely such entities — namely, sense data. But if looks are not phenomenal 
properties of experiences or objects, then what are they? Martin’s answer is at 
once simple and surprising: they are the ordinary appearance-independent 
properties of objects.
 The second aspect of Parsimony, then, is that it identifies the phenomenal 
character of looks with the appearance-independent properties of objects: being 
red, being square, and so on. On this view, the properties of which one is aware 
in perceptual experience are not the phenomenal correlates of an object’s 
appearance-independent properties, but those very properties themselves. When 
one sees the red ball, for example, one experiences or is aware of the redness of 
that very object, and not merely some phenomenal aspect of an experience 
caused by the object. Thus, instead of a duality between the world of ‘external’ 
objects and their appearance-independent properties and an ‘internal’ world of 
experience and its phenomenal properties, Parsimony entails — at least in the 
case of colour, shape and distance perception — that we experience the 
appearance-independent properties of external objects themselves. Furthermore, 
in the case of objects that merely look red, it explains why there need be no red 
thing present. In such cases, the red look of an object is explained by its 
qualitative similarity, as determined by the similarity function SIM, to things 
that are red. This may, though need not, cause one to mistakenly judge on the 
basis of this look that something is red when it is not. Thus in the case of mere 
looks and perceptual illusions, nothing in the subject’s experience need 
instantiate the properties that are perceived. Rather, one is confronted with an 
appearance that is relevantly similar to the characteristic look of some other 
object, causing one’s thoughts and actions to be guided accordingly.
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inference from:
 ∃x (experiencing(S, x) ∧ looksred(x))
to
 ∃x (experiencing(S, x) ∧ red(x))
is fallacious.
 In summary, then, Jackson identifies a class of non-comparative or 
‘phenomenal’ looks that he takes to underpin the meaning of comparative looks 
statements. This, along with the wider range of non-comparative looks — 
including Byrne’s Gestalten, which arise from combining multiple phenomenal 
looks — may indeed be used to ground a limited notion of representational 
content. However, the resulting content lacks the objective import that p-
representation requires. Martin, on the other hand, argues that although non-
comparative uses of ‘looks’ may exist, they are not themselves looks. Rather, 
looks arise from salient similarities between the experiences of objects that 
possess the relevant property, and in some cases those that don’t.
 Moreover, one can become visually aware of an object’s properties through 
direct perceptual experience of them such that the experienced properties of the 
object are themselves constituents of that experience. This removes the need to 
posit additional entities or properties that correspond to an object’s looks, 
instead locating looks in the similarities between those properties of objects in 
the world that subjects find visually salient. As such, to experience an F-look 
need not be to experience F-ness per se, but rather receives the disjunctive 
analysis of either experiencing F-ness or some other property, the experience of 
which bears visually relevant similarities to it. Thus, a stick that is half-
immersed in water is not itself bent, nor does it have a ‘bent look’ in the sense of 
possessing an appearance property of ‘bentness’. It merely looks, in certain 
respects and from particular angles, like bent sticks do. Similarly, a white wall 
illuminated by red light does not present the subject with the look of a red wall 
per se, but rather with a look that one might, under certain circumstances, 
mistake for a red wall due to the similarity between the two experiences, and so 
on.14  Such an explanation of perceptual illusion is consistent with Travis’s 
argument from misleading appearances (2.3.1).
4.3.3. The problem of conflicting appearances
Perhaps the most serious problem for the parsimonious account is one that 
Martin (2010: 219–22) himself considers. It is not unusual in philosophical 
discussions of perception to appeal to cases in which the appearance of an 
object is altered whilst its intrinsic properties remain unchanged. Hume 
famously used just such a case to argue that the direct objects of perception 
cannot be external physical objects, which ‘suffer no alteration’ despite changes 
in their appearances, but must instead be ideas or impressions in the mind 
(Hume 1999: XII.i, 201). This was later refuted by Reid (1997: VI.xxii, 186), 
whose response has since been taken up by Snowdon (1990) and others. 
However, this problem of conflicting or incompatible appearances also presents 
a problem for Parsimony. If judgements about the sensible properties of objects 
in the epistemically ‘good’ case are just judgements about their intrinsic 
properties, then how are we to explain cases in which an object’s sensible 
appearances change whilst its intrinsic properties do not? A paradigm example 
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14 See 4.3.4 for further qualification on this point.
of such a case is that of a stick that when partially immersed in water appears 
bent. That is to say, in certain respects from the relevant angle, it looks 
relevantly like a stick that is bent would do under normal circumstances, i.e. 
when it is not immersed in water (Martin op. cit.).
 There are two obvious responses to this problem in connection with 
Parsimony, both of which Martin rejects. The first is to claim that an object’s 
appearance depends not only upon its intrinsic properties, but also its relational 
properties. The appearance of the stick, for example, varies when it is partially 
immersed in water due to its acquiring the relational property of being 
immersed in water. This would be entirely in keeping with the principle of 
Parsimony, which claims only that how an object looks is explained by 
reference to its appearance-independent properties, and not what kinds of 
properties these are. We can therefore identify two variants of the principle 
according to which types of properties are admissible in explaining looks 
statements: (i) Relational Parsimony, according to which looks statements are 
made true just by those properties of objects and their relations to objects that 
we need to appeal to in order to explain the truth of sentences that are not 
explicitly looks sentences, and (ii) Non-Relational Parsimony: looks statements 
are made true just by the non-relational properties of objects that we need to 
appeal to in order to explain the truth of sentences that are not explicitly looks 
sentences.
 The problem with Relational Parsimony from Martin’s (2010: 220) point of 
view is that:
[T]he ways of looking that the stick has just are among its basic visible 
properties, most saliently its length and shape, and potentially its surface 
colour. These simply do not change when it is placed half in the water
Martin does not give any particular argument for this assumption, though he 
clearly aims to give the simplest possible account of our perceptual awareness of 
objects and their properties. Admitting that relational properties have an effect 
upon appearances would, perhaps, weaken the sense in which we can be said to 
be directly aware of the non-relational properties of objects, since various 
combinations of relational and non-relational properties can combine to 
produce the same or similar appearances. Such combinations, however, admit of 
a disjunctive analysis in a similar manner to disjunctive accounts of perception 
and perceptual illusion. On this view, the ‘bent’ appearance of the stick would 
be explained in terms of the distorting effects of the water in which it is 
immersed, the refractive properties of which combine with the shape of the stick 
to yield the resulting look. Thus, upon seeing a stick that is immersed in water, 
we veridically see the properties of the both stick and water combined, rather 
than just the shape of the stick. Presumably, however, even in the normal case, 
minute distortions from the air or other intervening medium would mean that 
we rarely, if ever, saw the non-appearance properties of objects simpliciter. The 
resulting account is therefore unattractive to Naïve Realists, like Martin, who 
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wish to claim that we have direct, and therefore unmediated, awareness of 
external objects in the normal case.
 An alternative response would be to claim that looks statements are 
‘principally reports of our psychological states’ (Martin 2010: 220). This view 
explains how objects can change in appearance without changing their non-
relational properties in terms of the subject having entering a different 
psychological state. However, this would seem to imply that objects do not have 
any particular look when they are not being experienced, which is contrary to 
the way we use ‘looks’. This drawback could perhaps be avoided by a move 
similar to the one that Jackson makes in the case of phenomenal looks, with 
each look corresponding to what subjects would experience were they to be 
confronted with that object (4.2.5). However, this again involves identifying 
looks with the psychological responses of subjects, thereby weakening the sense 
in which perceptual experience can be said to deliver direct awareness or 
knowledge of external properties, and so is similarly inhospitable to Naïve 
Realism.
 Martin’s own response to this challenge is to claim that the appearances of 
objects do not, despite evidence to the contrary, change. Indeed, he observes 
that ‘[i]f we endorse Parsimony, then we must reject the claim that the stick has 
changed in appearance’ (Martin 2010: 220). Instead, according to Martin, what 
changes is the appropriateness of asserting that the object has certain 
appearances according to the ‘perspective of comparison’ that one adopts (ibid. 
221). On this view, the stick has both the property of ‘looking straight’ and 
‘looking bent’, but one is only in a position to assert the former upon seeing the 
stick out of water, and the latter when it is partially immersed. The intrinsic 
properties of the stick that ground both appearances, however, remain fixed 
regardless of whether it is immersed or not. This position is highly 
counterintuitive since we can, and frequently do, say that the appearances of 
objects change. However, it follows from Parsimony  that if an object’s 
appearance-independent properties do not alter, its appearance — or 
appearances — must remain similarly fixed. In a sense, then, Parsimony entails 
that objects possess all of the objective appearances that they can possibly have, 
irrespective of which of these is currently available to observers at any given 
time. What makes it the case that things appear one way rather than another is 
instead the perspective or psychological state of the observer.
 This unpalatable consequence of Parsimony, however, may be avoided since 
the principle does not require that there be a simple one-to-one correspondence 
between perceptual appearances and the appearance-independent properties of 
objects. Instead, appearances may be realised by many different physical 
properties with the similarities between them being explained by the 
constitution and perceptual sensitivities of the subject. The ‘bent’ appearance of 
a stick in water, for example, need not be explained in terms of a single physical 
property that explains both the appearance of a stick in water and one that is 
genuinely bent. That we identify both appearances as forms of ‘bentness’ is not 
explained by sameness of truthmakers, but by their subjective — or rather 
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intersubjective — similarity to paradigm cases of bent objects. Provided that such 
similarities are grounded in the relevant appearance-independent properties, 
which may include the perceptual constitution of the subject, Parsimony is 
maintained. In most paradigm cases of perception, however, such properties 
typically will be just the shape, colour, distance properties, and on so, of 
external objects. However, in cases of illusion or subjective similarity (e.g. the 
submerged stick), this need not be the case.
 A modified version of Martin’s view may therefore be constructed in which 
changes of appearance are explained by the tendency of the human perceptual 
system to group appearances or looks together, based around certain paradigm 
cases. What an object looks like — a comparative notion — is explained in terms 
of its visual similarities to other objects, which in turn instantiate those 
properties of which they are paradigmatic. Precisely which objects constitute the 
relevant paradigms will be a partly empirical matter upon which the Parsimony 
theorist need not take a view. Indeed, it will not matter whether the relevant 
cases differ between times and subjects provided that the same sets of 
similarities are maintained. In that respect, a genuinely bent stick is as good an 
exemplar of bentness as, for example, a banana.15  Thus, it is no objection to 
Parsimony that the resulting looks are equivocal, since this is an inevitable 
consequence of any comparative analysis of ‘looks’. Rather, it suggests that 
what determines an object’s appearance is its similarities to other objects. This 
in turn may be explained by reference to both the object’s and the perceiver’s 
non-appearance properties, as Parsimony suggests. That we can describe the 
presence of a particular appearance in terms of a potentially complex 
disjunction of physical properties is neither here nor there. Indeed, the problem 
with doing so will be precisely the representationalist’s difficulty in attempting 
to index p-representational content by visible looks (2.3.2). Provided that we 
identify looks with sets of similarities rather than looks-independent properties, 
however, this issue need not arise.
4.3.4. Consequences of Parsimony
Thus far, we have only considered what might be termed objective looks; that is, 
the looks that objects have to any suitably perceptual observers under certain 
narrowly defined conditions. But Jackson and Byrne’s non-comparative 
accounts of looks are relative to individual subjects; i.e. subjective looks. How 
are ‘looks to S’ to be accounted for in the parsimonious account? In fact, 
Parsimony offers an elegant way of unifying these two varieties of looks since 
subject-relativity is already built into the parsimonious analysis in the form of 
the similarity function (4.3.1). Since the experiences that various subjects find 
relevantly similar may differ from one individual to the next, subject-relative 
looks are simply what constitutes a visually relevant similarity for a particular 
subject. That is, sentences like (1) — ‘The ball looks red to S’ — exhibit an 
identical logical structure to (13), as formalised by (20), but employ a subject-
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15 Cf. Wittgenstein on the grammar of sensation terms (1953: §293).
specific, as opposed to global, similarity function. We can formalise this as 
follows:
(22) ∃y (has(x, y) ∧ (look(y) ∧ SIMS(C(φ, look, k), y)))
where the subscripted similarity function SIMS captures those similarities that 
are visually relevant to subject S.
 An objective look, on the other hand, involves a set of similarities that all 
sufficiently acute perceivers have in common. Thus, for something to objectively 
look red is for the subject’s perceptual experience of an object to exhibit the 
same similarities to their experiences of red things as other subjects’ experiences 
do to their experiences of red things. This does not entail that one subject’s 
experience of an object or property need be subjectively similar to another’s 
experience of the same object or property — something that would in any case 
be impossible to determine. Rather, the intersubjectivity applies to what the 
subjects’ similarity functions have in common; i.e. the kinds of experiences that 
the subjects find to be visually similar. The mapping from subjective to objective 
looks thus reflects the similarities that all normally perceiving subjects share. To 
that extent, the global similarity function SIM may be thought of as a subset (or 
in some cases, a superset) of SIMS. It is therefore a feature of Parsimony that it 
takes both subjective and objective looks to share the same logical structure.
 Another important aspect of Parsimony is the role it accords to a subject’s 
prior knowledge. In fact, two distinctive kinds of knowledge are involved: (i) 
knowledge of the characteristics of each given type of look, i.e. getting-the-
characteristics, or C (4.3.1); and (ii) knowing which experiences exhibit relevant 
similarities to those characteristics, i.e. SIMS. Such ‘knowledge’ need not be 
explicit, but may correspond to an innate capacity — for example, to perceive 
certain experiences as being inherently similar — or be acquired through 
experience. Children below the age of five, for example, find it difficult to 
identify the colours of unfamiliar objects despite being familiar with the relevant 
colour terms in other contexts — they have no difficulty in naming a random 
selection of colours, for example (Bornstein 1985). This suggests that such 
associations, or the ability to reflect upon the sensory experiences that support 
them, may be acquired.
 Parsimony accords a role to this type of knowledge not only in acquiring the 
ability to name colours according to their appearance, but in recognising 
relevant similarities between different perceptual experiences. Once learned, this 
knowledge becomes implicit such that we can identify a red-looking object as 
‘red’ without any conscious thought or inference even though this term covers a 
wide range of actual and mere appearances — for example, under different 
lighting conditions. Conversely, a perceiver’s conception of green and blue may 
differ from other perceivers with similar levels of acuity not only because they 
differ in their phenomenal character (they may not) but because one finds 
certain pairs of colours to be more similar than others on the basis of one’s prior 
experience and training. Some subjects, for example (including the present 
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author), may find certain shades of bluish-green to be more subjectively similar 
to paradigm examples of blue than do those who class them as ‘green’. This 
need not be merely a matter of using the terms ‘blue’ and ‘green’ in slightly 
different ways. To such a perceiver, these colours may really more closely 
resemble blue than green. Thus, the implicit knowledge of looks plays a central 
role in the parsimonious analysis (cf. 6.4.2).
 Martin (2010) primarily presents a semantic analysis of looks statements. 
However, one might equally be interested in the psychological analysis of looks. 
What makes something look the way it does, and in what sense can this be said 
to be similar or identical to the looks of other things? As noted above, Martin 
does not attempt to provide such an analysis, but his account is suggestive of the 
basic outline for one. The look of an object is determined by the similarities that 
a subject is able to draw between experiences — in particular, similarities 
between this and one’s prior experience of paradigm examples of particular 
colours, shapes, and other visible properties. Subjects are able to move from 
looks to classes of experiences; for example, in being able to group together 
objects that look the same, or similar. Conversely, in moving from an experience 
to a look, one is able to recognise the property that is paradigmatic for that 
look — being red, being square, and so on, as encoded by the function C. 
Consequently, a subject’s grasp of looks runs both from a given looks-
expression to a class of experiences, and from a given experience to the 
corresponding looks-expression. Both of these abilities are therefore necessary 
for the understanding and communication of looks statements. Whether these 
constitute two forms of knowledge or two different uses of the same knowledge 
is an empirical question to be determined by the presence or absence of the 
corresponding abilities in actual subjects.
 The final aspect of the deflationary account of looks that I wish to consider 
is what, if anything, it tells us about the various uses of ‘looks’. Whilst Martin 
talks about ‘comparative’ and ‘non-comparative’ looks in the sense used by 
Chisholm, Jackson and Byrne (4.2.2), this terminology is potentially misleading. 
What Parsimony shows is arguably not that there are several different uses of 
‘looks’, but that there are (at least) two different uses of looks statements.16  A 
sentence like (1)  can be used (a) comparatively, as in the ball looks the way that 
red things do; and (b) phenomenally, as in the ball has a red* look. This does 
not reflect any difference in the meaning of ‘looks’, but rather in the intention 
that the speaker wishes to communicate. In the first case, the speaker is drawing 
an implicit comparison between her experience of the ball, which seems to be 
red (even though it may not be), and the characteristic appearance of red things. 
The second case draws attention to the phenomenology of the subject’s 
experience, which has a red* phenomenal character. According to Parsimony, 
both cases employ the same sense of looks, which is implicitly comparative.
 The same is true of the evidential and epistemic uses of ‘looks’. When (1) is 
offered as evidence of the proposition that the ball is red, the intended sense of 
‘looks’ is also implicitly comparative. The only difference from (i) is that the 
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speaker intends her audience to take this as evidence for, or justification of, the 
latter proposition. Similarly, sentences like
(23) It looks like rain
may be taken to mean it looks as if it is going to rain or those clouds look like 
rainclouds do. However, even in the former case, it is precisely because the 
clouds look like rainclouds that one concludes it is going to rain, and not 
because the term ‘looks’ takes on a different meaning. Rather, the difference 
between these two readings is pragmatic rather than semantic. This in turn helps 
to explain why both Chisholm (1957: 47) and Jackson (1977: 33) find epistemic 
and comparative looks statements to be so closely connected since they are 
effectively two different uses of the same proposition.
 Parsimony therefore suggests that we should abandon the idea of distinct 
comparative, non-comparative and epistemic uses of ‘looks’. Instead, it offers a 
single logical analysis of ‘looks’ in the form of (20) and its subject-relative 
variant (22), and two, or perhaps three, uses of looks statements. ‘Looks’, on 
this account, is implicitly comparative in both its epistemic and phenomenal 
uses. These two uses only come apart, if at all, in certain very specific cases, 
such as when talking about the phenomenal character of one’s experience. In 
most cases, however, including all of Jackson and Byrne’s examples (4.2), it is 
the comparative use that is being employed. As a general rule, we have little 
application for the phenomenal usage in everyday conversation, and even when 
we do use it — when doing philosophy, for example — it is unsuitable for 
indexing p-representation for the reasons given above.
 Furthermore, on the assumption that the deflationary analysis is correct, 
which seems at least plausible, most uses of ‘looks’ are either explicitly or 
implicitly comparative and so subject to Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2). 
This conclusion is unfavourable for the representationalist insofar as it suggests 
that experiential contents cannot be looks-indexed, since comparative looks are 
equivocal, thereby contravening the Face-value condit ion. The 
representationalist is therefore faced with the choice of rejecting either Looks-
indexing, Face-value or Parsimony. However, the mere plausibility of the 
deflationary analysis of looks is itself a problem for representationalism, since in 
the absence of an effective counter-argument, the mere possibility that looks 
may be comparative undermines the argument for representational content. 
Indeed, given the problems with Jackson and Byrne’s alternative accounts of 
phenomenal looks and the resulting notion of phenomenal content, one could 
argue that the burden of proof lies very much upon the representationalist to 
give a substantive account of looks that does not suffer from the problem of 
phenomenal content, or else — assuming that Face-value forms part of the view 
that they wish to defend — to reject Looks-indexing. Either way, the prospects 
for looks-indexed p-representational content do not look good.
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4.4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined three different notions of looks: comparative, 
epistemic and phenomenal, or ‘non-comparative’, looks. I argued that Jackson’s 
case for the primacy of the latter is unconvincing given its reliance on the 
unwarranted and implausible assumption that there must be some particular set 
of conditions according to which all looks statements are judged. Moreover, the 
phenomenal or non-comparative use of looks is only capable of indexing 
phenomenal content, which is veridical even in cases of perceptual illusion or 
misleading — i.e. ‘mere’ looks — and so incapable of misrepresenting. Such uses 
are arguably equally well explained by a comparative analysis of looks 
statements based upon the intersubjective similarities between experiences of 
different objects and properties. Combined with the principle of Parsimony, 
which states that the properties that make looks statements true or false are just 
the appearance-independent properties of objects, this deflationary account 
delivers a unified analysis of looks encompassing both objective and subjective 
appearances. Furthermore, the deflationary account renders the notions of 
comparative and epistemic looks redundant, replacing them with comparative 
and evidential uses of looks statements, respectively.
 The availability of an alternative, more powerful deflationary analysis of 
‘looks’ renders Travis’s provisional assumption of Looks-indexing untenable. If 
looks are essentially comparative, as Parsimony suggests, then they are 
equivocal and so incapable of indexing p-representational content, as per 
Travis’s argument from looks (2.3.2). The only sense of ‘looks’ that is not 
comparative, therefore, is Jackson’s phenomenal sense, but this is similarly unfit 
to index p-representation. Therefore the content of experience cannot be looks 
indexed and Looks-indexing is false. In the absence of any further argument 
against the plausibility of the deflationary analysis, this neutralises the 
representationalist claim that the existence of representational content may be 
derived from an analysis of appearances. Any appeal to the nature of 
appearances, or the semantics of ‘looks’, may be defused by a counter-appeal to 
Parsimony. Whilst this does not constitute a knock-down argument against 
representationalism, it does shift the grounds of the debate away from the 
analysis of looks-statements and towards the issue of recognisability, or 
availability of content to the subject. This is perhaps unsurprising since the 
semantics of ‘looks’ or appearances is a peripheral, though related, issue to the 
metaphysics of experience. If one cannot ground the representational content of 
experience in appearances, however, then Byrne, Siegel’s and Schellenberg’s 
arguments are beside the point. The following chapter therefore considers the 
nature of recognisability, along with some possible responses to it, in greater 
detail.
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5. Recognisability and
Phenomenal Character
Objective representation & perceptual awareness
5.1. Introduction
Having rejected various appeals to visual phenomenology, appearances and the 
semantics of ‘looks’ as responses to Travis in chapters 3 and 4, the following 
two chapters examine the relation between representationalism, Travis’s 
Recognisability condition and the phenomenal character of experience. I 
approach this by way of two distinct, but related questions. First, should 
representationalists endorse Recognisability, and if not, what are the 
consequences of rejecting it (5.2)? Second, how might some form of this 
condition be met by those representationalists who do endorse it (ch. 6)?
 I begin by considering the motivation for Recognisability in relation to Face-
value (5.2.1) and phenomenal character (5.2.3), as well as what form the 
condition should take (5.2.2). I then examine Tyler Burge’s (2010) account of 
‘objective representation’ and its relation to Travis (2004), arguing that they 
each relate to quite different explanatory projects (5.2.4). The second part of the 
chapter identifies a potential challenge, or ‘phenomenological objection’ (5.3.1), 
to representationalism concerning the role of phenomenal character in 
explaining our awareness of mind-independent objects that features in Travis’s 
argument from unmediated awareness (5.3.2). I argue that the challenge is 
question-begging and so does not, without substantial additional argument, 
constitute a genuine problem for representationalism.
5.2. Recognisability
I introduced Recognisability in chapter 2 as a means of capturing Travis’s 
requirement that the contents of individual experiences be cognitively available 
or otherwise accessible to the subject (2.2.4). In this section, I examine the 
arguments for and against this condition in greater detail (5.2.1), how it should 
be interpreted (5.2.2) and the relation between Recognisability and phenomenal 
character in order to establish whether the representationalist need be 
committed to it (5.2.3). This in turn clarifies two different questions that may be 
asked about representational content in perceptual experience (5.2.4), along 
with the consequences of accepting or rejecting this condition upon p-
representation (5.2.5).
5.2.1. The case for Recognisability
As described in previous chapters, Travis’s arguments from looks and 
recognisability rely heavily upon the notion that the contents of experience are 
not just attributable to perceptual experiences from a third-personal theoretical 
point of view, but accessible to or ‘recognisable’ by the subject. Without this 
condition, which forms an explicit premise in the argument from recognisability 
(2.3.3) and is also referenced in the argument from looks (2.3.2), Travis’s 
arguments would fail to go through. It is therefore essential to his case against 
representationalism that the condition obtains. But precisely what does 
Recognisability entail, and why should the representationalist endorse it? Here 
is how Travis (forthcoming: §4) motivates this condition:
If we are going to be represented to in experience, then the relevant 
representing must be something we can appreciate for the representing that 
it is. If, in a perceptual experience, things are represented to us as being thus 
and so, then we must be able to appreciate the experience as representing as 
so what it  thus does; to appreciate what it is that is so according to it. This 
need not mean that we can characterise such representational content 
accurately, or formulate it explicitly. But we should be able to recognise, 
where needed, of particular ways things may or may not be, whether that is 
what the experience represented to us as so — whether that is what one 
would take be so in taking the experience at face value — whether, for 
example, the experience is one according to which a certain stick is bent, or 
rather one according to which that stick is straight. The core idea is: you 
cannot represent things to people as so in a way they simply cannot 
recognise as doing that.
 The above passage highlights the connection between Recognisability and 
other conditions that Travis places upon p-representation, in particular Face-
value (2.2.2) and Givenness (2.2.3). Jointly, these two conditions entail that 
experiences have a determinate and univocal (i.e. single) ‘face value’ at which 
they may be taken or declined that is represented to the subject. Naturally, not 
all representations are recognisable in this way. Brain states, for example, may 
have representational content that need not be manifest at the level of conscious 
thought. Instead, these may form part of subconscious, sub-personal 
mechanisms, the nature of which is known only to neuroscientists if at all. 
Crucially, however, according to Givenness, p-representation is a form of 
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representation to the subject and so operates at a personal, rather than sub-
personal, level.
 Givenness alone, however, does not entail recognisability. According to 
Tyler Burge’s (2010) view of perceptual representation, perception is ‘a type of 
objective sensory representation by the individual’ (ibid. 368; original italics) 
that is ‘constitutively a representational competence’ (ibid. 379) and ‘where 
representation begins’ (ibid. 366). Perception, according to Burge, has objective, 
subject-level contents. These are not, however, recognisable to the individual, 
but rather play a distinctive role in scientific theorising. They are not 
representations-to, but representations-by the individual; autorepresentation 
rather than allorepresentation in Travis’s terminology (2.2.3).
 What, then, appears to motivate Recognisability  is the notion that 
experiences have a specific ‘face value’ at which they are capable of being taken 
or declined. It is constitutive of being able to take something at face value that 
what is taken or declined, i.e. its representational content, must be consciously 
available or accessible to the subject. When Travis (op. cit.) states that ‘you 
cannot represent things to people as so in a way they simply cannot recognise as 
doing that’, his thought appears to be that in order to facilitate the taking or 
declining of contents in perceptual judgement, it must be apparent to the subject 
what those contents are. If this were not the case, then it would be difficult to 
make sense of the idea that subjects are able to take experiences ‘at face value’, 
or to recognise the distinction between how things appear to them and how they 
believe them to be at all, since only the latter contents would be available to 
conscious reflection.1  On such a view there would be no determinate way that 
things appear to the subject to be, and so nothing capable of being judged as so. 
Rather, perceptual judgements and beliefs would simply spring fully formed, as 
it were, into consciousness — something that is clearly not the case.2 Thus, for 
Travis, the recognisability of content is a necessary condition for representing to 
a subject, though not necessarily for representations in general.
 Having established at least one motivation for endorsing Recognisability (I 
give another in 5.2.3 below), we can capture this condition as follows:
Recognisability: perceptual subjects must be capable of recognising the 
representational content of any given p-representation solely in 
virtue of having that very experience.
This formulation, however, leaves at least two important questions unanswered: 
(i)   what does such ‘recognition’, or availability to a subject, consist in?, and 
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1 A related objection to representationalism is given in 5.3.1.
2  The situation here might seem no worse than for the anti-representationalist, who denies 
the existence of such experiential contents outright. However, since representationalism 
specifically appeals to representational contents as being constitutive of perceptual 
experience, the problem constitutes an objection to the coherence of the representationalist 
view.
(ii)   in virtue of what are such experiences recognisable? I address each of these 
questions below.
5.2.2. Availability to the subject
The qualification at the end of the above formulation of Recognisability is 
intended to capture the need for the p-representational contents to be 
recognisable as contents of experience, and not, for example, as the contents of 
beliefs or actions. This is important because whilst it is widely accepted that 
perceptual beliefs, judgements and actions have intentional content, this cannot 
in itself be taken to prove the existence of p-representation. Provided that an 
alternative explanation of the relevant phenomenon — namely, perceptual 
experience — is available, then representation is just one of many several 
possible explanations, each of which is compatible with the existence of the 
contents of belief and action. Moreover, if the notion of p-representation is itself 
incoherent, as Travis argues, then there can be no such representations. It is 
therefore necessary for p-representational contents to be attributable directly to 
experience, and not simply to beliefs or judgements, which are traditionally 
thought of as being ‘downstream’ of experience. Consequently, cognitive access 
to the intentional content of perceptual belief or action is not sufficient to meet 
Recognisability. Similarly, a subject who is connected to a brain-scanner, the 
output of which is interpreted by a machine or team of scientists that informs 
the subject of the ‘contents’ of their experience would fail to meet the relevant 
condition. Rather, it must be apparent to the subject — perhaps on the basis of 
reflection or via perceptual phenomenology — what the content of their 
experience is. I will talk of such content as being available to or accessible by the 
subject.
 One way in which p-representational contents may be available to a subject 
is through introspection, or reflective awareness, of their own mental states. 
That is, in reflecting upon their experience, the subject may be able to tell that it 
represents, for example, that there is a lime in the fruit basket. For this to count 
as evidence of the content of experience, rather than of belief, such content 
should exhibit a degree of independence from the subject’s beliefs. If they do not 
believe there is a lime in the fruit basket, for example, since they bought only 
lemons, then experience must still recognisably represent there to be a lime — 
perhaps due to some trick of the light — in spite of their inclination to believe 
otherwise. Similarly, the lines of the Müller-Lyer illusion continue to look 
different lengths even to subjects who know them to be otherwise — because 
they have measured them, for example — quite independently of the subject’s 
beliefs. Finally, there must be some specific way that experience represents the 
world as being in order for it to qualify as p-representation. Contents that are 
equivocal about what is represented, or that merely reflect what the subject is 
inclined to judge under those circumstances, do not constitute evidence of p-
representation.
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 The above considerations suggest a stronger interpretation of 
Recognisability based upon the subject’s ability to gain knowledge of the 
content of their experience as follows. Call this Knowability:
Knowability: perceptual subjects must be capable of coming to know the 
representational content of any given p-representation solely in 
virtue of having that very experience.
As with Recognisability, Knowability does not require that subjects routinely 
know or are capable of formulating the accuracy conditions for each individual 
experience. Rather, it suffices that they are in principle capable of knowing how 
any given experience represents the world as being. This renders the resulting 
contents cognitively available or accessible to the subject as part of their overall 
mental economy, and so capable of playing a role in motivating action or belief. 
Nevertheless, Knowability might be thought to be too strong a condition upon 
p-representation for two reasons. First, such knowledge may be tacit or implicit, 
rather than explicitly held by the subject. Second, this may require the subject to 
employ other capacities, such as conceptual competencies or draw upon other 
background knowledge, and so not be ‘solely in virtue of having that very 
experience’.
 In relation to the first point, Travis’s account of Recognisability does not 
require subjects to know the content of their experiences in any explicit sense. 
Rather they should be ‘able to appreciate the experience as representing [what 
it] does’ and to ‘recognize, where needed, of particular ways things may or may 
not be, whether that is what the experience represented to [them] as so’ (Travis 
2004: 62). This suggests a weaker interpretation of Recognisability according to 
which the subject need only possess a tacit or implicit grasp of what it would 
take for their experience to be veridical. That is, they would recognise upon 
further inspection, for example, whether the experience was veridical or not 
based upon their interactions and expectations of the world.3  Such an 
understanding may be reflected in thought and action by guiding subjects’ 
actions and judgements according to what is represented. We can therefore 
formulate a weaker condition than Knowability as follows:
Recognisability′: perceptual subjects must be capable of grasping what it 
would take for the content of any given p-representation to be 
accurate or veridical solely in virtue of having that very 
experience.
Note that even on this weaker formulation, it must still be possible for a 
suitably self-aware and conceptually sophisticated subject to consciously 
recognise that experience is representational as such. If this were not the case, 
then the relevant representations would be opaque to reflective awareness 
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3 This counterfactual claim is intended to apply both to subjects who are actually capable of 
such investigation and those who are not.
(though not, perhaps, to empirical or scientific investigation; cf. 5.2.4). Not all 
perceptual subjects who satisfy Recognisability′, however, need possess such 
reflective self-awareness.
 In relation to the second of the above points, Looks-indexing characterised 
the recognisability of perceptual content in terms of how, according to the 
relevant experience, things perceptually seem — or look in the case of vision — to 
the subject. In this case, the relevant contents were recognisable solely in virtue 
of experience, since to have that experience was just to be aware of things 
looking some particular way. Having rejected Looks-indexing, however, we 
must now consider how else a subject might understand or grasp what is 
represented to them. Plausibly, this may involve the operation of various 
cognitive capacities, including conceptual capacities or other forms of 
background knowledge — a knowledge of appearances, for example (6.4.2). 
Whether such recognition is solely in virtue of experience will depend upon the 
nature of the particular capacities or knowledge involved, and whether this is 
taken to be built into experience or external to it.
 In the case of background knowledge, we can rule out the use of inference 
or deductive reasoning, since p-representation is intended to capture how 
experience represents the world as being, and not what can be concluded or 
deduced on the basis of it. However, to avoid ruling out the non-inferential 
application of the relevant capacities, we can further weaken Recognisability′ as 
follows:
Recognisability″: perceptual subjects must be capable of grasping what it 
would take for the content of any given p-representation to be 
accurate or veridical solely in virtue of having that very 
experience plus the non-inferential operation of perceptual 
capacities and/or tacit knowledge of appearances.
This formulation of Recognisability retains the spirit of Travis’s requirement 
that the relevant recognition be perceptual, and not simply a matter of reasoning 
or deduction, whilst not unnecessarily limiting the forms that such recognition 
might take.
5.2.3. Recognisability and phenomenal character
In addition to motivating Recognisability  via its connections with Face-value 
and Givenness (5.2.1) — both conditions that many representationalists would 
accept — there are good reasons to think that p-representation must also be 
recognisable in the following sense. To perceptually experience something 
entails a modification of the subject’s conscious state such that there is 
something that it is like for them to have that experience.4 This ‘what it’s like’-
ness of experience is identified as its phenomenal character (1.2.2). Given that 
representationalists explain the nature of experience in terms of its 
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representational content, and that every such experience has some specific 
phenomenal character, it follows that such content must play a role in 
determining phenomenal character. Several variants of this view are possible. 
Chief amongst these are weak and strong intentionalism:5
Weak intentionalism: the phenomenal character of a perceptual 
experience supervenes upon the (p-)representational content of 
that experience.
Strong intentionalism: the phenomenal character of a perceptual 
experience is identical to the (p-)representational content of that 
experience.
 In the case of strong intentionalism, every phenomenal character that an 
experience can have corresponds to some specific representational content since 
the two are, on this view, identical. Since phenomenal character captures what 
experience is like for the subject, and assuming that the subject is or can become 
consciously aware of this phenomenal character, it follows that such 
representational content will in some sense also be recognisable to the subject.
 This claim needs to be stated with some care since on a representationalist 
view of perception, the object of the subject’s conscious awareness is not the 
phenomenal character of experience per se, but worldly objects and their 
properties. Nevertheless, if we take phenomenal character to be a modification 
of the subject’s conscious state, there is a sense in which they are, or can 
become, aware of what their experience ‘is like’, i.e. its phenomenal character. 
Such awareness of phenomenal character is derivative of the subject’s experience 
of the objects of perception, and is what is subjectively indistinguishable from 
the case of a phenomenally matching hallucination or illusion. Since, according 
to strong intentionalism, every phenomenal character is identical to some 
representational content, it follows that this content is also recognisable to the 
subject on the basis of their experience in virtue of that experience’s phenomenal 
character.
 The position is less straightforward for weak intentionalism, which posits a 
supervenience rather than identity relationship with representational content. 
On this view, different contents may correspond to the same or subjectively 
indistinguishable phenomenal characters (though not vice versa). Consequently, 
representational content is underdetermined by phenomenal character. This 
means that contents need not be recognisable on the basis of phenomenal 
character alone, giving the weak intentionalist grounds to reject Recognisability 
on the basis of phenomenal character. (The above argument from Face-value 
and Givenness, however, still applies.) Nevertheless, according to many weak 
intentionalist accounts, there is some subset or core of representational content 
that determines phenomenal character. Where this is the case, it may in some 
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5 These positions are also sometimes referred to as weak and strong representationalism. For 
the avoidance of confusion, however, I will adhere to the present terminology.
(though not necessarily all) cases be possible to recognise that subset of content, 
though not the content of experience in general, on the basis of the phenomenal 
character to which it gives rise. That is to say, the subject will be capable of 
grasping what it would take for their experience to be veridical on the basis of 
its phenomenal character alone. On such views, a version of Recognisability will 
also hold.6
 It is notable that neither form of intentionalism requires that the content of 
experience be exhausted by its phenomenal character. As such, there may be 
elements of p-representation that do not contribute to phenomenal character 
and so cannot be recognised in virtue of it. If so, however, this will place 
constraints upon the explanatory role that those elements of conscious 
perceptual experience can play. If certain aspects of a representational content 
make no contribution to what experience is like for the subject, for example, 
then it is difficult to see how they can form part of that experience’s face value.7 
Whilst there is no reason that such content could not play some other 
explanatory role — in scientific theorising, perhaps (5.2.4) — it is unclear what it 
could possibly say about perceptual experience as such. Nevertheless, an 
interpretation of Recognisability that ruled out the existence of such content 
elements would be beg the question against those forms of intentionalism that 
include them. We can therefore place a further gloss upon Recognisability″ as 
follows:
Recognisability‴: perceptual subjects must be capable of grasping what 
it would take for that content which gives rise to the phenomenal 
character of any given p-representation to be accurate or 
veridical solely in virtue of having that very experience plus the 
non-inferential operation of their perceptual capacities and/or 
tacit knowledge of appearances.
It is this version of Recognisability that I will assume in further discussion and 
that I take representationalists to be committed to (modulo underdetermination 
of content by phenomenal character in weak intentionalism, as described 
above).
 In discussing perceptual experience, I have so far focused upon conscious 
experience. That is, those experiences that have a distinctive phenomenal 
character of which the subject is, or may become, consciously aware. It remains 
an open question whether the same kinds (i.e. type-identical) experiences can be 
had by subjects who are not consciously aware, or not actively attending to, 
whatever it is they are experiencing. Block (2007), for example, defends an 
account of perceptual experience which distinguishes between what he calls 
‘phenomenal’ and ‘access consciousness’, the first of which may be present in 
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6 For a representational view that denies Recognisability, see 5.2.4.
7  A possible exception to this might be externally individuated or demonstrative elements, 
though these arguably do make a contribution to perceptual phenomenology, at least in a 
general sense, and so form part of the resulting experience’s phenomenal character.
non-conscious perceptual experience and the latter of which corresponds to 
conscious access to the contents of experience. These come apart in cases such 
as blindsight or deaf-hearing, which are claimed to exhibit the second but not 
the first kind of perceptual consciousness.
 Nevertheless, the nature of conscious perceptual experience has — rightly or 
wrongly — assumed a certain priority in the discussion of perception due to the 
latter’s relation to thought and consciousness more generally. A subject whose 
perceptual experiences have a specific phenomenal character, for example, may 
be able to form demonstrative thoughts about the objects of their experience 
(5.3.1). This seems not to be true of subjects, such as blindsight or deaf-hearing 
patients, who lack the relevant phenomenal character in at least part of their 
perceptual field, or whose experience exhibits phenomenal but not access 
consciousness, similarly preventing phenomenal character from playing an 
epistemic role (cf. ibid.). The notion that phenomenal character plays a role in 
demonstrative thought does not of course rule out the existence of non-
conscious perception. However, if experience is to be explained in 
representational terms, then it should be clear what role it plays in conscious 
awareness. Plausibly, this occurs through the phenomenal character of 
experience which, according to intentionalism, is a function of its 
representational content. Thus if intentionalism, i.e. the view that phenomenal 
character supervenes upon or is identical to representational content, cannot 
account for the nature and role of conscious perceptual experience, then it 
should be rejected.
5.2.4. Two questions about perception
Having clarified the interpretation of Recognisability, along with some 
motivations for endorsing it, I will now consider the consequences of rejecting 
this condition upon p-representation. One theory that does this is Tyler Burge’s 
account of perceptual representation, or what he calls ‘objective’ or ‘empirical 
representation’ (Burge 2010: 3). I will argue that in rejecting Recognisability, 
Burge’s account fails to account for the nature of perceptual experience, and so 
does not constitute a form of representationalism as such. This in turn helps to 
clarify the claims made by Travis (2004), showing that these two views are not 
necessarily incompatible, but rather are responding to two different questions 
about the nature of perception and experience, respectively.
 According to Burge (2010), ‘[p]erception is a type of objective sensory 
representation by the individual’ (ibid. 368; original emphasis) and 
‘constitutively a representational competence’ (ibid. 379). The contents that 
perceptual states have, however, is not in virtue of their phenomenal or 
conscious character, since they may have none, but rather a function of certain 
distal facts about the evolutionary history and representational capacities of the 
organism. Combined with the proximal stimuli of the organism’s sensory 
surfaces, this yields representational contents that play a non-trivial role in the 
scientific explanation of the relevant individual’s psychology and behaviour. On 
this view, perceptual states have representational content irrespective of whether 
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those contents are consciously available to the subject via introspection. Rather, 
such content has a purely formal or descriptive role in explaining the 
functioning of the organism from a scientific perspective. Burge therefore rejects 
Recognisability as a necessary condition for perceptual representation, claiming 
in relation to vision, for example, that ‘[a]t the level of conscious access, 
individuals are oblivious to what they perceive’ (ibid. 375).
 In contrast to Burge (2010), whose account aims to explain the emergence 
of representation and objectivity in general, Travis (2004) claims that 
‘perception is not representational’ (ibid. 57), that ‘perceiving what we do has 
no representational content’ (ibid. 92) and so is ‘not an intentional 
phenomenon’ (ibid. 93). It is tempting to read Burge (2010) as a refutation of 
Travis (2004) on the basis that the latter makes precisely the mistake that Burge 
warns against; namely, attributing a capacity for representing certain general 
conditions for perceptual representation — the availability of content, 
phenomenal character, conscious awareness, and so on — to the subject. 
According to Burge, such attributions ‘constitute hyper-intellectualization of 
constitutive requirements on perception’ (Burge 2010: 13) which can equally 
occur in the absence of such personal-level rational capacities. Rather, objective 
representations are attributable to the subject — in virtue of initiating action 
(ibid. 373), for example — but are not representations to the subject in the sense 
described above (5.2.1). It is unclear, however, that Burge’s and Travis’s 
accounts actually conflict. Rather, we can understand each as addressing quite 
separate and independent questions about the nature of perception.
 The question to which Burge is responding concerns whether perceptual 
states have representational contents, and if so, what those contents are. The 
answer to this question will determine whether such content features in an 
account of what it is for a creature to perceive external objects. Such content 
need not be consciously or otherwise accessible to the subject in order to play an 
explanatory role in the relevant scientific theories. To say that perceptual states 
may be assigned representational content from some third-person theoretical 
point of view, however, is not to say that perceptual experiences are to be 
explained solely in terms of their content — the position I have been referring to 
as ‘representationalism’. What a subject experiences when they are in a given 
perceptual state is intimately related to their perceptual phenomenology, which 
need not be explained in purely representational terms. Indeed, Burge himself 
endorses a non-representational account of perceptual sensations, denying that 
intentionalism constitutes an adequate account of phenomenal character (ibid. 
14, fn. 2). Thus, the question of whether perceptual states possess or can be 
assigned representational content need not entail — or at least not 
straightforwardly so — a representationalist explanation of perceptual 
experience, where this is taken to involve conscious phenomenal character.
 In contrast to Burge, Travis (2004) is concerned to give an account of the 
constitutive nature of perceptual experience; that is, of the presentation of an 
external, mind-independent world in consciousness. This brings considerations 
about phenomenal character to the fore, since this is — at least in a large number 
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of central cases — an aspect of the conscious experiences of some conscious or 
self-aware subject. This is not to say that consciousness or self-awareness is a 
necessary condition for perception — a point that Burge (sometimes erroneously) 
makes against what he calls ‘Individual Representationalism’ in contrast to his 
own ‘anti-individualist’ account of perception (Burge 2010: 12–22). Rather, it 
underscores the need to explain the role of phenomenal character in the 
subject’s consciousness or perceptual awareness of the world. If perceptual 
experience is to be explained in terms of representational content, then there 
must presumably be some relation between that content and the phenomenal 
character of experience — hence Travis’s Recognisability condition (5.2.3). Not 
all representationalists endorse Recognisability. But where they don’t, the 
burden is upon them to explain precisely how the contents of perceptual 
experience give rise to its phenomenal character, and how this in turn enables us 
to be consciously aware of the external world, objects, properties, and so on.
 The above two questions about the existence of representational content and 
the nature of perceptual experience therefore come apart, and may — to some 
extent, at least — be considered independently of one another. On the one hand, 
Burge argues in favour of representational content on the strength of its role in 
scientific explanation, but without explaining how this relates to the 
phenomenology of conscious perception. Travis, on the other hand, argues that 
perceptual experience cannot be explained in terms of representational content, 
since the relevant content cannot explain what is recognisable to us (2.3.3) or 
how perceptual awareness is possible (2.3.4). So far, there is no reason to think 
that these two claims are incompatible. It would, for example, be perfectly 
possible to given a Burgean account of representational content whilst accepting 
that perceptual experience, in terms of its conscious phenomenal character, 
cannot be explained in this way — indeed, Burge himself takes this view. 
Intentionalist accounts of perception attempt to answer the second question 
concerning the nature of phenomenal character in terms of the first, i.e. the 
existence of representational content. Anti-representationalists, on the other 
hand,  who endorse REL (1.2.4), deny that any answer to the question 
concerning phenomenal character that draws upon the representational content 
of experience can be given. Strictly speaking, however, they are neutral on the 
first question. Rather, their principal claim concerns the role that representation 
can play in an account of perceptual experience, rather than ruling out its 
existence altogether.
 Distinguishing these two aspects of the debate — the existence of 
representational content and its role in accounting for conscious experience — 
enables us to more precisely pinpoint and evaluate the claims made by Travis 
(2004) and Burge (2010). Travis’s concern with perception is directed towards 
the experiential dimension of the debate. His arguments aim to show, based 
upon what is available to the subject through the phenomenal character of 
perception, that conscious perceptual experience cannot be explained in purely 
representational terms. This does not, however, rule out those views that do not 
appeal to representation to explain perceptual phenomenology, such as Burge’s 
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objective representation or Naïve Realist accounts of experience. Conversely, by 
abandoning Travis’s Recognisability condition, Burge (2010) is able to avoid the 
arguments from looks and recognisability since, for him, representational 
content has an entirely different explanatory role relating to scientific 
explanation and not the phenomenal character of experience.8 However, it does 
so at the cost of failing to make any substantive claims about the phenomenal 
character of experience, which remains unexplained. This is not to say that a 
Burge-style account of phenomenal character could not be developed. Such an 
account would, however, require substantive additions to Burge’s theory which 
would then be subject to Travis’s critique of representational content, as 
discussed in the following chapter (6.3).
 Similarly, when Travis claims that ‘[p]erception is not the stuff of which 
things might be represented to us as so’ (Travis 2004: 93), he must be 
interpreted as making a claim about conscious experience, since nothing in the 
arguments he gives in this paper rules out the possibility that we might assign, 
for scientific or other reasons, representational content to perceptual states.9 
Provided there is some way — teleosemantic, anti-individualism, asymmetric 
dependence, etc. — of disambiguating the contents of these states from all the 
other possible contents that might be attributed to that state, then such content 
cannot be objectionable on the basis of the arguments Travis provides.10 Rather, 
his claim is that such content cannot yield an adequate characterisation of 
perceptual experience, where this is taken to include conscious phenomenology. 
Understood in this way, ‘The Silence of the Senses’ does not establish that there 
is no role for representational content in the philosophy of perception — indeed, 
it is silent on precisely this point. Instead, Travis (2004) denies that we should 
think of perceptual experience, i.e. the conscious phenomenal character of 
perception, in representational terms. No form of representation, according to 
Travis, is capable of doing the required explanatory work.
5.2.5. Consequences of Recognisability
Having argued that Burge (2010) does not engage with the issues that concern 
Travis (2004) concerning the nature of conscious experience, there remains the 
question of whether any account that rejects Recognisability could do so. I 
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causal relations between perceptual ‘inputs’ and experimental ‘outputs’. To the extent that 
scientific explanation posits the existence of externally individuated representational 
contents, these are a purely descriptive tool or convenience for simplifying the relevant 
explanations, and do not indicate an ontological commitment to the existence of 
representations plural, as Burge (ibid. 379, fn. 15) himself admits. Furthermore, the role of 
the sciences in grounding the nature of such content raises issues concerning the priority of 
scientific over philosophical explanation, especially given that the alleged consensus over the 
existence of the relevant contents is much weaker than Burge claims, if indeed there is such a 
consensus. I will not, however, pursue these issues further here.
9 Travis (forthcoming: §1) hints at this possibility when he says that ‘[t]he representing this 
essay is thus not about is, I suggest, enough to serve the purposes of serious psychology’.
10 See 6.3 for further discussion.
argued above that if we understand conscious perceptual experience as being at 
least partly constituted by its phenomenal character, then according to a 
representationalist account of experience, some form of intentionalism must also 
obtain (5.2.3). This follows because if all there is to experience is its 
representational content, then the phenomenal character that partly constitutes 
that experience must also be representational. The alternative — a 
representational account of experience that did not account for phenomenal 
character — would not say anything about the conscious aspect of such 
experience or what perception is like for the subject. Furthermore, it is highly 
plausible that phenomenal character plays a positive epistemic role in perceptual 
awareness — for example in enabling the subject to entertain demonstrative 
thoughts about an object, or to know which object it is they are perceiving 
(5.3.1). Moreover, since phenomenal character includes at least those aspects of 
the subject’s conscious state that are discernible via introspection, these aspects 
of experience are accessible to the subject in the sense of being available to 
consciousness.
 According to strong intentionalism, an experience’s phenomenal character is 
identical with its representational content. It follows that if the phenomenal 
character of experience is accessible to the subject, then so is its representational 
content since they are one and the same thing. This in turn entails a form of 
Recognisability since the content of experience may be grasped by the subject 
simply in virtue of that experience’s phenomenal character (5.2.3). Where the 
subject’s access to phenomenal character is incomplete — for reasons of ‘anti-
luminosity’ (Williamson 2000: ch. 4), for example — or where the experience’s 
content is not exhausted by its phenomenal character, then only the content that 
corresponds to the accessible phenomenal character will be recognisable. 
Nevertheless, Recognisability in the sense discussed above will hold. Strong 
intentionalism is therefore incompatible with the denial of Recognisability.
 Rejecting Recognisability amounts to the claim that the representational 
content of experience need not be graspable on the basis of that experience — 
which for the intentionalist includes its phenomenal character — alone. This 
might be the case under weak intentionalism where content is underdetermined 
by phenomenal character due to different contents yielding the same, or 
subjectively indistinguishable, characters. In such cases, it may not be possible 
for the subject to grasp which of the relevant contents is represented in virtue of 
the resulting phenomenal character, and so Recognisability can fail. This might 
happen for a number of reasons. For example, two subjectively indistinguishable 
experiences might be thought to confer differing warrants for justification or 
belief according to the epistemic situation of the perceiver — a position known 
as content disjunctivism. Alternatively, the contents of experience may vary 
according to aspects of the perceiver’s environment, evolutionary history or 
other externally individuated factors (6.3.1). In each instance, subjectively 
indistinguishable experiences may plausibly lead to different beliefs, judgements 
or epistemic warrant in a way that is indistinguishable to the experiencing 
subject.
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 The weak intentionalist may therefore wish to reject Recognisability on the 
basis that representational content is not indexed by phenomenal character. 
Whilst this might be true of weak intentionalism in general, however, the above 
examples need not count against the version of Recognisability according to 
which only those content elements that give rise to phenomenal character need 
be available to the subject (5.2.3). Indeed, it would be surprising if subjectively 
distinguishable differences in phenomenal character were not closely correlated 
with corresponding differences in representational content, at least at a course-
grained level. Such qualitative differences may enable a limited form of 
Recognisability, i.e. Recognisability‴, to be preserved despite the global 
underdetermination of content by phenomenal character. This will be the case 
for any form of intentionalism in which phenomenal character unambiguously 
maps onto elements of representational content, at least in a wide variety of 
(though not necessarily all) cases. Such cases are not ruled out by weak 
intentionalism per se, but will depend upon the details of individual 
representationalist accounts.
 If the weak intentionalist were to reject Recognisability  outright, however, 
then it would be possible to avoid Travis’s arguments from looks and 
recognisability. The cost of doing so would be to deny that the corresponding 
differences in content form part of what is given to the subject in experience. 
This raises the question of what explanatory role such ostensible contents can 
play in perceptual experience, since they cannot be manifest to the subject 
through the phenomenology of experience. This in turn puts pressure on 
whether, given their cognitive inaccessibility, such contents should be considered 
a part of experience at all. Perhaps such elements, which may include references 
to external particulars, might facilitate the perceptual ‘tracking’ of externally 
individuated factors or demonstrative reference of the kind described above. 
However, such a role must be confined to a level below that of phenomenal 
consciousness, since such differences will be indiscernible to the subject via 
perceptual phenomenology.
 The weak intentionalist is therefore faced with a choice. They can either 
reject Recognisability, in which case it remains to be shown how it is possible 
for the relevant representational content to perform a substantive cognitive or 
epistemic role at the level of the subject. Moreover, if such content does not 
form part of the phenomenal character of experience, then it will be 
questionable to what extent it should be regarded as the content of experience at 
all, rather than of judgement, belief, or some other mental state. Alternatively, 
the intentionalist may endorse Recognisability, in which case an account of 
precisely how such content is recognisable is required. Again, the resulting 
contents must be demonstrably attributable to experience rather than any 
consequent beliefs, judgements or actions, since any evidence on the basis of the 
latter will be equally compatible with an anti-representationalist account of 
experience, and so not decisive in the present debate. For the weak 
intentionalist, this will involve explaining how it is possible to disambiguate the 
multiple possible contents of experience that correspond to any given 
Chapter 5, Recognisability and Phenomenal Character 119
phenomenal character given that the latter is held to underdetermine the former. 
This topic is addressed in the following chapter.
5.3. Phenomenal Character and Awareness
5.3.1. The phenomenological objection
One of the objections that is sometimes levelled against representationalism 
concerns the relationship between the phenomenal character of experience and 
the perceptual awareness of objects. Specifically, Schellenberg (2011b: 18) 
identifies the ‘phenomenological objection’ as the charge that representationalist 
views of perception ‘which explain phenomenology in virtue of relations to 
anything other than the mind-independent objects, properties, and events that 
perceiving subjects are aware of sever phenomenology from what we are aware 
of’ (ibid.). A version of this objection can be found in Travis’s argument from 
unmediated awareness (5.3.2), which claims that any mental state that can 
occur independently of the objects and properties of which it is a perception — 
in a hallucination or illusion, for example — will be incapable of explaining how 
that state can constitute an awareness of those objects and properties. This 
objection requires stating with care, since if the claim is supposed to be that we 
cannot gain knowledge of qualitative features of the world towards which we 
do not stand in a relation of direct acquaintance, then it risks begging the 
question against representationalism.
 In describing the phenomenological objection, Schellenberg (ibid.) cites 
Campbell (2002), Martin (2002b) and Brewer (2007) as claiming that 
‘representational views misconstrue the phenomenological basis of perceptual 
experience insofar as they detach the phenomenology of experience from 
relations to qualitative features of the world’ (Schellenberg 2011b: 3). Of these, 
the clearest exposition of a problem of this kind is to be found in Campbell 
(2002: 120–26), who claims that the explanatory role of experience can only be 
accounted for in relational terms as follows (ibid. 122–23):
On the Relational View, experience of objects is a more primitive state than 
thought about objects, which nonetheless reaches all the way to the objects 
themselves. In particular, experience of an object is what explains your 
ability to grasp a demonstrative term referring to that object.
For Campbell, the grasp of demonstrative terms is what enables us to gain 
knowledge of particular objects, and in particular which objects it is we are 
perceiving (cf. Evans 1982: 65). The principal objection, however, does not 
concern the acquisition of perceptual knowledge, which Campbell (op. cit. 125) 
admits may be explained in both representational and relational terms provided 
that the relevant representations are of particulars and not only general features. 
Rather, Campbell claims that only a relational understanding of experience ‘can 
explain how it is that we can have the conception of objects as mind-
independent’ at all (ibid. 121).
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 Campbell’s objection, then, is that a purely representational account of 
experience that does not constitutively involve the objects of experience cannot 
explain how we can conceive of objects as being independent of our perceiving 
them. If, as Campbell puts it, the contents of experience ‘do not reach all the 
way to the objects themselves’, then any resulting conception would only be of 
our own subjective experience, which can occur without any such objects, rather 
than of an objective world as such.
 This problem does not arise for the relationalist, according to whom 
perceptual experience is a matter of standing in a relation of direct acquaintance 
with perceptual objects and their properties, since acquaintance is not an 
intentional relation and so cannot obtain in the absence of the relevant objects. 
Moreover, according to certain versions of relationalism — Naïve Realism, for 
example — the phenomenal character of experience is not merely individuated, 
but metaphysically constituted by the properties of whatever external objects are 
being perceived. On this view, the phenomenal character of experience is 
directly explicable in terms of its objects, rather than something that is also 
present in the non-veridical case, as in the case of representational content.11 
Consequently, our conception of objects as mind-independent may be explained 
in terms of the subjective experience of such objects in perception through the 
phenomenal character of experience.
 Travis’s argument from unmediated awareness contains a related objection: 
without experience being grounded in the presence of worldly objects that are 
brought into view by perception, experience cannot explain our awareness of 
external objects and the world. Underlying both of the above claims is an 
assumption that thought and representation must at some point ‘bottom out’ or 
be grounded in some kind of unmediated or primitive connection with the 
world. Plausibly, this connection occurs in perception through the phenomenal 
character of experience, which reflects how the world is revealed to us in 
consciousness. Call this the grounding assumption.
Grounding assumption: perceptual awareness of external mind-
independent objects must be grounded in the phenomenal 
character of experience.
According to this assumption, an account of experience should explain both 
how phenomenal character enables us to grasp demonstrative references to 
objects, and how this makes an awareness of an external mind-independent 
world possible. That representationalism cannot do so is what I will refer to as 
the phenomenological objection.
 A number of responses to this objection are available. First, the 
representationalist may simply reject the grounding assumption, as per Burge 
(2010). According to Burge, the objectivity of perceptual representation comes 
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11  As discussed in 3.2.1, the phenomenal character of non-veridical experience may be 
explained as being in some sense parasitic upon, or secondary to, that of veridical 
experience.
from its teleological or functional nature, and not from the availability of 
content to the conscious subject.12 However, as we saw above (5.2.4), this fails 
to explain the connection between phenomenal character and demonstrative 
thought, since it is not account of perceptual experience as such. Nor does it 
explain how we are able to form a conception of a mind-independent world, 
since the relevant representations need not be conscious. Furthermore, the 
possibility of blindsight, in which a perceiver lacks the usual visual 
phenomenology and yet is able to respond at better-than-chance levels to 
perceptual stimuli strongly suggests that there is such a connection, since 
without conscious access to the relevant phenomenal character, the blindsighter 
appears unable to form demonstrative thoughts about objects to which he is 
otherwise able to respond. Rejecting the grounding assumption may not, 
therefore, be the representationalist’s best option.
 A second response appeals to the relation between the subject and object on 
the representationalist account. According to intentionalism, phenomenal 
character is either identical to or supervenes upon representational content, and 
not relations to the qualitative features of objects or property-instances (5.2.3). 
Moreover, most representationalists hold that a perceiving subject does stand in 
a relation to the objects and properties they perceive — namely, a causal 
relation. Moreover, this relation may be considered perceptual in virtue of its 
being constitutive of seeing, hearing, and so on. On such a view, the state or 
process of being perceptually aware of some external object or property may be 
factored into (at least) two distinct components: (i) a representational state, the 
truth or accuracy conditions of which, in the case of veridical perception, are 
met by the perceiver’s physical environment, but not in the case of 
hallucinations and illusions, and (ii) the satisfaction of some external, typically 
causal, relation between the intentional objects of that representational state and 
the state itself. Thus, according to this kind of representationalism, perceptual 
experience consists of no more than being in an appropriately caused 
representational state that there is (so far) no reason to suppose cannot occur in 
the absence of the relevant external objects and properties. Indeed, this is 
typically how perceptual illusions and hallucinations are to be explained on a 
representationalist view (2.3.1).
 If the phenomenological objection is that representationalism detaches 
phenomenal character from the objects of experience, however, then it is 
difficult to see how an appeal to causation is supposed to help here. According 
to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is explained by its 
representational content, not the causal relation of experience to its objects.13 If 
the awareness of objects were to be explained in terms of a causal or other 
relation, then it is no longer clear what explanatory work is being done by 
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12 ‘The developmental, phylogenetic, psychological, and constitutive sources of objectivity in 
perception lie below the level of individual representation, control, awareness, or 
responsibility’ (ibid. 547).
13  Building the causal element into the content, as in Searle (1983), does not seem to help 
here.
representational content, and in particular the content that gives rise to the 
experience’s phenomenal character. To the extent that the original objection 
was to explain how phenomenal character enables a grasp of demonstrative 
reference, this explanation does not seem to address the problem. Consider, for 
example, two distinct experiences, only one of which is veridical and which 
possess the same phenomenal character in virtue of their contents, but where 
only the veridical experience constitutes perceptual awareness. Since the only 
thing that differs between these experience is the presence of the causal relation, 
then (so the argument goes) it must be this and not their phenomenal character 
that explains the resulting awareness. Thus the representationalist fails to 
explain the role of phenomenal character in perceptual awareness since the 
causal relation is doing all of the explanatory work.
 Travis makes an objection of this form when he claims that ‘awareness of 
something else plus satisfaction of surrounding conditions cannot add up to that 
awareness of [an object] which we have in seeing one (to be there)’ (Travis 
2004: 89). From this, he derives the following principle (ibid.):
[I]f X is something there might be even without Y, then awareness of X (and 
whatever accompanies it per se in a particular case) cannot qualify as 
unmediated awareness of Y — the sort one might have in seeing Y.
This principle, however, is contentious for a number of reasons. First, it relies 
on two different kinds of awareness: the awareness of external objects and the 
awareness of representational content. According to the representationalist, we 
are aware of external objects by, or in virtue of, representing them to be some 
particular way. We are only aware of representational contents, however, in an 
indirect or derivative sense — for example by reflecting upon perceptual 
phenomenology. Thus, for the representationalist, we are not aware of 
representational content in the same way that we are aware of external objects, 
that is to say perceptually aware. Second, the objection is too quick. Like any 
‘common factor’ account, intentionalism entails is that representational content 
is not sufficient for perceptual awareness. This does not mean that it is not 
necessary. If representational content plus some causal or other relation were 
held to be jointly sufficient for such awareness, then phenomenal character, or 
the representational content that underlies it, will form part of the explanation 
of perceptual awareness. This meets the objection that representationalism 
detaches phenomenal character from awareness. Thus the phenomenological 
objection can be met.
 In order to constitute an objection against representationalism, the anti-
representationalist would need to claim that phenomenal character alone should 
explain perceptual awareness and the subject’s grasp of demonstratives. But 
such a strong principle does not seem to be motivated and would be potentially 
question-begging. It is not clear, therefore, that the phenomenological objection 
as stated above constitutes a genuine constraint upon representationalism. This 
is not to say that Travis’s principle is without merit, but to uncover the nature 
of his argument we will need to make it more precise.
Chapter 5, Recognisability and Phenomenal Character 123
5.3.2. The argument from unmediated awareness
A formulation of the phenomenological objection that does not appeal to the 
causal relation or other contentious metaphysical principles may be found in 
Travis’s argument from unmediated awareness (2.3.4), reproduced below for 
convenience.
       U1 ! P-representation is either (a) a separate source of perceptual 
information in seeing or (b) constitutes one’s perceptual 
awareness.
U2  If p-representation were a separate source of perceptual 
awareness to seeing, then it would be unnecessary for the 
awareness of objects simpliciter.
U3  We have no phenomenological evidence for the existence of 
multiple sources of perceptual information in visual experience.
U4 ! P-representation and seeing are not separate sources of 
perceptual information.
U5 ! Subjectively indistinguishable veridical and non-veridical 
perceptual experiences share a common representational content. 
(Common Content)
U6  In non-veridical experience, p-representation cannot yield 
unmediated awareness of intentional objects, since there may be 
no such objects.
U7  The same representational content cannot explain the 
unmediated awareness of objects in some cases, but not in others.
U8 ! P-representational content cannot yield unmediated awareness of 
an object in veridical perception. (From U5, U6 and U7)
U9 ! Visual experience (seeing) is a source of information that yields 
unmediated awareness of objects.
     U10! Visual experience is not p-representation. (From U4, U8 and U9)
Premises U1 through U4 argue that, according to representationalism, visual 
representational states must be constitutive of perceptual awareness, and not 
merely co-present with it. This is followed in U5 by the representationalist 
principle of Common Content (2.2), which is used to argue that representational 
content cannot yield unmediated awareness of an object, even in veridical 
perception (U6 through U8). Finally, since we do think that visual perception 
yields unmediated awareness of objects (U9) — that is, of having one’s cognitive 
responses shaped by the presence of perceptual objects (Travis 2004: 90) — then 
visual experience cannot be p-representational (U10).
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 There are a number points at which the representationalist may resist this 
argument. First, as noted above, representationalism is not necessarily 
committed to the view that representational content alone must account for 
perceptual awareness. Rather, causal or other conditions, such as the ability to 
perceptually track or re-identify objects over extended periods of time (cf. Evans 
1982: 175), may also need to be satisfied. Nevertheless, since none of these 
conditions itself constitutes an information source in the way that 
representational content is envisaged as doing, it does not seem that such 
considerations provide sufficient grounds for rejecting U4.14  Moreover, if 
experience were both a source of information about external objects and wholly 
representational, there would be no room for any additional or supplementary 
sources of information such as might be required for perceptual awareness.
 A more promising line of attack can perhaps be mounted against U7, the 
claim that the same representational content cannot explain the unmediated 
awareness of an object in some cases and not others. By arguing that what holds 
for non-veridical experience must also hold for perception, this move is 
analogous to the ‘generalising step’ in the traditional argument from illusion — a 
move that is often taken to be unsound (e.g. Snowdon 1990; Reid 1997). It is 
U7 that enables the inference from U6 to U8 — the claim that p-representation 
cannot yield unmediated awareness — from which it is but a short step to the 
conclusion in U10 that seeing, and by extension other perceptual states, do not 
involve p-representation. As with the traditional argument from illusion, this 
argument may be rejected as unsound on the basis that just because 
representational states do not yield awareness in one case — for example, 
hallucination — does not mean that they cannot (in part, at least) constitute it in 
any cases, such as veridical perception. Indeed, it is difficult to see this premise 
as anything other than begging the question against the representational view.
 Even given the rejection of U7, however, there remains an explanatory 
burden upon the representationalist to show how representational content can, 
in certain cases given the satisfaction of certain further conditions, constitute 
perceptual awareness. The challenge for the representationalist, then, is to 
provide an account that explains perceptual awareness at least partly on the 
basis of representational contents that are not in themselves sufficient for such 
awareness. Or, to put it another way, how the perceptual awareness of objects 
depends upon the representational content of perception despite veridical and 
non-veridical experiences sharing a single common factor — Martin’s ‘common 
kind’ assumption (2.3.1). Unlike Naïve Realism, representationalism does not 
deny the common kind assumption. Indeed, the existence of a common factor is, 
according to intentionalism, precisely what explains the phenomenal character 
of experience.
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14 Travis’s use of the term ‘source’ here is somewhat misleading, since it is clearly perceptual 
objects and properties that constitute the ultimate source of perceptual information. 
According to the target views, however, representational content is part of the means by 
which such information is perceptually available to the subject, and so constitutive of the 
way that objects and properties are presented to the subject in experience.
5.4. Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered whether and how the representationalist ought 
to meet the Recognisability condition proposed by Travis. This highlighted the 
distinction between the question of whether perceptual states, as considered 
from a third-personal scientific point of view, have representational content, and 
whether the phenomenal character of perceptual experience may be explained in 
such terms. Consequently, views such as Burge (2010) that seek to establish the 
representational nature of perceptual states quite independently of any concern 
with conscious phenomenal character do not engage with the point at issue in 
Travis (2004), which relates to the explanatory role of representational content 
in experience and our conscious awareness of mind-independent objects. As 
such, Burge (2010) should not be interpreted as providing any kind of response 
to Travis. Rather, he offers a largely orthogonal account of how representation 
might figure in the philosophy of perception, though not necessarily in 
conscious perceptual experience. The debate, therefore, is not so much between 
representationalism on the one hand and relationalism on the other, but rather 
between intentionalist theories of phenomenal character and their rivals, such as 
Naïve Realism.
 Furthermore, representationalists that accept intentionalism — the view that 
phenomenal character is identical to or supervenes upon representational 
content — face a number of problems in explaining how Recognisability can be 
met. I argued that this condition should be endorsed by any theorist who 
accepts strong intentionalism, and will also apply to some versions of weak 
intentionalism, at least for that content upon which phenomenal character is 
held to supervene. If it does not, then this will severely restrict the explanatory 
role of the relevant content. I also rejected the ‘phenomenological objection’ that 
representationalism detaches phenomenal character from perceptual awareness, 
as claimed in Travis’s argument from unmediated awareness (2.3.4). This is 
undoubtedly the weakest of Travis’s arguments, and arguably begs the question 
against representationalism. To the extent that this objection represents a 
genuine constraint upon representational accounts of experience, it does not 
appear to present any particular problem for the representationalist, though it 
does raise questions as to the explanatory role of phenomenal character in 
perceptual experience.
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6. Disambiguation Strategies
Externalism about self-knowledge &
discriminatory capacities
6.1. Introduction
In chapter 3, I argued that some straightforward, superficially plausible attempts 
to derive the representational content of experiences from the way that things 
appear or look fail to establish the existence of objective face-value content. 
Further considerations concerning the semantics of appearance epxressions — in 
particular the availability of an alternative comparative or deflationary analysis 
of ‘looks’ (chapter 4) — led to the rejection of Travis’s provisional Looks-
indexing condition on perceptual representation. This was replaced by the 
weaker Recognisability condition that the content of any conscious perceptual 
experience should be in some sense ‘recognisable’, or consciously available to 
the subject, solely in virtue of having that experience (5.2). I argued that 
Recognisability should taken as a condition upon perceptual representation, or 
p-representation, by those representationalists who take experience to have face-
value content that is given to the subject or is otherwise cognitively accessible 
via the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experience. Furthermore, 
rejecting this condition would result in severe constraints upon the explanatory 
role of the resulting content and its relation to phenomenal character, i.e. 
intentionalism.
 In this chapter, I consider various ways in which a representational account 
of experience and phenomenal character might meet Recognisability. To 
overcome Travis’s objections, the representationalist must propose some 
plausible means by which the multiple possible contents of experience are 
‘disambiguated’ to yield a univocal face-value content (6.2.1). I argue that the 
most plausible way in which this may be achieved is through an account of 
perception in which both the individuation and recognisability of p-
representational content share a single explanatory source (6.2.2). I then 
examine a range of candidates for such a mechanism including externalism 
about self-knowledge (6.3.2), demonstrative content (6.4.1), and recognitional, 
conceptual or other discriminatory capacities (6.4.3). Of these, I conclude that 
the latter capacities approach offers the most promising response to Travis, but 
also raises a series of questions about the nature and role of such capacities in 
individuating representational content, which do not exclusively favour 
representationalism over relationalism.
6.2. Content and Experience
6.2.1. Transmission and convergence models
In the previous chapter, I distinguished between the following two questions 
about perception and representational content:
(i) Do perceptual states have representational content, and if so, how is this 
content individuated? (Individuation)
(ii) Is representational content recognisable to the subject in experience, and 
if so, how is this possible? (Recognisability)
Accounts of representational content that provide a positive explanation of 
Individuation, but reject Recognisability, e.g. Burge (2010), are representational, 
but not representationalist as I have been using this term. Those that give a 
positive explanation of both Individuation and Recognisability may be further 
subdivided according to whether the individuation and recognisability of 
perceptual content are explained by the same or different factors into what I will 
call transmission and convergence models of experience. On the transmission 
model, whatever fixes the content of perceptual experience also makes that 
content recognisable with the relevant contents ‘transmitting’ through to the 
subject’s grasp of that content. Examples of this approach include Byrne’s ‘non-
comparative’ looks (3.2) (insofar as this may be taken to support Looks-
indexing), externalism about self-knowledge (6.3.1), as well as certain forms of 
strong intentionalism; e.g. Glüer (2009). The convergence model, on the other 
hand, explains the individuation of content and its recognisability via different 
mechanisms that converge upon a single univocal face value, at least in the 
majority of ordinary cases.1
 The problem for advocates of the transmission model is to explain how, in 
virtue of experience combined with the subject’s perceptual capacities and 
background knowledge, p-representational content is recognisable to the subject 
(5.2.3). Assuming that the relevant content has objective import — i.e. it is not 
phenomenal content that represents only the properties of subjective experience 
rather than of the objective world (3.2.3) — then what is recognised cannot be 
explained on the basis of what experience is like alone, since perceptual 
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1 An account that gave separate explanations of Individuation and Recognisability that did 
not converge upon a univocal face value would be a divergence model.  I take it that this is 
not an attractive position for the representationalist (see below).
phenomenology is equivocal, at least at the level of what is subjectively 
distinguishable to the subject. Alternatively, if perceptual phenomenology is not 
taken to be equivocal, then an account of how this is possible given the 
existence of perceptual ‘ringers’, i.e. subjectively indistinguishable cases that are 
non-veridical, and so equally candidates for the face-value contents of 
experience. In either case, then, some additional factor that is present in 
experience must feature in the explanation of how content is both individuated 
and recognised. This additional factor aims to explain how both actual and 
recognisable contents remain in step on the basis that both arise from the same 
source. The question for the transmission model, then, is to specify what this 
additional factor is and how it is able to perform its disambiguating role.
 Advocates of the convergence model, on the other hand, must explain both 
how p-representational content is individuated and how the resulting content is 
recognisable to the subject on the basis of something other than what 
individuates it. The problem here is to show how the content that is 
recognisable from experience — typically relating to phenomenal character — can 
correspond to, or track, the contents that those experiences actually have. If 
these contents are divergent, the resulting account of perception will be an error 
theory, since the representational content that the subject grasps will be different 
to the content that experience actually has, and so not a form of p-
representation. Unless there is something about the way that content is 
recognised by the subject that explains why, in the normal case, it corresponds 
to the content of experience, this model will be unable to explain how such 
content is recognisable to the subject.2  Whilst this possibility cannot be ruled 
out in advance — due to the evolutionary pressures of natural selection, for 
example — it seems implausible that the individuation and recognisability of 
content can be explained by two separate mechanisms that just happen to 
deliver precisely the same results in the majority of cases. In any case, this would 
be a substantial commitment that supporters of a convergence approach would 
need to defend. I therefore consider it unlikely that the convergence model is 
capable of delivering an account of p-representation that satisfies 
Recognisability.
6.2.2. Explanatory strategies
The primary objection that Travis (2004) sets up for those forms of 
representationalism that endorse Face-value is one of indeterminacy; i.e. there 
are too many possible contents of experience, each specifying a way that the 
world would need to be in order to satisfy the relevant appearance, and all with 
equal claim to being ‘the’ content of experience. As Tyler Burge puts this point 
in relation to vision, ‘[a] key aspect of this problem is that effects of proximal 
stimulation on the sensors of a perceptual system underdetermine both 
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2 Note that the problem here is not to guarantee that subjects cannot be mistaken about the 
contents of experience, since this is something that representationalists can allow. Rather, it 
is to explain how in a substantial number of ordinary cases that such recognisability is 
possible.
representata  of perception and the nature of the perceptual state that represents 
such representata’ (Burge 2010: 344). A suitable response must therefore specify 
both how determinate univocal content is to be assigned, and how it is 
recognisable to the subject. That is, it must disambiguate between the multiple 
possible contents of experience in such a way that explains how the resulting 
content is capable of playing some substantive cognitive or epistemic role in the 
perceiver’s mental life. Consequently, to determine precisely what the 
representational content of experience is, some additional element or factor 
must be appealed to.
 Focusing on the transmission model (6.2.1), then, possible candidates for 
explaining both the individuation and recognisability of contents via the same 
mechanism include:3
(i) anti-individualism about content (Burge 1979; 2010), self-knowledge 
(Burge 1998; 1996) and phenomenal character (Tye 1995; 2002)
(ii) distal causes, such as evolutionary function, that explain the function of 
perceptual mechanisms in terms of the role they play for that organism 
or genus (Millikan 1989; Burge 2010)
(iii) asymmetric dependency upon the veridical case (Fodor 1987)
(iv) demonstrative identification of the external objects and/or properties 
being perceived (McDowell 1994; Brewer 1999)
(v) the subject’s background knowledge of which appearances are correlated 
with which objects and property types
(vi) conceptual or discriminatory capacities invoked by individual perceptual 
experiences (McDowell 1994; 2008)
Options (i) through (iii) fall under the heading of externalism about 
representational content and self-knowledge (6.3) whilst options (iv) through 
(vi) are related by their reliance upon perceptual discriminatory capacities (6.4). 
Option (iv) exhibits characteristics of both groups, but is included in the latter 
for convenience. In the following sections, I examine each of these candidate 
views in turn.
6.3. Externalist Strategies
Externalist theories of content — for example, Burge (2010) — maintain that 
representational content depends upon distal factors, such as the evolutionary 
history of the organism’s genus or the representational capacities of its 
perceptual systems (6.3.1). I will call this kind of view individuative externalism 
(cf. Peacocke 2003). This may be contrasted with object-involving or Russellian 
Chapter 6, Disambiguation Strategies  130
3  This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is rather a representative sampling of 
disambiguation strategies employed in the recent literature.
views that entail that perceptual objects or their properties are proper parts or 
constituents of representational content. This is comparable to the views of 
Naïve Realists, who take phenomenal character to be at least partly constituted 
by external objects and their properties. I will call these kinds of view 
constitutive externalism. When using the terms ‘externalism’ and ‘externalist’ 
without qualification, I will mean individuative externalism, or anti-
individualism in Burge’s (1979) sense.
 When considering the availability of externally individuated content to the 
subject, however, it is not clear that such ‘external’ factors are accessible to 
introspection, thus presenting a challenge to any externalist theory of experience 
that wishes to uphold Recognisability. One solution to this would be to claim 
that the subject’s awareness of their own mental states is also externally 
individuated, thereby ensuring that the contents of experience ‘transmit’ through 
to the resulting beliefs and judgements (6.3.2). This strategy aims to reconcile 
the external individuation of perceptual content with the requirement that the 
subject be capable of grasping such contents simply in virtue of having — or 
rather being able to conceptualise — the relevant experience. This in turn 
amounts to a rejection of premise R7 in Travis’s argument from recognisability 
(2.3.3). Combined with intentionalism, however, this approach has the 
consequence that the p-representational content upon which phenomenal 
character supervenes or is identical to must also be externally individuated 
(6.3.3). Finally, I consider an alternative externalist account that is due to Fodor 
(1987) that I reject as an explanation of perceptual experience.
6.3.1. Teleosemantics and biosemantics
The first approach to disambiguating p-representational content that I will 
consider is the teleosemantic approach, or TA for short. Like other externalist 
views, this faces the difficulty of explaining how distal factors can influence a 
subject’s recognition of experiential content. According to one version of this 
view (Millikan 1989), the semantic content of a subject’s mental states depends 
upon the role that those states play in suitably defined ‘normal’ conditions for 
that organism. For example, a beaver’s splashing the water smartly with its tail 
represents (for that animal) that there is danger, not because beavers routinely 
splash their tails when there is danger (they also do this for all sorts of other 
reasons), but because ‘only when it corresponds to danger does the instinctive 
response to the splash on the part of the interpreter beavers, the consumers, 
serve a purpose’ (ibid. 288). According to Millikan’s bio- or ‘consumer’ 
semantics, it is this purpose, which is typically linked to the biological and 
evolutionary goals of the organism for survival, foraging, procreation, and so 
on, that fixes the representational content of the resulting mental state, and not 
the nature of the distal object or the organism itself. Whilst Millikan’s theory is 
not specifically targeted at perceptual states, it may be naturally extended to 
cover all forms of mental representation, including perception.
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 As discussed in chapter 5, Burge (2010) takes a similar view, emphasising 
the evolutionary role or function of the representational states in question. For 
example (ibid. 321):
[T]he specific range of attributes in the environment that an individual 
perceptually represents … are constrained by causal interactions with the 
environment, explained in ethology and zoology. The key interactions are 
those that figured in molding [sic] the perceptual system shared by relevant 
individuals.
Thus, according to Burge, it is to ethology and zoology that we must look to 
settle the question of which properties are represented in perception. 
Furthermore, ‘the relevant functional individual responses need not be by living 
individuals’ (ibid.). Rather, the relevant facts are ones about the evolution of an 
organism or genus that are common to all its individual members, and not facts 
specific to the individual doing the representing. Both Millikan and Burge’s 
views therefore constitute forms of ‘anti-individualism’ (Burge 1979), or 
individuative externalism.
 In each of the above cases, however, it is difficult to see how the distal 
factors that fix representational content could enable a subject to grasp that 
content, as Recognisability requires. The problem is particularly vivid in Burge’s 
formulation, since the relevant facts may concern aspects of the evolutionary 
history of an organism that are opaque to all but the most scientifically well-
informed observers — and even they can easily be wrong. However, even in 
Millikan’s consumer semantics, there is no suggestion that an individual must 
grasp, or be able to grasp, what their own mental states represent. Indeed, the 
‘consumer’ of a perceptual representation may be a sub-personal cognitive 
system, such as the system for bodily action, rather than the subject herself.4 
Consequently, such representational content need neither be conscious, nor 
consciously available to the subject. Similarly, it need not be obvious to nor 
recognisable by the subject what the normal function of a given representation 
is. Rather, this will be a matter for empirical investigation and debate, and so 
need not feature in the subject’s experience in the way that Recognisability 
requires. By assigning a disambiguating role to distal causal and functional 
factors, TA therefore makes it difficult to meet Recognisability, and so fails to 
explain how the representational contents of experience are manifest in the 
conscious experience of a perceiving subject.
 As discussed in chapter 5, an advocate of TA might simply reject this 
explanatory commitment, as per Burge (2010). This would fail to engage with 
Travis since the resulting content no longer plays the same (or possibly any) 
explanatory role in relation to the phenomenal character of conscious 
experience. It is therefore not a representationalist view of experience as I define 
this term.
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4  Here Burge differs from Millikan, insisting that the biological functions that fix 
representational content are ‘functions of the whole individual’ (Burge 2010: 320).
 Alternatively, the representationalist might wish to deny that there is any 
obstacle to a subject grasping the content of their own mental states on the basis 
that they do not need to know the enabling conditions of a mental state in order 
to know its content. Even if correct, however, this stipulation cannot explain 
precisely how it is that a subject can grasp these contents, which is the main 
point at issue. To do this, one might respond to the objection by appealing to 
the kind of externalism about self-knowledge described below (6.3.2). On this 
view, what individuates the representational contents of perceptual states also 
individuates the subject’s reflective grasp or awareness of those contents, 
thereby meeting the Recognisability constraint.
 A third approach would be to argue that a subject’s grasp of the contents of 
their experiences is at least partly conventional in that it is conditioned by their 
past experience of the object and property types represented. This is a variation 
of the background knowledge strategy (BKS) discussed below (6.4.2), which 
claims that subjects are able to recognise the contents of their experience by 
associating its phenomenal character, as determined by its content, with the 
objects or properties represented therein. Such associations may themselves be 
learned by experience or innate. Applying this strategy to TA, however, gives rise 
to a convergence model of experience (6.2.1), since experiential contents would 
be individuated and recognised by different means. This places constraints upon 
the kinds of knowledge that may be brought to bear in recognising such 
contents, along with the need to explain how BKS delivers contents that match 
those delivered by TA, which are externally individuated by the subject’s 
evolutionary history and environment.
6.3.2. Externalism about self-knowledge
Tyler Burge (1998) presents a strategy for explaining how a subject whose 
mental states are externally individuated may nevertheless possess knowledge of 
the contents of those states. His strategy can be summarised by the following 
four claims:
(1) Anti-individualism: first-order thoughts are at least partly 
individuated by external physical objects and/or the shared 
practices of a community of language users.
(2) Privileged access: second-order thought has a reflexive, self-
referential character that is directly accessible to consciousness.
(3) Enabling conditions: it is not necessary to know the enabling 
conditions of a thought in order to know the contents of that 
thought.
(4) Redeployment: knowledge of one’s own thoughts ‘inherits’ its 
empirical component from the concepts that those thoughts 
employ.
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 The first of Burge’s claims is the thesis that mental content may be externally 
individuated in various ways. He labels this anti-individualism in contrast to the 
idea that a subject’s mental states constitutively depend only on the physical 
state of the relevant individual, as well as to differentiate it from semantic 
externalism in the philosophy of language. It is a form of individuative 
externalism in the terminology introduced above (6.3.1). Whilst it lies outside 
the scope of this chapter to discuss each of the above claims in full generality, 
the representationalist may wish to employ a similar strategy to account for the 
recognisability of p-representational content. Although this is not a move that 
Burge himself makes, it is one that is available to advocates of externally 
individuated content, such as McDowell (1994) and Tye (2007). The precise 
method of individuation will not affect the present strategy, which is also 
compatible with a teleo- or biosemantic approach (6.3.1).
 Burge’s second claim posits a form of ‘second-order’ knowledge or 
privileged access to one’s first-order mental states. This may be contrasted with 
a perceptual model of self-knowledge according to which introspective thought 
replicates the content of another mental state, thereby giving rise to a second-
order mental state with representational content distinct from the first-order 
thought. This model of introspection is analogous to perception in that it 
conceives of mental states as internal ‘objects’ that a thinker is able to inspect in 
a way comparable to the sensory perception of external physical objects. Burge, 
however, rejects the perceptual model, taking thoughts, beliefs, judgements, and 
so on, about other thoughts to have a ‘reflexive, self-referential 
character’ (Burge 1998: 659–60). On this view, the content of every second-
order thought about one’s own thinking contains a reference both to the subject 
and to the first-order thought’s content. This enables the resulting belief state to 
‘inherit’ the content of the first-order thought, rather than duplicating it, in such 
a way that the two cannot come apart.
 On this view, the content of the thought ‘I am thinking that there is some 
water’ when I see water in front of me, for example, would have the following 
structure:
(5) I am thinking that there is some water
where the italicised proposition is not distinct from the first-order thought 
thinking, but rather an instance of that thought itself.5 Thus the content of the 
first-order thought (‘there is some water‘) is ‘inherited’ by the second-order 
claim — or to borrow a metaphor from computer science, its content is passed 
by reference rather than by value. This enables Burge to claim, contrary to 
McKinsey (1991) et al., that we have a priori knowledge that we are thinking 
about water without needing to know that there is H2O in our environment as 
opposed to, for example, XYZ, as in Putnam’s (1975) ‘Twin Earth’ scenario. 
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5  This approach is similar to, though should be differentiated from, so-called higher-order 
thought, or HOT, theories of consciousness (e.g. Rosenthal 1986), which employ a similar 
self-referential structure to account for consciousness rather than self-knowledge.
Our water-thoughts about H2O are subjectively indistinguishable from 
corresponding twin-water thoughts about XYZ (also called ‘water’ on Twin 
Earth). However, the very fact that individuates our thoughts as being about 
water — i.e. the presence of H2O in our physical environment — also 
individuates our first-personal knowledge that it is water about which we are 
thinking. Thus the first-personal awareness of the contents of thought can be 
said to ‘track’ the contents of those very thoughts without requiring any 
knowledge of the presuppositions or ‘enabling conditions’ (Burge 1988: 654) for 
thinking about water, such as ‘water is H2O’ or ‘there is an external world’ — 
Burge’s third claim.
 According to Burge’s fourth and final maxim, the empirical component of 
our second-order beliefs, etc., derives from the concepts that they employ rather 
than any evidential connection between first- and second-order thoughts. Such 
empirical content is therefore common to the subject’s first-order thought and 
their second-order awareness of it, since both employ the same concepts. This is 
what Peacocke (1996: 131) refers to as the Redeployment Claim and follows 
from second-order thoughts inheriting their contents from first-order thoughts. 
Thus we can know that we are thinking about water, where this term picks out 
some externally individuated natural kind, in virtue of possessing the concept 
water without having to know precisely which natural kind, i.e. H2O or XYZ, 
our concept picks out.
 Burge’s ESK strategy may be adapted by representationalists to explain how 
content that is externally individuated is nevertheless available or recognisable 
to the subject. In place of first-order beliefs we have perceptual experiences with 
externally individuated content. In place of the second-order knowledge of 
thoughts, we have the grasp, awareness or knowledge of perceptual content. 
The resulting account would therefore claim that content recognised on the 
basis of perceptual experience is ‘inherited’ directly from the experiential state. 
Unlike on Burge’s account, however, this cannot be due to the relevant second-
order states having a reflexive, self-referential character since the corresponding 
first-order states are experiences, not beliefs. Consequently, self-knowledge of 
perceptual content cannot be self-verifying in the same way as self-knowledge of 
thought since to think an experiential content is not thereby to perceptually 
experience it. Nevertheless, the empirical content of such states could still derive 
from the concepts that they employ. This approach is conducive to theorists like 
McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999; 2005) who argue that the representational 
content of perceptual states must be conceptual in order to yield knowledge of 
the world.6  However, even non-conceptual content theorists might apply a 
similar strategy provided that their account posits some kind of constitutive 
representational elements that are common to both p-representational contents 
and our reflective grasp of them, and from which the relevant empirical 
components may be derived.
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6  Brewer has since abandoned conceptualism in favour of a relational view of perceptual 
experience. McDowell (2008) still endorses conceptualism but no longer requires that the 
contents of perceptual experience be propositional.
 Adapting Burge’s maxims to the case of perceptual experience, then, yields 
the following claims:
(1′       ) Anti-individualism: perceptual experiences are at least partly 
individuated by external physical objects and/or the evolutionary 
history and representational capacities of the genus.
(2′) Privileged access: perceptual belief has an indexical nature that is 
directly accessible to consciousness.
(3′) Enabling conditions: it is not necessary to know the enabling 
conditions of a perceptual experience in order to grasp the 
content of that experience.
(4′       ) Redeployment: one’s grasp of the content of one’s own 
perceptual experiences ‘inherits’ its empirical component from 
the concepts or non-conceptual elements that those experiences 
employ.
Here, the relevant enabling conditions in (3′) would be knowledge of the 
relevant content types for perceptual experience, which under ESK will not be 
required in order for the subject to grasp that they are in that state.
 A first approximation of such a view might be modelled on the notion of 
demonstrative reference. One way of thinking about ESK about experience 
would be that the relevant second-order beliefs have demonstrative contents. On 
this view, the content of a second-order thought about seeing a red tomato 
would be of the form:
(6) I am seeing that: there is a red tomato
where the italicised proposition is the content of a visual experience that is 
demonstratively referenced by the second-order thought. This quotational model 
of perceptual belief would, however, make the object of such beliefs a 
proposition, which is — at least on some accounts of what it is to be a 
proposition — an abstract object. This raises problems with indirect senses, and 
does not seem a plausible account of experiential self-knowledge.
 A more sophisticated view would be to take the content of the resulting 
belief to incorporate demonstrative terms. For example:
(7) That (there) is thus.7
Here, the sense of these demonstrative elements would be constrained by the 
content of experience such that their reference is fixed by whatever objects and 
properties the experience itself picks out — in the above case a red tomato. This 
enables the representationalist to circumvent Travis’s argument from 
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recognisability by giving an externalist account of self-knowledge according to 
which p-representational contents and the first-personal awareness of them are 
individuated by the same external factors; i.e. a transmission model of 
experience. Thus it would be possible for a subject to know that they are, for 
example, representing a tomato (round object, red, etc.) when they see one (or a 
wax tomato, tomato-shaped ketchup bottle, etc.) on the basis that the content of 
their second-order awareness ‘inherits’ the externally individuated content of the 
first-order experience.
 Note that this need not mean that subjects simply represent whatever objects 
happen to be in front of them. Rather, depending upon the method of external 
individuation employed, p-representational content may be determined by the 
creature’s evolutionary history or representational capabilities. On this view 
there is no need for the subject to be able to consciously disambiguate between 
the multiple possible contents of experience. Rather, according to the above 
version of ESK, their perceptual system does it for them. This then carries 
through, or transmits, to any subsequent awareness, knowledge or belief about 
the perceptual state itself, yielding precisely the same content. Thus, a second-
order belief about the perceptual experience in (7) would have the content:
(8) I am seeing that: that (there) is thus.
Just as one’s water-thoughts track the presence of H2O as opposed to XYZ, 
one’s tomato- (round-, red-, etc.) perceptions would track one’s capacity to 
represent the presence of tomatoes (spheroids, red, etc.) in one’s perceptual 
environment. Thus, Travis’s Face-value and Recognisability conditions may be 
met by an ESK-based account of p-representation.
 The application of ESK to the recognition of perceptual content has a 
number of important consequences. First, it entails that a subject’s reflective 
awareness or grasp of the face-value content of experience involves a second-
order thought with demonstrative or indexical content. This means that first-
order perceptual awareness and second-order reflective awareness of p-
representational content are, according to ESK, separate and distinct mental 
states.8  Furthermore, ESK requires the resulting contents to be either 
conceptually structured or concept-like. Although Recognisability does not 
require that subjects are able to state the relevant content or accuracy conditions 
for their experience (5.2.1), the possession of such concepts would presumably 
be required in order for ESK to be capable of delivering the relevant empirical 
content in accordance with Redeployment (4′). Such concept possession would 
in turn require either (i)   the subject to have had prior experience of the types 
and entities that their experiences represent — shapes and colours, for example 
— in order to acquire the relevant concept, or else (ii)   that the grasp of such 
concepts is innate. The precise conceptual apparatus required would depend 
upon the relevant form of external individuation, but will involve some form of 
recognitional concepts, i.e. concepts that are essentially tied to the recognition of 
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8 Note that the first-order state may, though need not, be conscious.
perceptual stimuli, with similar considerations applying in the case of non-
conceptual content.
 ESK, then, accounts for the way in which subjects are able to grasp the 
contents of their perceptual experiences — for example, that is φ, where φ 
corresponds to some perceptible property — on the basis of their recognitional 
concepts, but without requiring them to be able to articulate the resulting 
contents or differentiate them from cases that may be subjectively 
indistinguishable; e.g. that is ψ. This is directly analogous to the external 
individuation of thoughts, where there is some water (i.e. H2O) and there is 
some twater (i.e. XYZ) may be indistinguishable from the thinker’s own 
perspective. Despite not being in a position to know which of these thoughts he 
is thinking, the subject can nevertheless know precisely what he is thinking due 
to the second-order thought ‘inheriting’, or being constrained by, the first-order 
content. In the case of perception, then, a subject would not need to know or 
recognise whether their experience represents there to be a tomato, a bulbous 
red spheroid or a wax imitation lemon in order to grasp what it would take for 
that experience to be veridical. Rather, according to ESK, they are capable of 
recognising that things would need to be like that in accordance with whatever 
demonstrative concepts or concept-like elements are employed by their first-
order experience.
 Whilst constituting a direct response to Travis, the form of recognisability 
delivered by ESK therefore constitutes something of a limited victory for 
representationalism. The sense in which subjects are able to grasp or know the 
contents of their experience is tempered by their inability to discern which of a 
range of properties is represented therein. Furthermore, if the resulting thoughts 
are of the kind described by (7) and (8), it remains to be explained how such 
demonstrative content plays a role in justifying or fixing the content of ordinary 
beliefs such as ‘there is a tomato’ or ‘the tomato is red’. At the very least, the 
relationship between the content of experience and the content of belief is not as 
straightforward as it might first appear. Furthermore, since all perceptual beliefs 
will take a similar form to (7), this content alone does not explain what makes 
certain beliefs subjectively distinguishable and others not. If, on the other hand, 
the relevant second-order thoughts or awareness are not of this kind, then it is 
incumbent upon the representationalist to give an account of them. Thus, whilst 
ESK offers a way of meeting Recognisability, this strategy is not without its 
costs.
6.3.3. Phenomenal externalism
A further consequence of ESK is that if, as suggested above (5.2.4), we 
understand representationalism as a thesis about the phenomenal character of 
experience, this raises the possibility of the external individuation of 
phenomenal character. The combination of intentionalism and ESK predicts that 
not only p-representation, but also phenomenal character will be externally 
individuated, since the latter is identical to, or supervenes upon, the former 
(5.2.3). According to this position, which I will call phenomenal externalism, 
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what experience ‘is like’ for the subject will depend not only upon that 
individual’s internal state, but the states of objects in the world. Thus the 
experiences of two exact physical duplicates could have differing phenomenal 
characters simply in virtue of the properties of the objects that they perceive 
despite having identical patterns of activity throughout their brains and nervous 
systems. Many philosophers find this consequence of phenomenal externalism 
to be problematic and counterintuitive, though it is contentious whether any of 
the arguments against it are decisive (see Lycan 2008, esp. §§4.4–4.5, for a 
representative sample). Phenomenal character, it is tempting to think — at least 
on the traditional conception of this term as picking out what is distinguishable 
by the subject — must surely be internally individuated.9
 There are two basic ways of responding to this issue. The first is to deny 
that it constitutes a real problem for the representationalist. On this view, in 
accepting ESK we must embrace an externalist notion of the mind and mental 
states upon which the external individuation of phenomenal character is no 
more problematic than, for example, the external individuation of thought and 
knowledge. This is Michael Tye’s (1995; 2002) view, who argues that 
phenomenal character is externally individuated in precisely this manner and 
that any philosophical intuitions to the contrary are based on a mistaken 
‘Cartesian conception’ of the mind. Alternatively, one could deny that those 
aspects of representational content upon which phenomenal character supervene 
are in fact externally individuated. This gives rise to the existence of ‘broad’ and 
‘narrow’ contents according to which phenomenal character only supervenes 
upon the internal aspects of representational content (cf. Schellenberg 2011a, 
2011b; Tye 2007). This again raises questions concerning how Recognisability 
can be met given the difference in individuation conditions between broad and 
narrow contents, which effectively rule out the use of the ESK strategy.
  It is also worth noting the parallel between phenomenal externalism and 
Naïve Realism, according to which external objects and their properties are 
considered to be partially constitutive of phenomenal character. These positions 
differ in that the former is a thesis about what individuates rather than what 
constitutes phenomenal character (in the metaphysical sense), as in the case of 
Naïve Realism. Nevertheless, there is a degree of convergence and overlap 
between the two theories. This in turn raises the question of whether we should 
account for phenomenal character in purely internal terms. If not, this reduces 
the grounds upon which the representationalist can object to Naïve Realism on 
the basis that external objects determine phenomenal character, since their own 
theory predicts the same, albeit with important metaphysical qualifications. 
Indeed, if the relevant contents are demonstratively individuated, as they are for 
Burge and Tye, then there is a sense in which the resulting representationalism is 
just a form of relationalism (i.e. weak relationalism) in that the subject’s relation 
to the external objects of perception plays a fundamental role in explaining the 
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9  This is a particular problem for the kind of demonstrative content posited by McDowell 
and Brewer, which may vary according to the objects and properties the subject is presented 
with (6.4.1).
nature and role of perceptual experiential. This yields a kind of compatibilism 
that combines elements of both relationalism and representationalism within a 
single hybrid view. Of course, such views will differ in how they account for 
perceptual illusions and hallucinations. But as discussed in 2.3.1 and 3.2.1, this 
need not constitute a knock-down objection to relationalism.
6.3.4. Asymmetric dependency
The final externalist approach that I wish to consider uses counterfactual 
dependences to determine which of a range of possible, potentially disjunctive, 
representational contents is present in any given case. Jerry Fodor’s (1987: 101–
10) solution to this ‘disjunction problem’, as he calls it, involves the 
counterfactual dependence of, for example, a frog’s visually representing flies — 
a potential food source — upon the presence of flies in its environment, as 
opposed to, say, black dots. According to Fodor, the frog can be said to be 
representing flies as opposed to the disjunction flies or black dots on the basis 
that it would not represent black dots as a token of this type if there were no 
flies in its environment. The converse claim — that it would not not represent 
flies as a token of this type if there were no black dots in its environment — is, 
however, false since flies are the frog’s food source and so the primary target of 
its representational abilities. Consequently, the frog’s representation is 
asymmetrically dependent upon the existence of flies, but not upon the existence 
of black dots. Thus the frog may be said to represent the former, and not the 
disjunction of flies and black dots.
 Whilst this may present a plausible method of individuating p-
representational content from a third-person point of view — something upon 
which many theorists would disagree (e.g. Burge 2010: 322; 307–8, fn. 27) — 
the truth of the relevant counterfactuals are not obviously available to subjects 
in experience. Indeed, given the contentious nature of modal facts in philosophy, 
it is debatable whether they are even available to philosophers. It therefore 
seems implausible to hold that in order to know what one’s perceptual 
experience represents, one must have access to facts about which counterfactual 
conditionals would hold in the absence of the thing that is ostensibly 
represented; e.g. if there were no lemons then I would not represent a wax 
lemon as a token of the same type as a real lemon. To suppose this — which 
Fodor himself does not, since he does not endorse Recognisability — would 
hugely over-intellectualise the notion of p-representation, the contents of which 
would be inaccessible to all but the most philosophically sophisticated 
perceivers. Thus, even if it constitutes a viable account of the representational 
content of perceptual states, asymmetric dependency cannot form the basis for 
the content of perceptual experiences whose content is recognisable to the 
subject.
6.4. The Capacities Approach
The remainder of the candidate representationalist strategies for meeting 
Recognisability I wish to consider highlight the role of perceptual capacities. 
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These range from recognitional and conceptual capacities (6.4.1) to the role of 
background knowledge (6.4.2), other discriminatory capacities (6.4.3) and so-
called ‘intuitional’ or non-propositional content (6.4.4). Each of these draws 
upon some form of perceptual discriminatory capacity which forms the basis for 
representational content that is recognisable to the subject. Whilst not 
exclusively internalist in nature, I argue that such approaches constitute the 
representationalist’s best opportunity to respond to Travis whilst avoiding 
phenomenal externalism. Such approaches, however, do not necessarily favour 
representationalism over relationalism, and so do not in themselves constitute 
an argument for representationalism per se (6.4.5).
6.4.1. Demonstrative content
The notion of demonstrative content is introduced by McDowell (1994) and 
developed by Brewer (1999) as a way of explaining how propositionally 
structured perceptual contents can provide reasons for belief and action. 
According to the latter account, such contents have the structure ‘that (there) is 
thus’, where the first demonstrative refers to some externally individuated object 
and the last to some determinate property-type that is predicated of that object 
(cf. 6.3.2). Call this the demonstrative content strategy, or DCS for short. 
According to McDowell (1994: 57), demonstrative concepts include potentially 
short-lived capacities to pick out or ‘track’ the relevant object or property over 
time, as well as more stable conceptual capacities as these are traditionally 
envisaged. Demonstrative concepts may also be arbitrarily fine-grained so that 
each colour shade or object-type corresponds to a different ‘concept’. Both 
McDowell (ibid. Lecture I) and Brewer (1999: ch. 5) argue for a fully conceptual 
account of representational content for reasons connected with the justification 
of knowledge claims. This does not mean, however, that subject need possess 
fully-fledged concepts for every object- or property-type that they represent, but 
merely what I will refer to as the discriminatory capacity to identify them 
throughout a given perceptual episode, with demonstrative ‘concepts’ being one 
example of such capacities.
 Since discriminatory capacities are general, i.e. they can apply to different 
objects or property-instances, there is nothing to stop them featuring not only in 
the representational contents of experience, but also in the subject’s first-
personal beliefs or knowledge of that content. When seeing a red cube, for 
example, the demonstrative ‘that’ might refer to the cube itself and the ‘thus’ its 
colour — in this case a particular shade of red. Consequently, even a subject who 
lacked the concept cube would arguably be able to recognise that her experience 
was of that object, where the demonstrative picks out the relevant cubical 
object. Such an experience would yield a different content, and so different 
accuracy conditions, to the experience of an otherwise indistinguishable but 
numerically distinct cube presented on a different occasion. Furthermore, this 
difference is in some sense ‘recognisable’ to the subject in that on each occasion 
it is manifest to them that they are representing that particular object, and not 
merely some object that falls under a general kind; e.g. a cube. Thus a subject 
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who enjoys a visual experience with the content ‘that (there) is thus’ may, by 
reflecting upon their experience, grasp that they are representing that spatially 
bounded object thusly without requiring any means of individuating the relevant 
object or property other than by demonstrative reference. In this way, the 
‘particular’ (i.e. object-dependent) content of a visual experience, and not just its 
‘general’ content, may be said to be recognisable to the subject solely in virtue of 
the experience itself, as Recognisability requires, by means of the experience’s 
phenomenal character, which is demonstrative in nature.
 This form of DCS, then, would appear to be a candidate for a transmission 
model of experience that is capable of meeting Recognisability and so refuting 
Travis. Moreover, it is a view upon which different contents may be present in 
subjectively indistinguishable (e.g. veridical and non-veridical) experiences, since 
the identity of the object will affect the experience’s accuracy conditions, though 
not its subjective character. This avoids Travis’s argument from unmediated 
awareness (2.3.4) and similarly circumvents the argument from recognisability 
(2.3.3), since the resulting contents are conveyed to the subject in experience.
 The difficulty with this view, however, lies not in the structure of the 
representational contents that it posits, but in the individuation of the relevant 
objects and properties. In order to represent that ‘that (there) is thus’, it must be 
possible for the perceptual system to single out both a particular object (‘that 
there’) and a property-type (‘thus’) which is predicated of that object. A Travis-
style indeterminacy objection to the view would therefore be that it is not 
recognisable from experience alone which object and property-type are thereby 
individuated since there are numerous different and incompatible ways of 
partitioning the world into objects and properties.10 The response that it is that 
object or property — namely, the one demonstrated in experience — is unhelpful 
as it fails to settle the question of how the relevant terms are individuated. In the 
case described above, for example, it is the cube and its colour that are so 
identified, rather than, say, the shape of its visible surfaces. The representational 
contents of a cube-colour experience and a cube face-shape experience are 
presumably different despite both falling under the same general description of 
‘that (there) is thus’. Indeed, on a purely demonstrative view, every perception 
will fall under this general schema, or some complex conjunction of terms of 
this form. There is therefore still a case to be answered by the DCS theorist in 
order to avoid falling prey to the indeterminacy objection, since the relevant 
contents are as yet indeterminate between multiple sets of accuracy conditions, 
depending upon the types of object and property that are demonstrated.
 In practice, a suitable response to this problem must lie in the way that the 
demonstrated objects and properties are perceptually individuated. To exercise a 
visual discriminatory capacity for, say, a cube, the subject’s perceptual 
apparatus must pick out and track the spatial extent and boundaries of that 
object over time. Similarly, if it is the object’s colour that is being tracked as 
opposed to its shape, then there must be some corresponding capacity that is 
perceptually attuned to the particular colour of the object over time. Where 
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10 For an externalist solution to this objection, see 6.3.2.
multiple properties are being represented then many such capacities will be 
active.
 Moreover, there must be some definite answer to which discriminatory 
capacities are active during any given perceptual episode. The answer to this 
question will in turn fix the contents of p-representation, thereby resolving the 
indeterminacy objection. To do this, the DCS theorist must appeal to further 
facts about the individuation or activation of the relevant discriminatory or 
conceptual capacities. Since the same (or indistinguishably similar) appearances 
can be shared by multiple object types, the activation of a particular capacity 
must be explained in terms of the perceptual abilities or conceptual repertoire of 
the subject. This makes DCS a form of the discriminatory capacities approach 
described below since the employment of such capacities on particular occasions 
is what individuates p-representational content (6.4.3). Furthermore, the subject 
must be capable of grasping which specific capacities are being employed in 
order for the resulting content to be recognisable. The precise methods by which 
this may be done are discussed in the following sections.
 A variation upon the above response to Travis’s indeterminacy objection 
would be to link phenomenal character to some other feature of experience, 
such as the exercise of concepts or recognitional capacities, as per Schellenberg 
(2011b). On this view, although the particular contents of experiences are 
externally individuated, their phenomenal character is constituted by the 
employment of concepts or conceptual capacities, rather than supervening 
directly on its content. On this view, seeing a lemon under typical circumstances 
would activate the concept is a lemon, thereby making it apparent to the subject 
that they are representing a lemon, as opposed to, say, a lemon-shaped bar of 
soap. This would be true even if the object were a lemon-shaped bar of soap 
that looked suitably like an actual lemon, since in both cases the same concept 
or recognitional capacity will be activated. It is unclear, however, that this is 
more than a notational variant upon the standard intentionalist view in which 
phenomenal character supervenes upon or is identical to the relevant contents. 
Moreover, it is unclear why the exercise of such recognitional capacities should 
result in the tokening of content. Indeed, it is debatable to what extent such 
views need posit general contents at all since, according to them, phenomenal 
character is a mere by-product of the operation of discriminatory capacities and 
so not necessarily represented in the contents of experience as such.
6.4.2. Background knowledge
The background knowledge strategy, or BKS, is a variation upon the 
discriminatory capacities approach that appeals to the subject’s explicit or tacit 
knowledge of the correlation between their sensory impressions and object- or 
property-types. For example, a subject who has visually experienced a number 
of yellow-looking objects, the majority of which, upon inspection, in fact turned 
out to be yellow rather than merely appearing to be, could plausibly come to 
know what it is to see an object as yellow.11  If these objects become their 
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11 Cf. Jackson’s (1982) Mary.
paradigms — or ‘samples’, to use Wittgenstein’s (1953: §16) terminology — of 
what it is to look yellow, then the subject can plausibly come to know that an 
experience represents some novel object to be yellow by means of its similarity 
to these paradigms. Such forms of background knowledge may be considered 
‘external’ to perceptual experience in that the subject does not recognise an 
experience to represent yellow in virtue of that experience alone. Rather, by 
employing explicit (i.e. inferential) or tacit (non-inferential) knowledge of the 
link between subjective appearances and the objective characteristics of objects, 
a subject can come to recognise their experience as representing that an object is 
yellow as opposed to merely looking yellow or some other way.
 To take a simple example, the yellowish, roundish appearance of a lemon 
may be taken to represent that there is something yellow, round, and so on in 
front of one because one knows (associates, has previous experience of, …) 
objects with this appearance as being yellow, round, lemons, etc. Such 
knowledge, if it can be described as such, will consist in associations between 
experiences of the relevant appearance types and the actual properties of objects 
which, upon further investigation, turned out to instantiate the properties that 
one comes to associate with the corresponding appearances; i.e. being yellow, 
round, a lemon, etc.12  Thus a form of Recognisability may be derived on the 
basis of the tacit knowledge of appearances.
 By acquiring knowledge of the appearances of yellow objects, the subject 
thereby acquires the capacity to recognise not only yellow objects, but the 
representation of yellow in perceptual experience. On this view, what privileges 
being yellow as the content of such representation — as opposed to, say, being 
white and illuminated by yellow light — is its role in the relevant paradigm 
cases. Typically, paradigm cases of yellow objects — a ripe lemon or banana, for 
example — are in fact yellow and can be seen to be such under a wide variety of 
environmental conditions.13 Thus whilst a white object, such as a white piece of 
chalk illuminated by yellow light, shares the same yellowish appearance and so 
‘looks yellow’, it is not paradigmatic of that appearance. Consequently, on the 
present view, objects that look this way are represented in perceptual experience 
as being yellow in virtue of their possessing a similar appearance to (i.e. they 
look like) certain paradigm objects that are yellow. That is, under BKS, just what 
it means to look yellow.
 It is worth noting that something not unlike this kind of knowledge is 
present in Martin’s comparative analysis of looks-statements in the form of the 
similarity function (4.3.1). This takes a predicate (e.g. is yellow) and a look, 
yielding truth if and only if the latter is relevantly similar to the look of those 
objects that satisfy the predicate. Crucially, however, on Martin’s account this 
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12  Note that the application of such knowledge need not render access to representational 
contents epistemically indirect since the relevant capacities may operate at a sub-personal 
level rather than involving conscious inference, at least once the learning phase is complete.
13  Note, however, that at least one paradigm case of a yellow object — namely, the sun — is 
not in fact yellow, but white; it merely appears yellow due to the effect of atmospheric 
absorption (Wilk 2009).
need not be part of a psychological process that the subject goes through in 
identifying particular looks. Rather, it is part of the semantic analysis of looks-
statements, and so not necessarily even implicitly known by the subject. If is 
therefore an important question for the BKS theorist whether subjects do in fact 
possess such knowledge of appearances and whether it is acquired or innate. If 
they do, then there seems to be no reason why this could not be applied at the 
level of recognising the content of perceptual experience on the basis of 
appearances.
 According to BKS, then, a subject’s background knowledge of certain 
paradigm cases of looks may be used to disambiguate p-representational 
contents. However, in order for this to be more than a mere convention — i.e. a 
way of reporting appearances, rather than constitutive of p-representation itself 
— it must be explained how this knowledge comes to figure in the content of 
perceptual experience in the first place. For this to be the case, such knowledge 
must in some sense be exercised by the perception of objects, whether 
consciously or otherwise. The exercise of tacit or explicit background 
knowledge thus becomes equivalent to the possession of a conceptual, 
recognitional or discriminatory capacity for the relevant object- or property-
type. When an object with the relevant appearance is perceived, this activates 
the subject’s background knowledge, causing the corresponding type to be 
tokened as part of that experience’s representational content. BKS is therefore 
effectively a special case of the discriminatory capacity strategy described below.
6.4.3. Discriminatory capacities
A number of the above approaches — specifically DCS (6.4.1), BKS (6.4.2) and 
certain forms of TA (6.3.1) — can be reduced to what I will call the capacities 
approach, or CA for short. According to CA, what gives experience univocal 
content is the exercise of conceptual, recognitional or discriminatory capacities, 
each of which corresponds to a particular type of object or property that may be 
represented. Since I take it that conceptual and recognitional capacities are 
themselves forms of discriminatory capacity, I will prefer the latter term on the 
grounds that it does not entail the existence of conceptual content (not all 
representationalists are conceptualists), or the successful recognition of 
perceptual stimuli (discriminatory capacities may misfire). However, variants of 
the present approach may be constructed for each of these and other types of 
capacity accordingly. Thus, if a given experience invokes the discriminatory 
capacity for lemons (being yellow, ellipsoid, etc.), then the resulting content of 
experience will represent a lemon (yellow, ellipsoid, etc.). This content is in turn 
available to the subject in virtue of its employing a particular concept, or non-
conceptual structure, that features in any second-order awareness of that 
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content — for example, ‘my experience is as of a lemon’, where ‘as of’ is not 
taken to entail the presence of lemons.14
 This becomes important when we consider a subjectively matching 
hallucinatory experience of — to continue the above example — a lemon. In this 
case, according to CA, the same discriminatory capacity will be operative, in this 
case erroneously, causing the experience to have the same or subjectively 
indistinguishable phenomenal character, which in turn supervenes upon, or is 
correlated with, the discriminatory capacities that are employed. However, since 
in this case there is no such object (colour, shape, etc.), the resulting 
representation is inaccurate, yielding a false or non-veridical content. Thus CA 
seeks to accommodate both (a) the sense in which veridical and non-veridical 
contents share the same phenomenal character in virtue of the discriminatory 
capacities that they employ, and (b) how the content of experience is 
recognisable to the subject in virtue of the very same capacities that give rise to 
its content. CA is therefore a transmission model of experience (6.2.1) that 
adheres to the modified recognisability condition set out in the previous chapter 
(5.2.3).
 Several features of CA are worth noting. First, in order to deliver univocal 
face-value content, the operation of the relevant capacities must not be 
underdetermined by the perceptual stimuli, since if the same stimuli were to 
trigger multiple capacities whose representational contents conflict, then this 
would yield multiple incompatible contents. This does not, however, prevent 
multiple compatible capacities from being invoked by the same perceptual 
stimuli. To take McDowell’s (2008: 3) example, seeing a red cardinal might 
invoke discriminatory capacities for bird, animal and cardinal, as well as for red 
and numerous other properties. If the same perceptual stimuli were to invoke 
the recognitional capacities for cardinal, crimson rosella, imitation wax 
cardinal, and so on, however, then the resulting content would be incoherent 
and so necessarily false, since these properties are incompatible with one 
another (a cardinal is not a crimson rosella, nor is it made of wax). This does 
not mean that there can be no cases of incoherent or necessarily false contents. 
Rather, such cases cannot be veridical or typical of experience in general 
without rendering CA an error theory of perception. To avoid this, independent 
justification that discriminatory capacities do not work in this way, or some 
limit to their scope and complexity, must be given if the threat of indeterminacy 
is to be avoided (see below).
 The second notable feature of CA is that the particular (as opposed to 
general) contents of experiences will necessarily outstrip what is recognisable on 
the basis of discriminatory capacities alone. Such abilities are limited to what is 
subjectively distinguishable in experience, and so cannot be used to support the 
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14  I take CA itself to be neutral between conceptual and non-conceptual approaches to 
perceptual content. Given the role of the resulting elements in the recognition of content, one 
might take the resulting view to be essentially conceptual in nature, which is McDowell 
(1994; 2008) and Brewer’s (1999) position. For simplicity, in what follows I will  therefore 
speak only of conceptual content, though this should not be taken to rule out the possibility 
of a parallel non-conceptual version of CA.
recognisability of particular aspects of experience. They may, however, generate 
particular contents that include, for example, demonstrative references to 
external objects and property-instances. Such references are not directly 
discriminable from experience, but arguably do contribute to the phenomenal 
character of experience in the sense that experience is presented as being an 
experience of particulars, and not merely general types. CA theorists, such as 
Schellenberg (2011b), would therefore do well to insist that the particularity of 
experience is manifest in perceptual phenomenology, which is not distinct from 
its particular content.
 By combining CA with DCS (6.3.1) in this way, it is possible to explain how a 
subject is able to grasp both the general content of their experience, based upon 
the discriminatory capacities it employs, and its particular content, based on the 
subject’s ability to identify and track objects in their perceptual environment. As 
with DCS, the indexical character of particular content, e.g. ‘that cardinal (there) 
is thusly red’, allows the subject’s grasp of demonstrative reference to ‘transmit’ 
to the relevant the self-knowledge claims; e.g. ‘I see a red cardinal’. Thus, by 
employing a combination of discriminatory capacities and demonstrative 
content, a potential response to Travis’s indeterminacy objection may be 
constructed.
 According to CA, then, the operation of perceptual discriminatory capacities 
results in the tokening of concepts or corresponding non-conceptual structures 
in the content of experience. This in turn raises further questions about the 
nature of these capacities and contents. Why, for instance, should the operation 
of discriminatory capacities yield representational content at all? And why 
should we think of such capacities as being active in experience as opposed to 
an anti-representational account of experience in which experiences give rise to 
thoughts in which such capacities are active? In effect, CA assimilates perceptual 
experience to a form of thought in which the exercise of discriminatory 
capacities yields structured representational contents. However, whether 
experience is assimilable in this way is part of what is in dispute. Whatever 
account of discriminatory capacities is given by the representationalist at the 
level of experience can be paralleled by the anti-representationalist in their 
account of how experience gives rise to thought. Just as hallucinations and 
illusions, in which representationalists posit the existence of false or non-
veridical contents, can be explained by anti-representationalists in terms of the 
misinterpretation or misjudgement of perceptual stimuli (2.3.1, 3.2.1), the role 
of discriminatory capacities can equally be applied at the level of thought or 
judgement. So even if CA constitutes a satisfactory response to Travis (2004), it 
remains to be seen why this should be considered a better account of experience 
than the corresponding anti-representationalist position.
 In practice, one of the primary motivations for representationalism, and 
specifically conceptualism, about experience comes from epistemological 
concerns, such as the need to provide reasons for beliefs and judgements, or as 
an explanation of hallucination and illusion. Given the Davidsonian dictum that 
only beliefs, which are paradigmatically both representational and conceptual, 
can constitute such reasons, this drives some theorists such as McDowell and 
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early Brewer to posit the existence of belief-like, i.e. conceptual, p-
representational contents. However, whether this motivation is sufficient to 
establish the question of whether experience is representational or not is itself 
highly contentious. Such considerations shift the debate away from the type of 
representations involved in experience, or indeed whether it has any, to what the 
explanatory role of such representations should be. Providing reasons or 
justification for judgements, beliefs, and ultimately knowledge is just one such 
role. Explaining the phenomenal character of experience, or what perceptions 
and illusions have in common, is another. Accounting for the behaviour and 
perceptual constancies in biological organisms is yet another. To conflate these 
explanatory roles, or to assume that they are all played by a single notion or 
type of representational content, runs together several different issues in a way 
that is antithetical to philosophical clarity. It is therefore vital that 
representationalists specify precisely what role, or roles, the contents they posit 
are supposed to play, and why this constitutes a better explanation of the 
relevant phenomena than the alternative anti-representationalist account.
 For the reasons given above, it is insufficient for representationalists to 
merely prove the existence of the relevant discriminatory capacities, since this 
eventuality is compatible with both REP and REL. Rather, it is the role played by 
the resulting representational content that must be justified. This leaves room 
for accounts of perceptual experience in which discriminatory capacities are 
active and may even be described in representational terms, but where the 
resulting account of experience is primarily relational, or is neutral between 
these two views. Again, the decisive factor in the debate will not be the fact that 
a representational description of experience is possible, but rather the 
explanatory role of that description in the explanation of thought and behaviour 
more generally. Even supposing that the existence of the kind of discriminatory 
capacities posited by CA were granted, this leaves a considerable amount of 
justificatory work to be done in order to show that experience is fundamentally 
representational. Moreover, if the operation of the relevant capacities 
themselves turns out to be relationally individuated, or partly constituted by the 
subject’s relation to the objects of perception, then the resulting view would 
itself qualify as a form of relationalism since the operation of such capacities 
would, on this view, form an essential part of perceptual experience.
6.4.4. Intuitional content
It is an interesting (though perhaps unsurprising in light of the above) historical 
fact that two of the leading proponents of CA — namely McDowell and Brewer 
— have since abandoned the view in favour of some form of relationalism. 
Brewer (2011) now endorses a version of Campbell’s (2002) ‘Relational View’ 
and McDowell now rejects the idea that representational content is 
propositional, though he still takes it to be conceptual — a notion he calls 
‘intuitional content’ (McDowell 2008: 6).15 The precise reasons for this change 
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15  Burge (2010: 381) also holds a non-propositional view, but advocates a form of non-
conceptual content.
are unclear, but in the case of McDowell it seems likely that it concerns the 
difficulty of determining precisely which discriminatory capacities are active in 
any given experience, along with the number of such capacities that would be 
required to justify the range of true judgements that can result from experience 
(McDowell 2008: 3–4). This change in the role of the discriminatory capacities 
means that, for example, the concept cardinal need not feature in the content of 
a subject’s experience in order for it to justify the judgement that there is a 
cardinal. Rather, the recognitional capacities for red, bird plus certain shape and 
colour concepts may be operative, with the act of judgement combining these 
conceptual elements in the appropriate way to derive the content of the resulting 
belief. On this revised view, the question of precisely which capacities are 
operative in any given experience will presumably be an empirical one. 
However, breaking the link between p-representational contents of experience 
and the contents of beliefs or judgements brings McDowell a step closer to a 
relational account of experience.
 If the distinction between the capacities that are operative in experience and 
those that are operative in judgement is to be a clear and principled one, then 
further justification for this distinction must be given. Moreover, since 
McDowell also admits the existence of discriminatory capacities at the level of 
judgement, then why should all such capacities not work in this way, rather 
than some being operative at the level of experience and others only in 
judgement? If this were the case, however, then the resulting account would no 
longer be representational, since this would leaves no role for representational 
contents to play given that phenomenal character can already be explained in 
terms of the employment of the relevant capacities.
 Furthermore, it is unclear that McDowell’s ‘intuitional content’ even 
constitutes a form of content in the philosophical sense since, being non-
propositional, it has no determinate accuracy conditions. Rather, McDowell’s 
claim appears to be that it is a feature of experiences that they are fully 
conceptualisable, or conceptually structured, rather than that they possess 
representational contents per se. However, this is no grounds for disagreement 
with the relationalist, who also holds that experiences are conceptualisable in 
the formation of beliefs and judgement. It is therefore unclear that McDowell 
(2008) should be taken to be offering a defence of representationalism as 
opposed to simply introducing an alternative non-representational notion of 
‘content’. Indeed, in the terms I have been using here, once one drops the claim 
that p-representations are propositional, the resulting view more closely 
resembles a form of relationalism than it does representationalism.
6.5. Conclusion
Of the views considered above, two possible strategies emerged as potential 
responses to Travis. Each approach seeks to disambiguate the ‘face-value’ 
content of an experience from its subjectively indistinguishable alternatives in 
order to avoid Travis’s indeterminacy objection. The teleosemantic approach 
(TA) holds that the contents of experience are externally individuated by distal 
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causal relations, such as the evolutionary history or biological function of the 
relevant organism’s genus. Since, by their nature, such factors are not directly 
accessible to the perceiving subject, the ability to recognise the content of 
experience must be explained by some further means, such as the external 
individuation of knowledge (ESK) or the application of background knowledge 
(BKS). That Travis’s arguments push the representationalist towards the external 
individuation of content is interesting in itself, and has potential ramifications 
for their account of phenomenal character; i.e. phenomenal externalism. The 
demonstrative content strategy  (DCS), on the other hand, as proposed by 
McDowell (1994) and Brewer (1999), may be coupled with the view that the 
content of perceptual experience is recognisable to the subject in virtue of the 
operation of the same discriminatory capacities that are deployed in structuring 
that content (CA). This raises important empirical and conceptual questions 
concerning the nature and individuation of the discriminatory capacities it 
proposes, which need not favour representationalism over anti-
representationalism.
 In order to motivate their view, representationalists must not only show that 
it is coherent and answers Travis’s challenge, but that it is superior to the 
equivalent anti-representationalist view in a way that does not itself reduce to a 
form of, for example, relationalism. Failure to do so gives representationalism 
no explanatory advantage over the comparable relationalist view — a position 
which in some cases it collapses into. McDowell’s (2008) notion of ‘intuitional 
content’ appears to do precisely that, since the non-propositional ‘contents’ that 
it posits are not assessable for truth or accuracy, and an equivalent explanation 
can also be given at the level of judgement or belief. For these reasons, the 
existence of representational content should not be seen as an end in its own 
right, or as a silver bullet for solving problems in the philosophy of perception, 
but rather as fulfilling some specific explanatory role, the nature of which needs 
to be made clear from the outset. The existence of multiple such roles, including 
epistemic justification and explaining phenomenal character, may require 
multiple contents, the interrelations and connections between which need to be 
made explicit, or else a detailed account of how such contents are individuated, 
integrated and, where necessary, recognisable to the subject, given.
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7. Conclusion
Beyond representationalism
7.1. Summary
In this thesis I have argued that the case against representationalism — the view 
that perceptual experience is fundamentally and irreducibly representational — 
set out in chapter 2 constitutes a powerful and much neglected argument against 
the currently prevailing philosophical orthodoxy. Moreover, Travis’s arguments 
establish substantive constraints upon the nature and role of perceptual content. 
I also argued that the debate surrounding the content of experience centres not 
so much upon the existence of representational content, but rather its 
explanatory role, particularly in relation to phenomenal character and its 
relation to other mental states — beliefs, thoughts, knowledge, intentions, and so 
on.
 In subsequent chapters I examined the implications of the above arguments 
for various accounts of representational content including, though not restricted 
to, looks- and appearance-based accounts (chapters 3 and 4), Burge’s ‘objective 
representation’ (chapter 5), demonstrative, teleosemantic, counterfactual and 
non-propositional accounts (chapter 6). In particular, the idea that perceptual 
representation is ‘looks-indexed’ was rejected (pace Glüer 2009) on the basis 
that such looks are either equivocal (in the case of comparative or visible looks) 
or non-perceptual (epistemic or thinkable looks). Whilst the existence of a 
phenomenal or ‘non-comparative’ notion of looks was not ruled out, this 
proved to be unhelpful in establishing the existence of objective representational 
content (4.2). Moreover, the availability of alternative comparative analyses of 
phenomenal looks in the form of Martin’s (2010) ‘parsimonious’ account and 
Brewer’s (2011) similarity-based account (4.3), neutralises this form of 
argument for representationalism by reducing most such phenomenal uses to 
their comparative equivalents, which are equivocal and so unsuitable for 
indexing face-value content of the kind that many representationalists endorse.
 In chapter 5, I argued that the central issue at stake in the debate between 
Travis and the representationalist is not the existence of representational 
content, per se, but its role in explaining perceptual phenomenology. Thus, 
views like Burge (2010), which claim that perceptual states have 
representational contents with some other explanatory purpose — in scientific 
explanation, for example — but deny that this explains the phenomenal 
character of experience, i.e. intentionalism, are not in conflict with Travis 
(2004). Rather, ‘The Silence of the Senses’ should be read as denying that 
representation can fulfil a particular explanatory role in the mental life of 
conscious subjects, not that representation has no role to play in the analysis of 
perceptual states or abilities whatsoever.1 This criticism extends to the supposed 
justificatory or reason-giving role of perceptual content, along with its relation 
to belief, which can equally be explained in terms of conceptual or 
discriminatory capacities operating at the level of judgement as at the level of 
perception (chapter 6). Furthermore, I argued that the so-called 
‘phenomenological objection’, or argument from unmediated awareness, that is 
sometimes levelled at representational views is unmotivated and potentially 
question-begging, despite raising substantive unanswered questions concerning 
the role of phenomenal character in perceptual awareness (7.3.3).
 In chapter 6, I considered how externally individuated representational 
views, such as Millikan and Burge’s teleosemantics, might be extended to 
account for the recognisability of phenomenal character through externalism 
about self-knowledge (6.3.2). This view generalises to yield a form of 
externalism about phenomenal character that many philosophers find 
implausible, but which is able to escape the most serious of Travis’s arguments, 
albeit with restrictions on the type of contents it can deliver.
 Finally, I examined a number of alternative responses to Travis (2004), 
including demonstrative, background knowledge- and capacity-based 
approaches. Each of these involved the operation of perceptual discriminatory 
capacities — whether these be conceptual, recognitional or otherwise — that 
structure experience and its content. This raised a range of important and non-
trivial questions about the precise nature of such capacities, their relation to 
thought, concepts, content and phenomenal character. Whilst constituting the 
outline of a possible response to Travis (2004) (7.2.4), such approaches fall 
short of a providing conclusive argument for representationalism.2  Such an 
argument would need to show why such representational content constitutes a 
better explanation of perceptual phenomena than a comparable non-
representational view, such as Naïve Realism. As in the case of looks, any 
argument based on the existence of discriminatory capacities that is available to 
the representationalist at the level of experience is also potentially available to 
the relationalist at the level of judgement, thereby neutralising its dialectical 
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1  This conflicts with an obvious reading of some of Travis’s stronger claims, most notably 
that ‘perception is not representational’ (ibid. 57). Further arguments for this claim may be 
found in some of Travis’s other work; e.g. Travis (2007) and Travis (unpublished).
2 See 7.1 below.
force. Thus, even if a satisfactory response to Travis on this basis can be given 
— something that it is far from clear (see 7.3.1) — this may not be decisive in the 
wider debate concerning the fundamental nature of perceptual experience.
7.2. Implications for Representationalism
The case against representationalism presented above has a number of 
important consequences for representationalist accounts of experience. First, it 
rules out many otherwise apparently plausible accounts of representational 
content, including the appearance-based accounts that I discuss in chapter 3. 
Second, it refocuses the debate upon the existence of various constraints upon 
the notion of representation that they employ (7.2.2) as well as the explanatory 
roles that such representation is supposed to play (7.2.3). This in turn helps to 
move the debate away from present, and in some cases artificial, divisions and 
towards the more central issue of the distinction between perception and 
thought (7.2.1) and the role of perceptual phenomenology (7.3.3).
 Most importantly, however, Travis’s anti-representationalism sets up the 
following challenge for representationalists about experience. Either:
(i) they drop the requirement that p-representational content is apparent to 
the subject in virtue of experience, including its phenomenal character, 
i.e. Recognisability,
(ii) they reject the claim that each experience has a single privileged ‘face 
value’ content, i.e. Face-value, or
(iii) they provide an alternative account of how the subject, in virtue of 
perceptual experience, plus relevant perceptual capacities or background 
knowledge, is able to grasp the representational content of their 
experience.
 As I argued above, none of these options is without its costs. The first either 
leads to the rejection of intentionalism, or an acceptance that perceptual 
representation is, as Travis claims, ‘silent’ in that it does not make 
representational contents available to the subject, thus severely constraining its 
explanatory role. Representational accounts of this sort are not forms of 
representationalism per se, since they do not explain the nature of perceptual 
experience as such (cf. 1.2.4). The second option rejects what many 
representationalists take to be a basic datum about the phenomenology of 
experience: namely, that things can be ‘just as they seem’ in the sense of having 
accurate or veridical representational content. Rejecting this principle grants a 
key premise of Travis’s argument — that looks are equivocal — which again 
constrains the role of representational content in explaining perceptual 
experience and the formation of judgements and belief. The third option 
therefore seems like the most promising for any representationalist who wishes 
to uphold some form of Recognisability. An account that aims to meet this 
criteria, however, will need to do so in a way that does not itself reduce to a 
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form of relationalism in order to qualify as a fundamentally representational 
view. Alternatively, it may give rise to a ‘hybrid’ or compatibilist position in 
which both representational and relational aspects of experience are taken to be 
equally fundamental (7.3.2). I sketch a possible strategy for responding to this 
challenge below (7.2.4).
7.2.1. Perception and thought
The debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism — or 
between representationalism and relationalism, as it is sometimes, in my view 
misleadingly, portrayed — is most fundamentally a question concerning the 
division of labour between perception and thought. Assimilating the former to 
the latter yields a representational picture of experience that is more obviously 
conducive to explaining the reason-giving role of perception and the formation 
of judgements and beliefs, which are representational. It does this, however, at 
the cost of making perception into a kind of testimony of the senses, to be 
accepted or rejected at face-value — a notion which Travis shows to be highly 
problematic. Whether perceptual experience is, in the relevant sense, analogous 
to testimony, or whether there are other ways in which it might satisfy this 
function, are therefore central questions in the debate concerning the existence 
(or otherwise) of representational content.
 Moreover, Travis puts pressure on the assumption that the kind of content 
that is needed to explain the phenomenal character of experience and the 
representational contents that justify perceptual judgement or belief are one and 
the same thing. This calls into question the role of phenomenal character in the 
awareness and knowledge of the external world, and whether 
representationalism can account for it.
 Many representationalists whose accounts involves demonstrative or 
otherwise externally individuated elements take themselves to have already 
addressed these apparent shortcomings of the representational view. By 
incorporating externally individuated elements into the contents of experience, 
they aim to do justice both to the particularity, or fine-grained nature, of 
experience and its role in enabling knowledge of the physical world. However, 
as the arguments from looks and recognisability show, these issues are not 
limited to the individuation of content, but also its availability to the subject — 
an epistemic constraint.
 This issue of ‘recognisability’, as I have called it, highlights the point at 
which perceptual content becomes available to consciousness. This occurs most 
obviously, though not necessarily exclusively, through the phenomenal character 
of experience, or what experience ‘is like’. Only by being available to the subject 
in some way can representational content play a substantive cognitive role in the 
formation of thoughts and beliefs. Conversely, without explaining how such 
availability to consciousness is possible, representationalism fails to meet its goal 
of explaining the connection between thought and experience. Of course, the 
representationalist can simply deny that experiential contents need be available 
to consciousness, claiming instead that we simply find ourselves disposed to 
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think, believe or do certain things as a result of our experiences. This approach, 
however, fails to do justice to perceptual phenomenology which, at least in a 
wide variety of cases, is available to conscious introspection, not to mention the 
representationalist’s own notion that we can accept or reject perceptual 
experience ‘at face value’ (2.2.2). To reject this principle therefore places severe 
constraints upon the role that such content can play in our conscious mental 
life.
 Apart from drawing attention to the many and varied roles that 
representational content may be thought to play (7.2.3), this highlights the need 
for representationalists to explain precisely how experience makes it possible to 
grasp or ‘recognise’ the content of experience. Indeed, it is upon precisely this 
point that Travis’s arguments press. Any account that is unable to do this fails 
to say anything about what it is to perceptually experience the world, regardless 
of whether it posits the existence of representational content for other 
explanatory purposes (cf. Burge 2010). Furthermore, the mere fact that beliefs, 
judgements and knowledge possess such contents cannot be taken as a point in 
favour of representationalism since the anti-representationalist can apply similar 
explanations at the level of judgement as does the representationalist at the level 
of experience. That is, whatever the representationalist takes to make 
experiential contents available could instead be given as an explanation of what 
gives perceptual judgements, beliefs and subsequent actions their contents. To 
constitute an argument in favour of representationalism, then, as opposed to an 
anti-representationalist view, such an explanation would need to be one that is 
not available to the anti-representationalist ‘downstream’ of experience at the 
level of perceptual interpretation or belief, or that otherwise rules out a non-
representational explanation of the relevant phenomenon.
7.2.2. Constraints upon representationalism
By challenging both the coherence of and need for objective representational 
content, the arguments set out in chapter 2 present a series of constraints upon 
representationalist theories of experience. Whilst this, in my view, falls short of 
ruling out all representational accounts of perceptual experience, it also helps to 
shift the debate onto potentially more fertile ground. As suggested above, the 
alleged dichotomy between exclusively ‘representational’ views on the one hand 
and exclusively ‘relational’ views on the other is a false one. Many so-called 
representational views — for example, those that include demonstrative or 
indexical elements — also contain a strongly relational aspect, whilst some 
relational views may also be described in representational terms. Focusing solely 
upon this axis of the debate only serves to obscure many other important 
distinctions — and indeed similarities — between the candidate views. These 
include the difference between individuative and constitutive externalism (i.e. 
Fregean and Russellian content) and whether phenomenal character should be 
explained in terms of purely internal or partly external factors, along with its 
role in accounting for perceptual awareness (7.3.3).
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 What constraints, then, do these arguments place upon representationalism? 
To some extent these are set out in Travis’s Objectivity, Face-value, Givenness 
and, crucially, Recognisability conditions (2.2), which provide a useful way of 
categorising various forms of representationalism according to which of these 
conditions that they endorse. But since not all representationalist accounts 
endorse each of the conditions, what else does this tell us about 
representationalism?
 Travis’s arguments highlight the need to separate two important issues 
about representational content. First, how is such content to be individuated — 
phenomenologically, internally, externally, and so on. Second, whether and in 
virtue of what it is it recognisable, or cognitively available, to the subject. 
Accounts that aim to satisfy the latter criteria also need to explain why the 
content that is recognisable from experience matches the content that is 
individuated. Most plausibly this will be because both are determined in 
precisely the same manner — the so-called transmission model described above 
(6.2.1). Alternatively, the account may be an ‘error theory’ in which the 
contents that are recognisable in experience are never, or only very rarely, 
instantiated. Such an account, however, raises questions concerning the 
desirability or advantages of such a theory over the available alternatives.
 Finally, the relation between representational content, phenomenal character 
and the role that each plays in conscious perceptual awareness must be 
explained. If representational content is to explain phenomenal character, i.e. if 
intentionalism is true, then at least some elements of that content may be 
recognisable to the subject in virtue of this phenomenal character. Other content 
elements may, however, be recognisable to the subject via other means. 
Furthermore, if the same representational contents are to play a role in 
explaining perceptual awareness and so ground the subject’s epistemic access to 
perceived objects and properties, then this will also depend upon certain content 
elements. Now, only where these two sets of content elements — i.e. those that 
are recognisable to the subject in virtue of perceptual phenomenology and those 
that explain perceptual awareness — are identical will the subject’s justification, 
or reasons, for perceptual beliefs and judgements be cognitively available to 
them. As the arguments in chapter 5 showed, the mere overlap or association 
between these two sets of elements will be insufficient for such cognitive 
availability. This impacts upon both the explanatory role of phenomenal 
character in perceptual awareness as well as the kinds of explanation of 
perceptual knowledge that can be given. Thus the issue of recognisability 
highlights an important epistemological constraint upon the representational 
content of experience.
7.2.3. Explanatory roles of representation
In ‘The Silence of the Senses’, Travis states that ‘[i]n no case I am aware of is 
this view [representationalism] argued for’ (2004: 57). Whilst being something 
of an overstatement, and certainly no longer the case, as demonstrated in 
chapter 3, beyond a vague appeal to some form of argument from illusion, 
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representationalists are often less than clear about the motivations for and 
benefits of their view. Indeed, the notion of ‘representation’ has been seen as 
something of a silver bullet in solving a wide variety of problems within the 
philosophy of perception and action. Whether all of these can be solved by a 
single form of content is, however, doubtful. Travis’s argumentative strategy 
pits just two of these roles, or perhaps more, depending how finely they are 
individuated, against one another to show that they cannot be made to coexist 
without considerable difficulty. This highlights a general need for philosophers 
of perception to be clear and explicit about precisely which explanatory role, or 
roles, any given type of content is supposed to fulfil, as well as how it achieves 
that goal and its relation to other content types.
 By focusing exclusively upon the nature and existence of representational 
content, it is easy to lose sight of the various overlapping roles it is often 
supposed to play, many of which are frequently conflated or simply assumed 
without substantive argument. Just a few of these — some of which have already 
been mentioned above — are listed below, though the list is far from exhaustive:
(i) Presenting objects and properties in the world in such a way as to make 
them available to the subject in conscious thought and action
(ii) Epistemic justification or giving reasons for beliefs and judgements
(iii) Explaining the contents of beliefs, judgements and knowledge
(iv) As the supervenience base for, or as constitutive of, phenomenal 
character, or what perception ‘is like’
(v) The nature of perceptual appearances, or how the world appears to the 
perceptual subject to be
(vi) Consciousness or awareness of objects and properties in the external 
world
(vii) Explaining the existence or nature of perceptual hallucinations and 
illusions
(viii) As a common factor between subjectively indistinguishable, but 
epistemically distinct (i.e. veridical and non-veridical), experiences
(ix) As part of the scientific explanation of an organism’s psychological 
functioning and behaviour
(x) As a way of individuating perceptual states
(xi) Explaining the finely-grained nature of perceptual experience
That a single phenomenon — i.e. perceptual representation — might even be 
considered to play each of the above roles may itself seem to be a point in its 
favour. However, it is far from clear that any one form or notion of content is 
capable of encompassing all of the above. If it did, the nature of, and responses 
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to, Travis’s arguments from indeterminacy and awareness would surely be much 
clearer.
 Whilst it is tempting to posit different forms of representational content, or 
different content elements, that fulfil various of the above roles, the resulting 
contents will still face the above objections either individually (in the case of 
multiple contents) or en masse (in the case of disjunctive or ‘multi-level’ 
contents). Moreover, in order to constitute an argument for representationalism, 
each content would need to explain some aspect of perceptual experience that 
could not equally well be explained by a comparable anti-representationalist 
view. Simply assuming or insisting upon the existence of such contents from the 
outset, particularly where this encompasses multiple explanatory roles, does not 
constitute a justification for representationalism. If the content of experience is 
to play a distinctive role in the philosophy of perception, then it needs to be 
clear precisely what this role is and how it performs it, otherwise the supposed 
explanation merely obfuscates the problem it is intended to solve. To this 
extent, I concur with Burge that ‘the dispute would be better focused on 
questionable psychological, representational, and epistemic roles that 
[perceptual] representations have been given’ (Burge 2010: 379, fn. 15).
7.2.4. Responding to Travis
Having set out various roles of and constraints upon the content of experience, 
how should representationalists respond to the challenges posed by Travis 
(2004)? Clearly, if a representationalist account of experience is to be given, 
then it must account for perceptual phenomenology. Furthermore, the resulting 
content should play a constitutive, and not merely incidental, role in our 
conscious awareness and epistemic access to the external world. Finally, the 
representational content of experience must be available to the subject in 
conscious thought and introspection, and not merely derivatively through the 
contents of, for example, belief and action.
 In chapter 6, I argued that the most plausible way of doing this would be via 
a ‘transmission’ model of experience in which both the individuation and 
recognisability of perceptual content are explained in terms of the same 
mechanism or factor. Furthermore, I suggested that the most likely candidate for 
such a mechanism would be some form of discriminatory capacities that are 
responsible for structuring perceptual experience, and so its content, but that 
also involve a demonstrative or indexical component that enables the subject to 
grasp, as reflected in their perceptual phenomenology, particular and not only 
general contents. Whether such capacities are conceptual or a precursor to 
conceptualisation remains an open question. In either case, however, such 
capacities will be grounded either in the subject’s implicit knowledge of 
appearances, as gained through their past experience, or innate capabilities for 
representing aspects of the world via the relevant sense modalities.
 Whether perceptual experience is fundamentally representational, in the 
sense required for representationalism, however, is uncertain. It is entirely 
plausible that the discriminatory capacities that structure perceptual content, if 
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indeed there are such capacities, would themselves be fundamentally relational 
in character. That is, the operation of such capacities cannot be described in 
isolation from the objects and properties to which they are perceptually 
sensitive. Moreover, depending on the details of this account, it may make sense 
to consider those objects and properties not only as individuating the contents 
of experience, but as its constituents or relata. This would make the ‘contents’ 
of experience essentially relational as well as representational, and so a form of 
compatibilism about experience. Provided that the phenomenal character of 
experience can be described in terms of the operation of discriminatory 
capacities that are fundamentally dependent upon the relevant objects or 
properties that they track in the world, this need not divorce it from perceptual 
awareness. However, any account of such awareness must in turn explain how 
it is possible that a capacity that can ‘misfire‘ — in the case of perceptual 
illusions, for example — can constitute awareness of an environmental 
particular, rather than of some aspect of experience that can also occur in the 
absence of its intended target. Alternatively, such capacities may operate at the 
level of belief or judgement, rather than experience, in which case they could 
also be used to support a non-representational account of experience.
 Such a solution would represent only a partial victory for 
representationalism, since the resulting view incorporates both representational 
and relational elements. It is, therefore, an endorsement of CON and not only 
REP or REL (1.2.4). Moreover, whether this constitutes a form of 
representationalism at all will depend upon the explanatory work done by the 
content that resulted from the operation of the relevant discriminatory 
capacities, the precise mechanism for which remains unclear. Indeed, there are 
reasons to be sceptical about the very distinction that philosophers draw 
between perceptual experience and belief that motivates the need for such 
content in the first place (7.3.4). An account of the above form, however, would 
appear to be the representationalist’s best hope of giving an adequate response 
to Travis. That such a response has yet to be given in any detail is a reflection of 
the fact that, at the time of writing, there is no convincing argument in favour of 
representationalism in its present forms.
7.3. Directions for Future Research
The above conclusions suggest the following areas for future research which 
follow on directly from the issues raised in this thesis.
7.3.1. Perceptual discriminatory capacities
In chapter 6, I identified the role of what I called perceptual discriminatory 
capacities as being central to a satisfactory account of perceptual experience 
and/or belief. This is true not only for representationalism, but for relational 
views as well, which require an explanation of the conceptualisation of 
experience in belief, judgement and intentional action. Developing a more 
detailed account of the nature and role of such capacities in experience is 
therefore a priority for future research in this area that will in turn help inform 
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the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience. Such research will 
involve answering the following questions concerning the individuation and 
scope of such capacities, requiring a combination of philosophical and empirical 
work to ascertain the precise role and mechanisms for such capacities along 
with their relation to both representational content and perceptual 
phenomenology:
(i) How and why does the operation of discriminatory capacities instantiate 
tokens of the relevant types in the content of experience?
(ii) How are the relevant perceptual capacities to be individuated, and how 
do they differ from the corresponding capacities involved in perceptual 
judgement or belief?
(iii) Precisely which discriminatory capacities are involved in any given 
experience, and how is this to be determined?
(iv) How and when do we acquire or develop the relevant capacities, and are 
these learned or innate?
(v) How does the operation of discriminatory capacities relate to the 
conceptualisation, recognition and perceptual awareness of objects and 
their properties?
(vi) If the capacities that individuate experiential content differ from what 
makes it recognisable, why should the latter contents coincide with the 
former?
7.3.2. The possibility of hybrid views
It is surely no coincidence that a number of the positions described above (7.2.4) 
are those more typically assumed by relationalists than by representationalists. 
There is, however, no reason why these two views should be seen as opposing or 
competing hypotheses, rather than two sides of the perceptual coin. Just as it is 
possible to posit different representational contents to fulfil different 
explanatory roles, it may be similarly advantageous to adopt, for example, a 
representational account of non-conscious visual content and a relational 
account of visual phenomenal character, or some other combination thereof. 
Moreover, certain aspects of these positions are compatible such that it is 
possible to combine relational elements within representational content, or to 
even to describe fundamentally relational states as having propositionally 
structured contents. Such ‘hybrid’ or compatibilist positions are not without 
precedent, with Siegel (2010), Schellenberg (2011b) and McDowell (2008) all 
advocating some form of hybrid view (cf. 6.4.4).
 The possibility and potential advantages of such hybrid views is a 
worthwhile and interesting development in recent philosophy of perception. By 
letting go of the false dichotomy between representationalism and relationalism, 
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it may be possible to move beyond the present debate and see representational 
and relational elements not as two competing accounts of experience, but as 
complementary ways of describing a single underlying perceptual reality. 
Thought of in relational terms, representational content need not be seen as a 
surrogate for, or epistemological barrier between, perceptual subjects and 
objects, but as a descriptive tool for individuating and characterising the role of 
certain perceptual states. Further work is needed, however, both on what forms 
such hybrid accounts might take as well as the relation, or interrelation, 
between the representational and relational elements of perception.
7.3.3. The role of phenomenal character
Much of the literature in the representationalist tradition is devoted to 
explaining how representational content can account for the phenomenal 
character of experience. However, comparatively little attention has been given 
to the explanatory role of phenomenal character itself. If, as Campbell (2002) 
and Johnston (2006) suggest, phenomenal character is not a mere by-product of 
perceptual experience, but the means by which we are aware of the objective 
world, this places further constraints upon the kinds of representational content 
that can fulfil this role. In particular, representationalist accounts upon which 
phenomenal character is epiphenomenal, as opposed to being constitutive of 
perceptual awareness, may be ruled out. Furthermore, an explanation of how 
the content that gives rise to phenomenal character contributes to perceptual 
awareness will need to be given. The precise role of phenomenal character in an 
overall account of perceptual experience is therefore a central question in the 
philosophy of perception that, in my view, deserves much greater attention.
7.3.4. Experience and belief
Finally, as described above (7.2.1), the existence of representational content in 
experience is often motivated by the division between perceptual experience on 
the one hand, and perceptual belief, judgement and knowledge on the other. 
This in turn assumes a division between experiential and belief states that, 
whilst well established in the philosophical literature, is neither well defined nor 
grounded in empirical research. In particular, the question of what makes a state 
distinctively experiential, as opposed to doxastic or discursive, is not well 
defined. Moreover, the individuation of particular experiences over time and 
across multiple perceptual modalities is highly problematic. Whilst the multi-
modal nature of perception has received considerable attention in recent times, 
the distinction between experience and belief that is so central to the present 
debate has not. After all, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the 
contents or metaphysical nature of experience when it is unclear how individual 
experiences are to be defined or individuated. Most importantly, this issue holds 
the potential to dissolve many of the puzzles surrounding the existence and 
nature of perceptual content.
 Some authors — notably Hinton (1973) and Byrne (2009: 431–32) — have 
expressed scepticism that there is any such thing as perceptual experience in the 
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philosophical sense of this term. Moreover, the notion of an ‘experience–belief 
synapse’ (Byrne unpublished) at which experiential episodes become belief states 
forms part of the motivation for the notion of perceptual content, which is 
intuitively characterised as what experience and belief have in common, or from 
which the content of belief may be derived. This in turn presupposes a model of 
perception as a sequential ‘pipeline’ or ‘train of operations’ (Reid 1974: VI.xxi, 
174) in which raw sensory input is processed by our perceptual faculties to yield 
one form of content which is then conceptualised and transformed into belief 
through the act of judgement. If, however, the relevant processes were not 
sequential but, for example, mutually constraining such that perceptual 
experience is the result of both top-down and bottom-up processes that 
constrain or mutually reinforce one another to form a coherent and stable 
percept, then the standard division between experience and belief may itself be 
ill founded. On this view, instead of a causal relation between experience and 
belief, experiences may themselves be constitutive of perceptual beliefs, with 
experiential states playing a belief-like role in the psychology of the subject.
 The existence of a constitutive relationship between perceptual experience 
and perceptual belief would explain why many theorists — including Byrne 
(2009: 450), Smith (2002), Armstrong (1968), Heil (1982) and Reid (1974), to 
name but a few — have taken experience itself to be a doxastic state. However, 
it would also negate the need to posit representational contents of experience 
that can form the basis for the contents of belief in the first place, since 
experience and perceptual belief would each be complementary aspects of the 
same underlying mental state. Such an approach has the potential to unify 
representationalism and relationalism in a single account of perceptual 
experience centred around the kind of discriminatory capacities described above 
(7.2.4). As with many other areas in the contemporary philosophy of mind, 
however, a satisfactory resolution to this issue is only likely to be achieved 
through a combination of philosophical and empirical investigation.
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